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Résumé 
Cette étude de cas, composée de trois articles, examine les diverses sources 
d’explication de l’écart salarial selon le genre chez les professeurs d’une grande université 
de recherche canadienne.  
Le premier article analyse les écarts selon le genre sur les primes “de marché” à 
partir de données d’un sondage réalisé auprès des professeurs en 2002. Une analyse des 
correspondances donne une solution à deux facteurs dans laquelle le second facteur oppose 
clairement les professeurs qui ont reçu une prime à ceux qui n’en n’ont pas reçue. Le genre 
est fortement associé à ce facteur, la catégorie “femme” se retrouvant du côté de l’axe 
associé à l’absence de primes de marché. Les résultats de la régression logistique 
confirment que le secteur d’activité, la fréquence des contrats de recherche, la valorisation 
du salaire ainsi que le rang combiné à l’ancienneté sont reliés à la présence de primes de 
marché, tel que proposé par les hypothèses. Toutefois, même après avoir contrôlé pour ces 
relations, les femmes sont toujours près de trois fois moins susceptibles de s’être vu 
attribuer des primes de marché que leurs homologues masculins. Dans l’ensemble, les 
résultats suggèrent que dans un contexte où les salaires sont déterminés par convention 
collective, la réindividualisation du processus de détermination des salaires — en 
particulier le versement de primes de marché aux professeurs d’université — peut favoriser 
la réapparition d’écarts de salaire selon le genre. 
Le second article est réalisé à partir de données administratives portant sur les 
années 1997 à 2006. Les contributions respectives de quatre composantes de la 
rémunération à l’écart salarial selon le genre y sont analysées, soit le salaire de base, l’accès 
au rang de professeur titulaire, l’accès aux primes de marché et chaires de recherche du 
Canada, de même que les montants reçus. Les composantes varient quant à leur degré de 
formalisation. Ceci permet de tester l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’ampleur de l’écart salarial 
selon le genre varie en fonction du degré de formalisation des composantes salariales.  
Nous déterminons également dans quelle mesure l’écart selon le genre sur les diverses 
composantes de la rémunération varie en fonction de la représentation relative des femmes 
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professeurs au sein des unités. Les résultats démontrent l’existence de variations dans 
l’ampleur des différences selon le genre en fonction du degré de formalisation des pratiques 
de rémunération. Qui plus est, après contrôles, la rémunération est plus faible dans les 
unités où les femmes sont fortement représentées.  
Le dernier article examine les mécanismes pouvant mener à un écart selon le genre 
en ce qui a trait à l’accès aux primes de marché chez les professeurs de l’institution. Les 
processus d’attribution de ces suppléments salariaux sont examinés à partir d’entretiens 
réalisés avec 17 administrateurs à tous les niveaux hiérarchiques de l’institution et dans une 
diversité d’unités académiques. Les résultats suggèrent que les différences selon le genre 
pourraient être liées à des caractéristiques spécifiques du processus d’attribution et à une 
distribution inégale des primes aux unités à forte représentation féminine. 
De façon générale, les résultats démontrent que l’écart de rémunération selon le genre chez 
les professeurs de cette université n’est pas totalement expliqué par des différences dans les 
caractéristiques individuelles des hommes et femmes. L’analyse révèle que l’écart réside 
dans des différences selon le genre en ce qui a trait à l’accès aux primes de marché et aux 
chaires de recherches du Canada et, dans une moindre mesure, au rang de professeur 
titulaire. Aucune différence n’est observée sur le salaire de base et le montant des primes 
salariales reçues, que celles-ci soient dites de “marché” ou associées à une chaire de 
recherche du Canada. Qui plus est, on constate que la rémunération est plus faible dans les 
unités où les femmes sont le mieux représentées. L’accès différencié selon le genre aux 
primes de marché qui est observé pourrait être lié à certains processus organisationnels qui 
limitent les probabilités d’octrois à des femmes. Les femmes pourraient être 
particulièrement désavantagées dans ce système d’octroi, pour plusieurs raisons. 
L’existence de différences selon le genre en ce qui a trait aux dispositions ou habiletés des 
individus à négocier leur salaire est évoquée et supposée par certains administrateurs. Un 
accès limité aux informations concernant la politique de primes pourrait réduire la 
probabilité que des femmes tentent d’obtenir ces suppléments salariaux. Les directeurs 
d’unités, qui sont en majorité des hommes, pourraient être biaisées en faveur des 
professeurs masculins dans leurs évaluations s’ils tendent à favoriser ceux qui leurs 
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ressemblent. Il est également possible que les directeurs d’unités où les femmes sont les 
mieux représentées n’aient pas reçu d’information sur les primes de marché ou que des 
traditions disciplinaires les aient rendu réticents à demander des primes.  
 
Mots-clés : Écart salarial selon le genre, professeurs d’université, organisation, 
formalisation des salaires, discrétion salariale, représentation féminine. 
  
vii
Abstract 
This case study examines the various sources of explanation of the gender pay gap 
among professors at a large Canadian research university. It comprises three articles.  
The first article analyzes gender differences in “market supplements” using data 
from a survey of professors conducted in 2000. The correspondence analysis produces a 
two-factor solution in which the second axis clearly opposes faculty who receive market 
supplement to those who do not. Gender is strongly related to this factor, with the female 
category on the side of the axis associated with the absence of market supplement. The 
results of the logistic regression confirm that field of specialization, frequency of external 
research contracts, faculty members’ values and attitudes towards remuneration and 
seniority within rank are all related to the award of market supplements, as hypothesized. 
However, women were still almost three times less likely than men to have been awarded 
market supplements after controlling for these relationships. Overall, the results suggest 
that within a collective bargaining context, reindividualization of the pay determination 
process — notably, the payment of market supplements to faculty — may reopen pay 
differences by gender. 
The second article uses administrative data for years 1997 to 2006. We estimate the 
respective contributions to the gender pay gap of four pay components: base pay, 
promotion to full professor, access to market supplements and Canada research chairs as 
well as the amounts received. These are characterized by various levels of formalization. 
This allows testing the hypothesis that the magnitude of gender differences in pay varies 
with the extent of formalization of pay components. We also determine how gender 
differences on each pay component vary according to the relative representation of female 
faculty members within units. We find some evidence that the magnitude of gender 
differences varies with the degree of formalization in remuneration practices. We also find 
that, other things being equal, pay is lower in units with a high proportion of females.  
The last article examines the mechanisms that may lead to gender differences in 
access to ‘market supplements’ among professors. The process of awarding pay in excess 
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for the amounts provided for in a collective agreement are examined based on interviews 
with 17 administrators at all hierarchical levels and in various academic units. Results 
suggest that gender differences in the likelihood of receiving an award may be related to 
specific features of the award process and to an unequal distribution of awards to units with 
strong female representation. 
Overall, the results show that the gender pay gap among professors at this university 
is not entirely accounted for by differences in the individual characteristics of male and 
female professors. The analysis reveals that the pay gap resides in gender differences in 
access to market supplements and Canada research chairs (CRCs) and, to a lesser extent, to 
the full professor rank. No difference is found on base pay or on the amounts of pay 
supplements received, whether they are “market” premiums or supplements associated to a 
CRC. Furthermore, pay tends to be lower in units where female representation is highest. 
The observed gender differences in access to market supplements could be due to 
organizational processes that reduce the likelihood of awards to women. There are several 
reasons why female faculty members are particularly disadvantaged in this award system. 
Gender differences in the propensity or ability to negotiate are alleged (and assumed) by 
some of those negotiating. More limited access to information about supplements reduces 
the likelihood that women will pursue them. Chairpersons, who are mostly males, may 
allow gender bias to influence their evaluations of faculty members, perhaps because they 
tend to favor others like themselves. It may also be that chairpersons from the units where 
women are better represented do not have access to information about market supplements 
or that disciplinary traditions make them reluctant to request them. 
 
Keywords : Gender pay gap, university professors, organization, pay formalization, pay 
discretion, female representation. 
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Women’s situation in the work place has deeply changed over the last decades. 
Their presence on the labour market has strongly increased and they have entered several 
professions previously dominated by men. Their career profiles have become more 
continuous than before, more similar to those of men. On the legislative front, anti-
discrimination and pay equity laws have been voted in order to foster gender equality on 
the labour market.  
Yet, although these laws guarantee formal equality in the professional sphere, 
substantive equality has not been achieved. The gender pay gap is undoubtedly the most 
frequently cited evidence of the persisting differences by gender on the labour market. The 
many explanations offered to account for the gap bespeak its multidimensional character; it 
is indeed related to factors pertaining to family situations, public policies and to work itself.  
With regards to family situations, the pay gap may partly reflect a sexual division of 
domestic labour that disadvantages women. They still take on a larger share of family 
responsibilities (Armstrong & Armstrong, 2001) and as a result, they may more often than 
men reduce their work hours or take part-time jobs, which also tend to be poorly paid 
(Statistics Canada, 2003; Drolet, 2002; Finnie & Wandell, 2004).  
The gender pay gap also reflects insufficiencies in public policies for work-family 
balance; in particular it is often difficult for families to find affordable, high quality 
daycare. This problem most acutely affects women because they still are more often than 
not the primary caregivers of their children (Armstrong & Armstrong, 2001; Rooney et al., 
2003).  
With regards to the work sphere, the pay gap partly reflects the precariousness of 
jobs and the poor wages in labour market sectors and industries where women are over-
represented, the lesser work experience cumulated by women (partly due to their more 
recent entry in the labour market) gender differences in fields of study and occupations, 
women’s under-representation in higher hierarchical levels and discrimination (Drolet, 
2002; Fortin & Huberman, 2002).  
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A major change occurred between the 1960’s and the 1990’s: whereas about two-
thirds of the gender pay gap used to be due to between occupation differences in pay and 
one-third to within occupation differences, the reverse is true today (Fortin & Huberman, 
2002). Detailed studies of occupations may thus constitute a sensible strategy to generate a 
better understanding of the processes that lead to the gender pay gap. 
Universities are suitable sites to study gender differences on the labor market to the 
extent that the intellectual foundations of socio-economic equality between women and 
men emerged from universities (Goyder, 1992). Furthermore, as Guppy (1989) points out, 
“...academics often cloak their role in the garb of enlightenment and progressive thinking 
and so, to the degree that this is more than intellectual posturing, sexist pay practices might 
be expected to disappear early in this milieu” (Guppy 1989). Finally, university faculty 
members are purportedly evaluated on the basis of their individual performances, which 
should in theory trump gender biases. As a result, higher education should logically 
represent a standard in terms of gender equality.  
The pay gap is indeed lower in academia than in the general population or other 
professions requiring university degrees. In the general population the gender pay gap 
observed among full-time employees was estimated at 29.4% in 2006, compared to 18.2% 
among university faculty members (Statistics Canada 2006). It is lower among primary and 
secondary teachers (9.8%) and among college teachers (12.8%), similar among natural and 
applied scientists (19.3%) and higher among general practitioners (27.7%), lawyers 
(34.1%) and senior executives (40.1%; Statistics Canada 2006). Given that gender 
differences seem less substantial in academia than in other professions, why research them 
at all? For one thing, it may deepen our understanding of how differences may occur in a 
context where, prima facie, one could expect equality to be achieved. Second, recent 
changes in Canadian academia, i.e. the introduction of the Canada Research Chair program 
in 2000 along with an increased use of market supplements, might aggravate differences 
between men and women in this profession. 
Two general models emerge from the literature on gender differences in the labour 
market (Sonnert & Holton, 1996; Marry, 2003). The difference model analyzes gender 
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differences on individual characteristics that are related to the outcome (whether it is 
employment, wages or promotions). This model rests on explanations such as self-
selection, self-exclusion, socialization process and stereotypes that influence choices of 
academic orientations to account for differential outcomes by gender (Marry, 2003). 
Explanations related to this model in analyses of the gender pay gap include for instance 
differences between men and women on human capital, research productivity or mobility. 
The deficit model refers to formal and informal processes that exclude women. As Sonnert 
(1999) explains, the difference model focuses on factors at the individual level. The deficit 
model refers to the way women are treated; it focuses on structural, organizational and 
social factors. Empirically, the boundary between the two models is not always clear-cut. 
Nonetheless, the factors associated with the deficit model approximately coincide with 
those that might be considered discrimination. 
Empirical research on gender differences in pay among university faculty members 
tends to analyze the impact of individual characteristics, variables which are more readily 
available (Nielsen et al., 2005). Yet salary and promotion decisions are taken at the 
organizational level and differences may be seen as reflections of organizational practices 
(Tolbert, 1986; Reskin, 2000a). “Inequality at work does not just happen; it occurs through 
the acts and the failures to act by people who run and work for organizations.” (Reskin, 
2000a, p. 717). The extent of gender differences thus varies with organizational contexts, 
but this aspect is rarely treated in research. The few studies reviewed in Kulis (1998) tend 
to show that institutional size and prestige are related to gender differences in rank and pay. 
Porter, Toutkoushian and Moore (2008) find that the gender pay gap varies by institution 
type and by field. In Canada, Warman, Woolley and Worsick (2010) find that gender 
differences in pay tend to be greater in universities where salaries are determined using 
discretionary judgments of merit rather than seniority. In addition, they observe an 
increasing differentiation by discipline and institution in the salaries of Canadian 
professors. 
This thesis contributes to our understanding of gender difference on the labour 
market by analyzing individual and organizational factors related to the gender pay gap as 
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well as the mechanisms that may produce it. Doing so, the research contributes to our 
knowledge on specific measures that may foster equality within given contexts. The 
method used is a case study of a large Canadian research university. The thesis is composed 
of three integrated articles. First, we review the literature on individual factors potentially 
related to the gender pay gap among university professors. Second, a discussion of 
discrimination and results of empirical analysis that attempt to measure its role in the 
gender pay gap among university professors are presented. Third, cultural and 
organizational factors potentially related to the gender pay gap among university professors 
are discussed. Fourth, we present the approach used for this research, followed by a brief 
description of policy features at the institution under study that are relevant for this 
research, namely the family leave and remuneration policies. This introductory chapter 
closes with a presentation of the broad theoretical framework upon which the thesis rests, 
followed by a brief outline of the three articles in order to make their integration explicit. 
The articles are then presented in separate chapters, followed by the conclusion chapter. 
The gender pay gap among university professors: the role of factors at the individual 
level  
The proportion of female professors in Canadian universities has constantly 
increased since the mid 70’s, from 13% among full-time faculty members in 1973 
(Ornstein, Stewart & Drakich, 1998) to 30% in 2002-2003 (Sussman & Yssaad, 2005). 
Women’s presence has also increased within all ranks: between 1990 and 2003, the 
proportion of female professors has grown from 44% to 55% among lecturers, 33% to 41% 
among assistant professors, 20% to 33% among associate professors and 8% to 17% among 
full professors (Sussman & Yssaad, 2005). Women therefore remain under represented 
within the highest rank. The gender pay gap in Canadian academia has declined from 21% 
to 14% between 1970 and 2000 (Warman, Woolley & Worsick, 2010). This “raw” gap may 
be related to various factors at the individual level which will be reviewed in the next 
section.  
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Gender differences in human capital 
The gender pay gap may in part be due to gender differences in human capital. The 
human capital theory posits that workers choose to acquire such capital through education 
and experience on the labour market (Becker, 1993). Men and women may make different 
choices because of gendered comparative advantages of investing in productive and 
reproductive work. The general argument is that women do not invest as much in education 
or avoid rapidly evolving, highly paid fields such as engineering and technical/scientific 
fields because they expect to be in the labour force for fewer years than men and to 
interrupt their career to raise children1. Nowadays women’s average education level is 
higher than men’s, thus taking this factor into account in estimates of the gender pay gap 
tends to lower the explained part of the gap (Drolet, 2002). However, gender differences in 
choices of field of education remain and account for part of the gender pay gap (Drolet, 
2001). In academia, fields within which women tend to be underrepresented command 
higher salaries. For instance, in 2001-2002, Canadian female faculty members were 
underrepresented in two of the four highest paid academic sectors, i.e. engineering/applied 
sciences as well as mathematics/physical sciences (Canadian Association of University 
Teachers, 2004). Conversely, they were over-represented in all four sectors offering the 
lowest average salaries, i.e. health professions and occupations, fine and applied arts, 
humanities and related sciences, and education.  
                                                 
1 Other explanations for this horizontal segregation include gendered socialization and stereotypes (Duru-
Bellat, 2004) as well as historical processes that limited women’s access to education (Le Doeuff, 1998) and 
excluded them from acquiring certain types of knowledge (Mosconi, 1994). For instance, Duru-Bellat (2004) 
suggests that few girls choose to follow scientific orientations in school partly because the characteristics 
stereotypically associated to researchers, for instance logic, rationality and coolness, are closer to male than 
female stereotypes. She observes that there is a tendency for girls to self-select into scientific orientations only 
if their academic results in science are exceptional. LeDoeuff (1998) argues that although women are no 
longer actively excluded from science nowadays, science is still presented as undeniably masculine, which is 
tantamount to excluding women. According to Mosconi (1994), the educational choices of boys and girls 
result in large parts from a reproduction phenomenon; girls’ reluctance to choose technical and science fields 
and their strong tendency to enter literary fields are extensions of the institutional structures established over 
the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century. The author explains that “If one admits that today 
mathematics have replaced Latin and Greek as symbols of excellence and elite, the relative exclusion of girls 
from preparatory science classes may be interpreted as proof that despite formal equality in access to 
education, the policy that tends to exclude girls from the most prestigious knowledge is still having some 
effects.” (Our translation of Mosconi, 1994, p. 219). 
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In addition, although gender differences in labour market experience have 
decreased with the recent convergence of male and female employment patterns, women 
are still on average more likely to interrupt their careers or to work part-time when they 
have children, which translates in a lower cumulated labour market experience (Altonji et 
al., 1999). Female professors cumulate less seniority than their male counterparts (Ornstein 
& Stewart, 1996) and occupy lower academic ranks (Ornstein & Stewart, 1996; Ornstein et 
al., 1998; Sussman & Yssaad, 2005). Possible reasons for this include women’s relatively 
recent presence in the academic profession, career interruptions, delayed career starts and 
discrimination (Ornstein & Stewart, 1996; Ornstein et al., 1998; Sussman & Yssaad, 2005).  
The sexual division of domestic labour 
Researchers have hypothesized that women are responsible for a larger share of 
domestic responsibilities, which negatively impacts promotion outcomes (Ginther & Hayes, 
2001; American Sociological Association, 2004; Perna, 2005). Being an academic implies a 
heavy workload and high mobility, which can be difficult to reconcile with family 
responsibilities. In addition, child bearing years usually coincide with a period when 
academics are working towards becoming tenured. Hannah et al. (2002) suggest that 
academic careers are shaped on the model of a male breadwinner free from family 
constraints. On the other hand, female professors use various strategies to avoid potentially 
detrimental impacts of child rearing on their careers. They are less likely than male 
professors to become parents and when they do, they have fewer children (Ginther & 
Hayes, 2001). Many postpone having children until after tenure (Armenti, 2004). 
The results of research investigating the impact of family responsibilities on the 
career outcomes of academics are mitigated. Ginther and Hayes (2001) find that female 
professors who are mothers are less likely to be promoted than their childless counterparts. 
Perna (2005) observes no relation between number of children or marital status and 
promotion among female professors; being married or having children is positively related 
to the odds of promotion among males. Toutkoushian (1998) finds that male faculty 
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members benefit from a « marriage premium » on pay: after controls2, married men are 
paid on average 4% more than their single male colleagues. The impact of marital status 
varies by sector, differently so for male and female faculty members. For instance, the 
marriage premium observed for male faculty members is larger for those working in 
physical sciences/mathematics (6.6%) than it is for their counterparts in social sciences 
(4.9%). Female faculty members in social sciences who are cohabiting (without being 
married) are paid on average 9.3% more than their single colleagues. 
If women professors take on a larger share of family responsibilities, this could 
affect their publication rates. Yet in a research using a 1998-1999 survey answered by 
8,544 faculty from 57 American universities, Sax et al. (2002) found that after adjustments 
were made for factors related to publication rates such as rank, age and field of 
specialization, the only family-related variable associated to publication rates of women 
was financial stress3.  
Gender differences in research productivity  
A lower average level of research productivity is often cited as one reason 
accounting for female faculty members’ lesser pay. With regards to number of published 
works, over 50 American studies (Cole & Zuckerman, 1984, in Cole & Singer, 1992), as 
well as two Canadian studies (Nakhaie, 2002; 2007), have detected a gender gap in average 
publication rates. Nakhaie (2002) shows that the “raw” gap in career publications is 
approximately two to one in favor of males. It is for the most part associated with gender 
differences in rank, field of specialization, seniority, type of institution and time devoted to 
research. However, the author explains, the causal relationship implied by these 
associations is unclear. Women tend to hold lower ranks than their male counterparts. 
Publishing is crucial to rank progression, but it could also be that holding a higher rank 
                                                 
2 These controls include measures of human capital (number of years of experience, seniority, age, highest 
degree earned), publications (number of articles, books and book chapters published over one’s career), 
principal field of teaching (43 categories), institution type (Carnegie classification), length of appointment, 
whether respondent is a departmental chairperson, region and race. 
3 The other family-related variable used in this research were marital status, number of dependant children, 
stress from having to take care of an elderly parent and number of hours per week dedicated to taking care of 
children and housework. 
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leads to publishing more — that faculty members in higher ranks benefit from a process 
of accumulation of advantages such as better access to resources for research, a wider 
professional network, and the recognition that leads to invited publications (Nakhaie, 
2002). In his analysis of factors associated with promotion for male and female faculty 
members, Nakhaie (2007) shows that a gender gap in average number of publications 
remains in 2000. However, given that the focus of the article is the gender gap in 
promotion, how much of those gender differences in average number of publications can be 
accounted for by other factors is unknown.  
A study on American faculty revealed very little, if any, gender difference in 
publication rates in recent cohorts of science faculty (Xie & Shauman, 2003). However, a 
recent longitudinal study suggests that gender differences emerge over time. Using 
multilevel longitudinal analysis on survey and CV data collected in 2004, Leahey, Lee and 
Hunter (2008) analyzed the trajectories of research productivity (as measured by the 
number of peer-reviewed articles at each point in time) of American faculty of sociology 
and linguistics. After controls4, no gender gap in productivity level is detected, but men’s 
rate of growth is larger than women’s. Thus, gender differences in productivity emerge 
over time. Women and men benefit differently from specialization: the former benefit in 
terms of productivity level and the latter, in terms of productivity rate of growth. Combined 
with the fact that men specialize slightly more than women, these findings contribute to 
explain why productivity trajectories differ by gender.  
The visibility of publications is another important indicator of an academic’s 
research productivity. The scarce research on gender differences in visibility has produced 
mixed results. Two studies of science faculty members have shown that women have higher 
citation rates than their male counterparts. Long’s (1992) study of biochemists shows that 
over the first 17 years of their career, women see their articles cited 9 to 13 times on 
                                                 
4 These controls are level of specialization (measured by a variable created by the authors using keywords 
descriptors of published articles), field (sociology or linguistics), number of years elapsed from PhD to start 
of trajectory, department prestige of PhD institution, rank, two dummy variables indicating the presence of 
moves from higher prestige to lower prestige institution and vice versa, prestige of current department and 
cumulative citations.  The effects of parental and marital status were also tested and were not significant for 
either gender. 
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average, versus 7 to 9 times for men. In their research of science academics, Sonnert and 
Holton (1996) find that publications by women receive on average 24 citations and those by 
men, 14. The authors suggest that this could be related to a tendency in women to be more 
perfectionist and to produce more comprehensive and synthetic work, which in turn could 
explain their lower average publication rates. In their longitudional study of American 
faculty of sociology and linguistics, Leahey et al., (2008) also analyzed trajectories of 
visibility (as measured at each point in time by number of articles weighed by journal 
impact factors and by number of citations). After controls5, men’s visibility benefits more 
from previous publications than women’s, both in terms of the likelihood of getting articles 
published in high impact factor journals and number of citations, which translates over time 
in large gender differences in visibility.  
Gender differences in access to research resources and networks 
Research on gender difference on access to resources for research has yielded 
inconsistent results. Wennerås and Wold (1997) found that women’s applications to 
postdoctoral fellowships were underrated compared to those of males and that at equal 
levels of scientific productivity, the evaluation of women’s scientific competences was 
inferior to those of men. However, in a replication of this study, Sandström & Hällsten 
(2008) examined relative success by gender in 2004 on research grants applications to the 
same research council (Wennerås and Wold analyze only post-doctoral fellowships 
applications), and found that women did a little better than men. In 1999, a highly-
publicized report from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology concluded that its women 
faculty members had limited access to space and to research grants and were excluded from 
positions of power (MIT, 1999). In Canada, there has been concern expressed about poor 
female representation among Canada Research Chair holders, which led to a human-rights 
complaint (PAR-L Electronic Network, 2005) that was recently settled by an agreement on 
equity in the nomination process for chairholders. The Fifth-Year Evaluation of the Canada 
Research Chairs Program showed that although the proportion of new female chair 
                                                 
5 The same controls used in the analysis of productivity trajectories are used in the analysis of visibility 
trajectories, except cumulative citations of course, which is replaced with cumulative publications. 
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recipients had increased from 14.1% to 32.0% between 2000 to 2004, only 19.8% of 
chairholders were women in 2004 (R.A. Malatest & Associates Ltd, 2004) and 22% in 
2006 (Canada Research Chairs Program Website).  
Given their relatively recent entry in academia, female faculty members may be less 
integrated into professional networks than males – effectively, strangers in academia 
(Sonnert & Holton, 1995), excluded from dominant ‘old boys networks’ (McKenna et al., 
2002; MIT, 1999; see also R.A. Malatest and Associates Ltd, 2004). Long’s study of 
American biochemists shows that among professors who publish, male and female 
collaboration rates are virtually identical (Long, 1992). Women are more likely to 
collaborate with their spouse because they are more likely than their male counterparts to 
have a spouse who is also a scientist. A recent study of academic economists in the United 
Kingdom found that women were less likely than men to have received an outside offer in 
the five previous years (Blackaby, Booth & Frank, 2005). The authors argue that this 
finding is consistent with the “loyal servant hypothesis” (Booth, Francesconi & Frank, 
2003): family commitments more often limit female than male mobility, prospective 
employers know this and as a result, they are less likely to make offers to women. Current 
employers exploit the opportunity that this provides by paying their female employees less. 
Note, however, that the fact that women had received less outside offers over the five 
previous years was the only evidence produced by Blackaby et al. (2005). The article 
contained no direct evidence bearing on the loyal servant hypothesis.  
Gender differences in values and attitudes towards pay 
Men and women may differ in terms of values and attitudes towards work and pay. 
The relationship between gender and negotiations has been widely studied. An extensive 
review of theory and research distinguishes five general theoretical approaches that vary 
according to the hypothesized origin of gender differences in negotiations: within the mind 
of the negotiator, within the mind of his opponent, as a product of the interaction, as a 
product of contextual influences or as a result of the interaction between gender and 
situational characteristics (Kray & Thompson, 2005). Overall, the research reviewed by 
Kray and Thompson (2005) suggests the following trends. First, men tend to be generally 
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more competitive than women, although some contradictory results are cited, and women 
and men are expected to behave differently in negotiations. Second, most research 
addressing how men and women are treated in negotiations find that the former are treated 
more favorably, but again there are contradictory results. Third, studies on the relationship 
between power and gender in negotiations yield inconsistent findings. Finally, the studies 
conducted on various situational moderators (e.g. stereotype activation, recipient of 
negotiations, work vs non-work related negotiations) suggest that these may influence how 
men and women negociate (Kray & Thompson, 2005).  
The evidence on gender differences in negotiations outcomes is mixed. A meta-
analysis of 21 studies, 19 of which were laboratory-based, revealed only small gender 
differences in the outcomes from salary negotiations (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). One 
study based on a survey investigating the actual experiences of salary negotiation by 
university graduates in business, psychology, sociology, and history found no gender 
difference in the incidence of negotiation or in the relative success of negotiation (O’Shea 
& Bush, 2002).  Babcock and Laschever (2003) find that in general, women are less likely 
than men to negotiate their salaries. Finally, to our knowledge, no research has specifically 
examined whether women and men academics differ in their attitudes towards salary 
negotiation. However, a recent study finds no gender pay gap among newly hired faculty, 
which, according to the authors, casts doubts on the idea that women are less likely to 
negotiate their wages upon hiring (Porter, Toutkoushian & Moore, 2008). 
Another form of the argument that there are gender differences in attitudes to work 
and pay is based on the idea of compensating differentials (Shirazi, Biel & Fransson, 2002). 
According to this model, there are gender differences in preferences with respect to job 
attributes. The results of recent studies on this topic are mixed. Using different data sources 
and studying different occupations, Tolbert and Moen (1998), Browne (1997), and Shirazi 
et al. (2002) all report no differences between men and women in the job attributes they 
most value. In contrast, Barbezat (1992) found significant gender differences in the job 
attributes preferred by Ph.D. graduates entering the academic job market. Men displayed a 
greater tendency to prioritize salary than women. Women were more likely to prioritize 
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student quality, collegiality and opportunities for collaborative work (Barbezat, 1992). 
However, this research is by no means definitive since it was limited to economists and 
subjects were at the beginning of their career.  
The gender pay gap among university professors: the role of discrimination 
Gender differences in pay among university faculty may also result from wage 
discrimination, which is generally defined as  
…a situation in which persons who provide labor market services and who are equally 
productive in a physical or material sense are treated unequally in a way that is related 
to an observable characteristic such as race, ethnicity, or gender. By “unequal”, we 
mean these persons receive different wages or face different demands for their 
services at a given wage (Altonji & Blank, 1999, p. 3168). 
There are three theoretical models of discrimination: systemic, taste-based and 
statistic. 
Systemic discrimination differs from the other types in that it does not necessarily 
entail discriminative behaviors. This model posits that the disadvantaged positions of some 
groups results from the practices, values and rules of certain actors on the labour market, 
among which are unions, businesses and governments (Chicha, 2003).  
Taste-based discrimination characterizes a situation where employers, colleagues or 
clients may have an aversion to cross-group contacts, i.e. contacts across age, ethnicity or 
sex boundaries (Becker, 1957). Employers prefer hiring individuals from certain groups, 
employees prefer working with those individuals and clients prefer buying goods or 
services from them. In the case of sex-based groups, this preference may be related to the 
beliefs of employers, colleagues or clients about the “social roles” that are appropriate for 
women and men, which may more or less correspond to social representations associated 
with various jobs (Blau et al., 2006). For instance, some employers may be more willing to 
employ women as secretaries than heavy machinery operators. Some male employees may 
be willing to work with a woman if she is a subordinate but may resist doing so if she is a 
hierarchical superior. Some clients may prefer to buy clothes from saleswomen and cars 
from salesmen.  
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Employers who discriminate consider that a psychological cost is associated with 
hiring individuals who belong to the groups that they discriminate against. This cost is 
added to the wages of these individuals, thus discriminating employers are only willing to 
hire them under the conditions that they are paid less than employees from the preferred 
groups. Colleagues who discriminate have an aversion to working with members from 
certain groups and if they can’t avoid doing so, they may ask for better wages, which 
produces inter-group wage differentials. As for clients, if for instance they prefer buying 
goods or services from employees who belong to certain groups, employees from other 
groups may have weaker sales or be considered by their employers as less productive, 
which may create between-group differences in pay (Blau et al., 2006).  
Developed by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973), the statistical discrimination model 
posits that employees may evaluate a candidate’s potential productivity based on 
observable characteristics such as gender, race or age when faced with incomplete 
information with regard to the candidate’s qualifications or job attachment (Havet & Sofer, 
2002). This may be due to employers’ beliefs or measurement error. In the former case, 
employers are not willing to pay the same wages to members of different groups because 
they conclude, based on their beliefs or observations, that some are less productive than 
others. They fill the gaps in the information needed to make compensation decisions with 
signs that may not be counterfeited and that they believe are related to the qualities that 
they look for in candidates (Blank, Dabady, & Citro, 2004). Gender, race and age are 
examples of signs used in such situations. In the case of discrimination related to 
measurement error, employers use signs such as academic degrees or test results to evaluate 
potential productivity, but these are not considered as reliable a sign of productivity for 
individuals belonging to groups that employers discriminate against. For instance, in the 
case of gender discrimination, this perception could be related to the perceived risk of 
women leaving the work force (Havet & Sofer, 2002). In the statistical discrimination 
model, for equal wages individuals from groups that are discriminated against have to 
perform better than those who are not. For equal performances victims of discrimination 
receive lower wages. 
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Consistent with the statistical discrimination model, Valian (1999) argues that 
female workers may be disadvantaged because individuals’ judgments are skewed by 
gender schemas that tend to associate professional success to individual characteristics that 
are traditionally male (Valian, 1999). Gender schemas are defined as “hypotheses about 
what it means to be male or female, hypotheses that we all share, male and female alike.” 
(Valian, 1999, p. 1045). There is a correspondence between professional success and the 
characteristics traditionally associated to males, such as competitiveness and assertiveness. 
Professional success is expected of men because it corresponds to the male identity. Our 
gender schemas of females do not include professional success. Because of this, we all 
tend, men and women alike, to undervalue females and overvalue males in professional 
contexts. 
Some studies of academia are compatible with the idea that the work of female 
professors may be undervalued. For instance, Trix and Psenka (2003) compared 
recommendation letters written for male and female applicants to medicine faculty 
positions. Those written for females were shorter, which suggests that qualifications were 
described more succinctly than for males, they contained twice as many ambiguous 
comments6 and more adjectives describing how hard-working the female applicants were. 
The authors argue that while this description may seem positive, if it is not accompanied by 
words suggesting research excellence, female applicants may generally appear like they 
work hard, without being particularly skilled. Indeed, letters written for female applicants 
comprised fewer adjectives suggesting exceptional qualities. The finding by Wennerås and 
Wold (1997) that women’s scientific competence was judged inferior to that of men at 
equal levels of scientific productivity in postdoctoral fellowships competitions is also 
consistent with the hypothesis that the work of female academic may be undervalued.  
Valian (2005) argues that small differences in evaluations of males and females 
cumulate over time so that in the long run, males tend to end up in advantageous positions. 
The academic world is characterized by processes of accumulation of advantages – the so-
                                                 
6 For instance, letters written for women contained comments such as “she has a somewhat challenging 
personality” or “her personal life was in turmoil and in view of the difficulties she was experiencing, […] her 
performance was especially impressive”. 
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called “Matthew effect” whereby small initial advantages on the outset of one’s career are 
used to secure further advantages (Merton, 1968) – and of accumulation of disadvantages – 
which consists in reinforcement over time of small initial disadvantages (Long & Fox, 
1995). All advantages and disadvantages are likely to have repercussions for academic 
careers because they are dominated by fierce competition for ideas and resources (Cole & 
Singer, 1992). Some research suggests that processes of accumulation of disadvantages 
tend to characterize the careers of female academics (Nakhaie, 2002; Clark & Corcoran, 
1986; Sonnert & Holton, 1996).   
The measure of discrimination 
Discrimination can seldom be directly observed. Detecting and measuring it is 
particularly challenging because it entails using causal inference to answer a counterfactual 
question, i.e. “what would have happened if a person had belonged to a different group?” 
For instance, the impact of gender discrimination is the difference between a woman’s 
salary and the salary she would have received had she been a man, after controls for all 
other relevant salary determinants. Evidently, both cases cannot be observed for a given 
individual, which is why measuring discrimination is tantamount to a missing data problem. 
To establish a causal link between discrimination and the situations of individuals, one uses 
knowledge on average situations in the general population and within specific groups to 
estimate the average impact of discrimination.  
Because discrimination can rarely be observed, in the presence of a pay gap between 
groups, in order to conclude that the pay gap may result from discrimination, one has to 
eliminate other possible explanations. Methods differ with regard to what may be included 
among these other possibilities. For instance, in the classic Oaxaca-Blinder method 
(Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973), the other possible explanation of the wage gap is 
differences in productivity. However, because a measure of actual productivity is rarely 
available, indicators of potential productivity are often used, for instance measures of 
human capital such as education level and previous work experience. The BMZ method 
takes into account the impact of job segregation by including the probability of accessing 
various jobs (Brown, Moon & Zoloth, 1980). Whatever the method used, the general logic 
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relies on a partition of the pay gap into two parts, i.e. the explained and unexplained, 
where the latter is considered as a measure of the extent of discrimination.  
Measuring discrimination requires adequate knowledge of the processes that 
regulate a given outcome both in the presence and in the absence of discrimination. In the 
case of pay discrimination, one needs to be aware of all the criteria used to determine pay; 
in order to correctly estimate it, one has to know how a non discriminating employer would 
act. For instance, based on the human capital model, one may posit that employers who do 
not discriminate base their pay decisions on the expected productivity of employees. This 
requires adequate knowledge of all the criteria used by employers to predict employees’ 
productivity (Blank et al., 2004). But in many cases wage levels do not solely depend upon 
the human capital of individuals; for instance, they may be negotiated.  
Complicating matters further, the influence of some important determinants of 
wages is not straightforward. For instance, the impact of professional experience, which 
could be the most important factor in explaining differences in salaries between individuals, 
is related to several processes, i.e. the development of general skills, the returns on seniority 
(which can reflect both the investments of workers in job-specific skills and employers’ 
incentives) and the returns on job searches over one’s career (Altonji & Blank, 1999). 
Controlling for employment history in a gender pay gap analyses is difficult. Researchers 
often do not have information on actual job experience; instead they use a measure of 
potential experiences such as age. Altonji and Blank (1999) point out that this may 
overestimate women’s experience because it does not take into account the fact that they 
are on average more likely than men to interrupt their careers. This may result in a weaker 
impact of experience on wages among women, a finding that a researcher may wrongfully 
attribute to discrimination. 
Another serious difficulty with the measurement of gender discrimination is the fact 
that there are important differences in the characteristics of jobs held by men and women. 
The labour market is horizontally segregated. Professions and sectors in which women are 
better represented tend to yield lower wages (Armstrong & Armstrong, 2001; Drolet, 2002; 
England, Allison & Wu, 2007). How does one go about treating this factor in analyses of 
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the gender pay gap? Simply controlling for the impact of job characteristics is problematic 
given that cultural devaluation of traditionally female activities may contribute to gender 
pay gaps (England, 1992; England, 2005). However, not taking into account gender 
differences in positions occupied is likely to overestimate the unexplained part of the gap. 
Finally, when analyzing gender pay gaps, one has to take into account possible 
endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity issues (Beblo et al., 2003). When explanatory 
variables are not determined exogenously and are related to unobserved determinants of 
wages (in the present case, when they may be related to discrimination), results are likely to 
present bias due to endogeneity. Among possibly endogenous employment-related 
variables in analysis of gender pay gaps are full-time employment and hierarchical position 
because both are potentially affected by discriminatory processes. Unobserved 
heterogeneity occurs when unobserved determinants of salaries are related to explanatory 
variables in the analysis. For instance, if mobility is related to wages and differs by gender, 
an analysis of the gender pay gap without controls for mobility would overestimate the 
impact of discrimination. Unobserved heterogeneity may also bias estimates of 
discrimination downwards in cases where the influence of some determinants in the 
analysis comprises the impact of retroaction and of past discrimination (Plasman, Plasman, 
& Rusinek, 2002). This happens when the awareness of being discriminated against in 
relation to a desirable outcome translates into a reduced motivation to seek the outcome at 
all (Blank et al., 2004).  
Because it is based on a residue, the measure of discrimination ought to be 
interpreted with great caution (Beblo et al., 2003; Blank et al., 2004). Given the problems 
associated with the measurement of discrimination, one is left wondering “what is really 
being measured in analyses of the gender pay gap?” Differential treatment? Unobserved 
gender differences? Both? Given these uncertainties, it is unsurprising that in most 
empirical analyses of gender (or race) based inequality, researchers do not specifically 
attribute the unexplained portion of the differences between groups to discrimination (Fang 
& Moro, 2010). 
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Thus, for the time being, one can hardly conclude that the unexplained portion of 
the pay gap constitutes convincing and unambiguous evidence of discrimination, let alone a 
measure of it. Convincing empirical evidence of the existence of gender discrimination 
does exist. For instance, a well-known study of symphony orchestra hiring found that the 
proportion of female musicians hired increased significantly after blind auditions 
procedures were adopted (Goldin & Rouse, 2000). However, to our knowledge, convincing 
and unambiguous empirical evidence of the existence of discrimination has yet to come out 
of analyses of the pay gap. Despite these problems, when carefully conducted, quantitative 
analyses of the type used for the measurement of discrimination can certainly contribute to 
our understanding of gender pay gaps by identifying which factors are related to it and 
which are not, and by quantifying the portion of the pay gap accounted for by each factor.  
Results of empirical analysis of the gender pay gap among university professors  
A large body of empirical research has analyzed the extent of the gender pay gap 
among university professors after controls for relevant pay determinants. Using data from 
the 1984 Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching national survey of 
American faculty, Smart (1991) examines how gender affects pay and rank both directly 
and indirectly (i.e. through differences between male and female professors on the 
determinants of pay and rank). Results show that after controls7, about 40% of the impact 
of gender on academic rank is unexplained. The remaining effect of gender is almost 
entirely due to differences between men and women on seniority and highest earned degree. 
Gender has a major impact on pay: of the 14 predictors8 included in the model, it is the 
third most important determinant of pay, after rank and seniority. Although both direct and 
indirect effects of gender on pay are significant, the latter is much larger than the former 
and reflects gender differences in rank, seniority and male-domination of disciplines. About 
                                                 
7 Predictors include measures of human capital (highest degree earned, career age, years unemployed or 
employed part-time since receipt of highest degree), time devoted to teaching, research and administrative 
work, discipline/field (percentage male domination of discipline, hard/soft and pure/applied field), and 
institution type (prestige of institution, public status of institution, financial health of institution). 
8 Predictors included are the same as the ones used in the analysis of rank, and rank is added. 
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15% of the gender pay gap is unaccounted for by differences between men and women on 
other pay determinants.  
Using data from the 1968 Carnegie national survey of American faculty, Weiler 
(1990) estimates gender discrimination in promotion and incorporates this measure into an 
analysis of the gender pay gap. The results show that using this method instead of simply 
controlling for rank raises the part of the gender pay gap attributable to discrimination from 
15% to 20%, after controls for a large set of pay determinants9.      
Using the 1993 National Survey of Postsecondary Faculty, Toutkoushian (1999) 
shows that after controls10, female professors are paid on average 7% less that their male 
counterparts and are less likely to be tenured and to be full professors. Using data from the 
same survey for 1999, Bradburn and Sikora (2002) describe the extent of gender 
differences on several pay determinants. Men tend to hold higher ranks on average and 
women are more likely than men to be in non-tenure-track positions. Men are more likely 
to hold doctoral degrees. They also hold more teaching experience, both within their 
current and previous jobs, but there is no gender difference in the number of higher 
education jobs held. Given that women’s career is on average shorter, these findings mean 
that women have a higher job turnover rate. Women are better represented in two-year 
colleges, while men tend to be more present at doctoral institutions. Differences according 
to fields are also observed: men tend to be in higher proportions in natural sciences and 
engineering and women more often work in health sciences, social sciences and education. 
Faculty members also differ by gender with respect to how they report spending their time: 
men report spending on average 55% of their time on teaching while for women, it reaches 
                                                 
9 Controls include measures of human capital (years since earning highest degree, and years since earning 
highest degree squared, years of seniority [actual number of years of experience if under 30 years], 
cumulating at least 30 years of experience [binary variable], holding a PhD [binary variable], publications 
[number of articles, books and book chapters published over one’s career], field [11 variables], institution 
type (3 binary variables: private institution, university rather than 4-year college, located in the south), 
research as primary activity (binary variable), type of contract, set of 3 binary variables accounting for 
administrative positions held (currently department chair, formerly department chair, currently holding 
administrative position outside department), being non-white, being a US citizen and rank. 
10 These controls include measures of human capital (number of years of experience, seniority, age, highest 
degree earned), publications (number of articles, books and book chapters published over one’s career), 
principal field of teaching (43 categories), institution type (Carnegie classification) and race. 
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60%. In addition, men are on average more likely than women to report that they are 
engaged in research (70% of men vs 62% women) and have published more scholarly work 
over the past two years.  
Bradburn and Sikora (2002) estimate the unexplained pay gap at 9% in 199911.  This 
result cannot be compared with the 7% estimate of the unexplained pay gap by 
Toutkoushian (1999) for the year 1993 of the survey because the controls included are too 
different. Importantly, Bradburn and Sikora (2002) control for rank, time spent on research, 
teaching and administrative work as well as number of courses taught; Toutkoushian (1999) 
does not use these controls, but includes seniority in his analysis. In addition, the measure 
of publication used by Bradburn and Sikora (2002) is a derived categorical variable of 
number of recent total publications while Toutkoushian (1999) controls for number of 
various types of publication over one’s career.  
Also using the 1999 National Study of Postsecondary Faculty data (NSFOP), 
Toutkoushian, Bellas and Moore (2007) systematically examine the effects on pay of all 
possible interactions between gender, race and marital status. After controls for other pay 
determinants12, only two two-way interactions (out of 11) and one three-way interaction 
(out of 6) reach statistical significance. In addition, their inclusion does not add to model fit 
when compared to a model taking into account only the main effects of the three group 
variables. In some cases, this may be due to small numbers of faculty members in some 
categories. The authors suggest focusing on the main effects of gender, race and marital 
status rather than interactions in future research.  
Umbach (2007) uses multilevel analysis on a subsample of the 1999 NSFOP to 
estimate the contributions of human capital, structural characteristics of 79 academic 
disciplines and disciplinary labor market conditions on faculty pay. The analysis is 
restricted to research universities on the premise that within these types of institutions, 
                                                 
11 Controls include measures of human capital ( number of years since earning the highest degree, highest 
degree earned, age), publications (number of recent publications in 4 categories), average proportion of 
working hours devoted to research and teaching, number of courses taught, discipline (43 categories), 
institution type (Carnegie classification), rank and race.   
12 This research uses the same controls as Toutkoushian (1999), plus measures of length of appointment and 
region. 
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disciplinary affiliation will be more important to faculty members than institutional 
affiliation. The raw gender pay gap is estimated at 21.8%. Adding controls for human 
capital13 decreases it to 9.6%. When rank is also accounted for, the gap is further reduced to 
7.8%. Adding several discipline-level variables14, the gender pay gap is at 6.8%. The results 
show that controlling for human capital, rank and disciplinary-level effects, a 0.3% 
decrease of average salary within disciplines is associated to each increase of one 
percentage point of proportion female professors within disciplines.  
Porter, Toutkoushian and Moore (2008) conduct multilevel analyses15 on data from 
the NSOPF for years 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004 in order to determine whether the gender 
pay gap among professors occurs upon hiring, later in their career or both. They find no 
gender differences in pay among recently hired professors (i.e. assistant professors hired 
during the three years prior to each survey wave) after controls16. In the sample including 
all faculty members, the unexplained gender pay gap varies between a low of 4% in 1999 to 
a high of 6% in 1993. Further analysis by type of institution reveal the presence of a 
substantial, 9% unexplained gender pay gap among newly hired faculty working in research 
universities. In other types of universities, no unexplained difference among newly hired 
faculty members is observed. Analyzing the pay gap among the newly hired by aggregated 
field17 yields no significant effect. When the full sample is used, unexplained gender 
differences are observed within each institution type and aggregated field, but the size of 
the gap varies little across sub-samples (between a low of 4.8% and 5.5%), the only 
exception being “other fields”, where a 9.3% unexplained gap is observed. According to the 
                                                 
13 These human capital controls are age, holding an administrative position, years of experience and years of 
experience squared, seniority and seniority squared, number of patents and publications of various types over 
one’s career, percentage time teaching, currently receiving research funds and highest degree earned. 
14 The disciplinary-level variables are percentage female, percentage unemployed, percentage with funded 
research, mean career articles, chapters, books and patents and mean percentage time teaching. 
15 Multilevel analysis is used to account for the nested structure of the data, in this case individuals within 
institutions. 
16 Similar controls as Toutkoushian (1999) are used for human capital, publications and institution type, but a 
more general field measure (9 categories) instead of a primary teaching field measure is used. Rank, length of 
appointment and public status of the institution are also accounted for. 
17 The analysis is done using three aggregated fields: natural sciences and engineering; arts humanities and 
social sciences; all other fields.   
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authors, given these results, research on the gender pay gap among professors should 
focus on research universities in the future.  
With regard to changes over time, a review of several studies conducted between 
1965 and 1984 on national samples finds a reduction in the extent of the unexplained 
gender pay gap over time, from between 12% and 17% before 1972 to between 5% and 
12% during the 1972-1984 period (Ransom & Megdal, 1993). Ransom and Megdal’s own 
estimates, using data from 4 different surveys conducted between 1969 and 1984, show a 
decrease in the unexplained18 part of the gender pay gap over the 1970’s, but the gap 
remains roughly stable afterwards. Thus, the results are consistent with an initial decrease 
of pay discrimination against women, followed by stabilization during the 1980’s. In 1984, 
the last data point studied, the unexplained pay gap is estimated at 10.4%.  
More recently, Toutkoushian and Conley (2005) analyzed the gender pay gap using 
the NSOPF:99 and compared their findings to research conducted by Barbezat (1991) using 
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching dataset for years 1968, 1975 
and 1984 and by Toutkoushian (1998) using the NSOPF:93. Controlling for several 
characteristics of individuals and institutions19 but excluding rank, the unexplained gender 
pay gap declined from 16.3% in 1968 to 4% in 1999. Including rank, it was at 3.6% in 
1999. The authors then estimate the size of the unexplained pay gap (excluding rank) in 
1999 using alternative methods20 and find that there are only small differences in the results 
obtained (estimates vary from a low of 4.3% to a high of 5.7%). Comparing the size of the 
unexplained pay gap (excluding rank) between institution types reveals that it is significant 
only in research (7.3%) and comprehensive universities (4.2%). Finally, comparing the size 
of the unexplained pay gap in 1999 according to field, the research shows that it is 
                                                 
18 Specific measures of pay determinants vary between surveys, but include measures of type of degree 
earned, years of experience and years of experience squared, years of seniority and seniority squared, number 
of publications of various types, field and institution type. 
19 Controls included are: highest degree earned, years of experience and years of experience squared, years of 
seniority and seniority squared, age and age squared, race, number of patents and publications over one’s 
career (articles, books), length of appointment, discipline, institution type, public status of the university and 
geographic location. 
20 These methods are the single equation, Oaxaca with male salary structure as non-discriminative wage 
structure, Oaxaca with female salary structure as non-discriminative wage structure and Neumark. 
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significant in social sciences (4.7%), physical sciences (3.8%) and in “other fields” (6.7%). 
When compared to 1993, results indicate a significant change in the size of the unexplained 
gap in arts and humanities, from 9.2% to a non significant 3.4%, and in professional fields, 
from 10% to a non significant 3.3%. 
A number of studies of gender differences in pay among Canadian professors have 
been published over the past 20 years. One important difference between these and research 
on American professors is that apart from Ornstein and Stewart’s 1996 research, the other 
studies reviewed do not analyze the impact of research productivity. The datasets used do 
not include measures for this pay determinant.  
Using Statistics Canada’s Survey of Full-Time University Faculty in Canada for 
1972 and 1986, Guppy (1989) shows that after controls21, the unexplained gender pay gap 
is estimated at 7% in 1972 and 5% in 1986. In addition, the impact of some pay 
determinants differs by gender; for instance, the increase in salary associated with age is 
larger for males, but holding a PhD has a stronger impact on females’ pay. 
Analyzing data from Lennards’s survey of Canadian faculty, Ornstein and Stewart 
(1996) find a 16.8% raw gender pay gap in 1986. Adding controls for age and highest 
degree earned reduces the gap to 9.9%. Adding further controls for experience, research 
productivity22, field (15 categories) and university classification (16 categories based on 
location, size and history), reduces the gender pay gap at 6.5%. Adding rank and several 
variables describing work experience at different ranks23, the gap is further reduced to 
3.4%.  
Using the Survey of Full-Time University Faculty in Canada for the 1957-1994 
period, Ornstein, Stewart and Drakich (1998) find a 20.4% raw gender pay gap in 1957. 
Adding controls for age, highest degree earned, field (8 categories), and institutional 
                                                 
21 These controls are age, place of degree, level of highest degree, administrative position, rank, field, size of 
university and province, 
22 Research productivity is measured by the number of publications of various types over one’s career and the 
number of articles per year. 
23 The variables describing work experience at different ranks are the number of years employed at other 
universities, the number of years at current university at ranks lower than the current rank, the number of 
years at present rank, whether respondent ever taught at another university and tenure status. 
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affiliation does not reduce the gap; in fact taking these determinants into account, the gap 
reaches 23.5%. When rank is also included, it falls to 10.5%. Almost 40 years later, in 
1994, the raw gender pay gap has slightly decreased to 16.8%. Including all controls but 
rank, it shrinks to 8.1%; adding rank, it is further reduced to 3.9%.  
Also using Statistics Canada data, Sussman and Yssaad (2005) show that the raw 
gender pay gap by 2002-2003 was at 15%.  However, because this study uses median 
salaries instead of averages, the results are not directly comparable to those of Ornstein et 
al. (1998). Sussman and Yssaad (2005) also find a gender gap in median salaries within 
rank, ranging from 4% to 6%, depending on rank.  
Warman, Woolley and Worswick (2010) use the same survey to analyze the 
evolution of the gender pay gap among Canadian university professors between 1970 and 
2000. The raw gender pay gap declined from 21.1% in 1970 to 13.9% in 2000. Controlling 
for highest degree earned, country of first degree, country of highest degree, age, age 
squared, rank, field (11 categories) and institutional affiliation, the unexplained pay gap is 
estimated at 5.1% in 1970 and 2.6% in 2000. The inclusion of controls for rank likely partly 
explains why these estimates are small compared to other research. Another important 
finding of this study is that gender differences in pay tend to be greater in universities 
where salaries are determined using discretionary judgments of merit rather than seniority. 
In addition, an increasing differentiation by discipline and institution of the salaries of 
Canadian professors is observed. 
As for gender gender gap in promotion rates, Ornstein, Stewart and Drakich (2007) 
analyze the Survey of Full-Time University Faculty in Canada for the period spanning 
between 1985 and 1999 and find no gender difference in the probability of promotion to 
associate professor; however, median time for promotion to full professor is about a year 
longer for female faculty members. Substantial variation across fields of study is observed 
in the extent of this gender difference. Controlling for institutional affiliation, men are 
promoted to full professorship more than two years earlier than women in rehabilitation, 
physical education/kinesiology/recreation, and about one year earlier in science, 
engineering and biology. Interestingly, women are promoted to full professor more rapidly 
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than men in disciplines with higher female representation: about 1.25 years and 0.68 years 
earlier in education and humanities respectively. The variation of gender differences in 
median time to promotion is much larger across institutions. Controlling for detailed 
disciplines (124 categories), median time for promotion to full professor among female 
faculty members is longer than for males in medical-graduate institutions (0.64 year 
difference) and in comprehensive institutions (0.34 year difference), but it is shorter in 
primarily undergraduate institutions (0.64 year difference). In addition, the gender 
difference in median time to promotion varies widely within institutional categories. At 
medical-granting institutions, it ranges from being 4.7 years shorter for women at the 
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education to 2 years longer at McGill University, at 
comprehensive institutions, from 1.62 years shorter for women at Simon Fraser University 
to 3.87 years longer at Memorial University of Newfoundland and at primarily 
undergraduate institutions, from 6.21 years shorter for women at University College of 
Cape Breton to 2.95 years longer at Laurentian University.  
In sum, the reviewed research shows that the gender pay gap is related to gender 
differences on human capital, rank and research productivity. The gender pay gap varies 
according to career stage, discipline and institution type. The influence of marital status and 
race on faculty pay tends to vary by gender. However, using interactions between gender 
and marital status and/or race instead of  a simpler, main effect of gender on pay does not 
add to model fit, possibly because of the small size of several categories. The gender pay 
gap among American and Canadian faculty members has decreased over time, but an 
unexplained gap remains. It is smaller in Canada than in the United States, even though 
most Canadian research does not include controls for research productivity. 
The gender pay gap among university professors: the role of factors at the cultural 
and organizational levels 
The cultural devaluation of work mainly done by women 
As mentioned previously, female professors are overrepresented in relatively poorly 
paid fields (Canadian Association of University Teachers, 2004). While the human capital 
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theory suggests that women avoid rapidly evolving, highly paid fields such as 
engineering and technical/scientific fields, which contributes to explaining the gender pay 
gap, comparable worth theory suggests that the concentration of women in a field may 
itself depress that field’s pay because cultural norms associate less value to work mainly 
done by women (England, 1992, 2005). Pay equity policies are based upon this premise. 
Research showing that care work is less paid than any other type of work with equivalent 
levels of skill, effort and risk (England, 2005) are compatible with this theory. For 
academia, evidence in Bellas (1994) and Umbach (2007) confirms that average salaries in a 
field fall as the proportion of women rises, even after controls for individual characteristics, 
jobs, and labor market conditions.  
Organizational conditions that limit discretion in pay decisions  
Reskin (2003) argues that because our perceptions of others are unconsciously 
influenced by stereotypes, cognitive bias and in-group preferences, we all tend to be more 
or less biased and discriminative when evaluating them (Reskin, 2000b). Organizations can 
allow or limit the impact of these biases and discriminative tendencies; these organizational 
conditions are “the proximate causes of employment discrimination” (Reskin, 2000b, p. 
319).  
Formalization of pay-setting procedures may limit discretion and reduce the 
likelihood that women will be paid less than men (Reskin, 2000a, 2003; Kulis, 1998; 
Silvera, 1996; Rubery et al., 1998; Elvira & Graham, 2002). In a study of gender 
differences in various pay components within a large financial corporation, Elvira and 
Graham (2002) showed that the more formalized the pay component, the lesser gender 
differences in pay. Collective agreements, in particular, tend to tie pay to seniority and to 
impose salary caps, the effect of which is to prevent one group being advantaged through 
its member’s network ties or the preferences of decision-makers (Ridgeway, 2009). In fact, 
gender differences in pay are greater in universities where salaries are determined using 
discretionary judgments of merit rather than seniority (Warman et al., 2010). Further 
evidence of the effect of the exercise of discretion on gender pay differences is provided by 
Finland, often considered a model in terms of gender equality. It does indeed have the 
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highest proportion of female academics in Europe. However, during the 1990s, 
professorships were awarded both by invitation as well as through open competition. 
Women were relatively disadvantaged when the very discretionary invitation method was 
used. In 1997-1998 the proportion of female academics hired was twice as high in cases 
where there were open competitions (Husu, 2000).  
Other organizational conditions that may limit the exercise of discretion include the 
imposition of accountability, for example, by requiring that decision-makers justify 
discrepancies by gender (Reskin, 2000b) or publish information that allows for the 
detection of evidence of discriminatory practices (Petersen & Saporta, 2004). 
In sum, research analyzing the influence of organizational conditions on the gender 
pay gap is scarce; the few studies reviewed here suggest that this may be a fruitful avenue 
for a better understanding of this issue.  
The gender pay gap among university faculty: a case study 
The research reviewed in the previous sections shows that the gender pay gap 
among university faculty has substantially decreased since the end of the 1960’s. Yet a gap 
remains and it is larger at research universities (Porter et al., 2008) and in universities 
where salaries are determined using discretionary judgments of merit rather than seniority 
(Warman et al., 2010). Thus, concentrating research efforts on research universities and 
focusing on discretionary forms of remuneration seems to be a potentially fruitful avenue to 
better understand the causes of the remaining gender pay gap among university professors. 
This thesis is a case study of the gender pay gap among professors at a large Canadian 
research university. A recent increase in the use of market supplements has been observed 
at this institution. These are determined through a highly discretionary process at this 
institution, making it a suitable site to analyze the relationship between the gender pay gap 
and discretionary forms of remuneration.  
This study does not attempt to isolate the effect of discrimination on the gender pay 
gap. Many studies have already done so using much more complete datasets than the ones 
available to us. Instead, this research analyzes how the gender pay gap is related to various 
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individual and organizational factors and attempts to identify processes and structures at 
the organizational level that may contribute to it. Our general objective is to contribute to a 
better understanding of gender differences on the labour market. Specifically, we wish to 
produce knowledge that can be used in developing concrete, empirically informed solutions 
to reduce gender inequalities on the labour market.  
Two relevant institutional policies: remuneration and family leave 
The remuneration policy 
At the university in which this research is conducted, the base pay of professors is 
determined by collective agreement. There are no merit increments based on judgments of 
performance. Scale increases with years of service are mechanical. Faculty members may 
receive pay supplements in addition to base pay. These are administrative, market, and 
chair supplements. The information used for the description of these supplements comes 
from various data sources: administrative data on the remuneration of professors, 
institutional reports and documents, minutes of general university meetings, union 
publications and interviews with former administrators. 
Administrative supplements (or administrative stipends) are automatically awarded 
to faculty members who hold some administrative positions. The amounts are mostly pre-
established and are presented in public institutional documents.   
Administrative data from the institution indicate a strong increase in the use of 
market and chair supplements over recent years. They represented 1.8% of the total payroll 
in 1997 (the earliest data available) and 6.1% in 2006. The proportion of faculty receiving 
either type of supplements grew from 22.6% in 1997 to 38.6% in 2006. The average 
amount of these awards has more than doubled over the years, from about 5,600$ in 1997 
to 15,000$ in 2006. Thus, they represent a growing proportion of the total earnings of 
faculty employed at the university and an even more significant component of those to 
whom they have been awarded: in 1997, they represented 7.5% of the salary of the 
recipients, in 2006, 12.8%.  
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The attribution of market supplements24 is discretionary. This observation is based 
on information gathered through our own interviews with administrators and on the fact 
that no written trace of the criteria used to allocate these supplements or on allocation rules 
can be found in the organization’s documents. In principle, market supplements are offered 
to attract new professors and retain those likely to leave. They aim to respond to the market 
demand for individuals and for academic fields. However, in practice they often seem to be 
awarded in response to requests. In addition, they have been used to recognize research 
performance. Thus, although their designation as “market” supplements suggests that they 
are based on the demand for faculty in various disciplines or for individuals because of the 
excellence of their academic records, in practice their use is varied.  
Until about 1998-2000, market supplements were normally used as a temporary 
adjustment to the base salary. Their amounts reflected the difference between the base 
salary that was prescribed by the collective agreement and a target salary. As the base 
salary increased with seniority and negotiated raises, the supplements diminished until the 
base and target salary matched. Since 2001, they have been negotiated for a period of five 
years and the amount remains the same for the duration of the agreement. After five years, 
the agreement may be extended after a performance assessment. 
Chair supplements have been used since the Canada Research Chair program was 
introduced in 2000. They are awarded to all CRC recipients. While the CRC Secretariat 
uses a formalized application and review process, it does not prescribe standard procedures 
for nominations; those are determined by universities. Based on information gathered from 
interviews with administrators, university reports, minutes of general university meetings 
and union publications, the nomination process appears highly discretionary at the 
university.  
From the beginning, the enactment of the CRC program has been criticized for its 
lack of transparency at this institution. Two administrators interviewed for this research 
raised the issue. The only public information provided by the university on the nomination 
process is a “strategic planning” document published in 2000 in which the administration 
                                                 
24 Other designations include « market premiums » or « market differentials ». 
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sets target numbers of Tier 1 and Tier 2 chairs on various research themes. No 
information is provided on how the targets were established or on the criteria or processes 
used for nominations. According to the minutes of a general university meeting held in 
2001, academic units identify candidates and a leader’s committee approves them. During 
the meeting one faculty members’ representative raised concerns about possible conflicts of 
interest because he felt that the committee members were not impartial. To illustrate this, he 
cited the example of a department chair who was informed that a new chair would be 
created within his unit, without having participated in the process that led to this 
endowment. In 2002, a union publication criticized the administration for failing to consult 
with democratic instances of the institution in relation to the CRC program. Then, in 2003 
the union publication stated that the issue of the selection procedure of CRC recipients was 
being disputed between the union and the administration, and was submitted for arbitration. 
 In 2005, a report based on consultations by a university committee with department 
chairs and deans was published. It was commissioned in 2002 to analyze the impact of the 
integration of CRC recipients in academic units. It described a generalized perception 
among administrators that the nomination process for CRCs was lacking transparency. This 
perception was based on two elements. First, departments and faculties were not consulted 
on nominations. Secondly, according to the authors of the report, the fact that nominations 
were made within a very short period of time may have accentuated the perception that the 
process lacked transparency. Another report was published in 2008, this time by the 
university’s research committee. The topic was broader – it analyzed the impact of the CRC 
program at the institution – and more importantly, it also mentioned a widely shared 
impression among faculty members that the nomination process had lacked transparency 
and that unit assemblies were presented with a fait accompli.      
Another source of criticism by administrators was the allocation of CRCs to current 
faculty members. The 2005 report argued that administrators perceived this as problematic 
because they mistakenly thought that the goal pursued with the allocation of CRCs was to 
recruit new faculty members. However, these criticisms may have been founded on more 
than a misperception. Although the “strategic planning” document published in 2000 by the 
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institution stated that a maximum of 20% of Canada Research Chairs nominations would be 
for professors already employed at the university, an institutional newspaper published later 
on the same year reported that despite this decision, 16 of 22 recent nominations were for 
current faculty members. Questioned on this inconsistency by the journalist, an 
administrator explained that “it was more simple to operate an internal stabilization to 
begin with, particularly given very short notice”. Our own analysis of the institution’s 
administrative data indicates that the 20% maximum remained exceeded in subsequent 
rounds of CRC allocations: we find that 46% (31 out of 68) of the chairs allocated between 
2000 and 2006 for which we have information, went to faculty members who had been 
employed at the university for more than 5 years.  
According to a university newspaper published in 2008, by 2006, 15% of the 
recipients of CRCs within the institution were women; yet women represent 31% of the 
institution’s faculty members. Their representation among chairholders is lower than the 
national average of 22%. This underrepresentation seems unlikely to result from the 
selection process operated by the CRC Secretariat on the nominations provided by the 
university; according to the minutes of a university committee meeting held in 2004, all 
nominations submitted up to that point by the institution to the CRC Secretariat had been 
successful.  
In sum, at this institution, the allocation of market supplements and CRCs (to which 
chair supplements are automatically attached), resulted from discretionary judgments by the 
administration. These measures shared a common goal, i.e. to attract and retain faculty 
members. In addition, the increase of market supplement allocations to retain faculty 
members over the past years was closely related to the CRC program. Six of the 17 
administrators interviewed for this research mentioned that market supplements had to be 
allocated to faculty members who were deemed qualified enough to receive a CRC, but 
were not selected in view of the university’s strategis plan. In addition, in many cases, 
faculty members were receiving market supplements before becoming CRC recipients; this 
pattern is observed for 17 of the 31 professors who became CRC recipients 5 years or more 
after their appointment.  
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The family leave policy 
If an institution’s family leave policy is likely to translate in a larger reduction of 
working hours or longer career interruptions for women than men, it can potentially 
contribute to the gender pay gap. According to the collective agreement effective between 
1993 and 2003, for mothers, the family leave policy at the university under study included a 
right to a fully paid maternity leave that could last up to 20 weeks. Starting 1997, a new 
provision stated that upon request, after returning from maternity leave, professors were 
granted a yearly, three credit reduction in teaching assignments with full salary until the 
child had reached the age of two. After her maternity leave, the professor could take an 
unpaid parental leave for a maximum of two years. The provisions that applied to male 
faculty members were more limited. Professors whose partner had given birth could obtain 
upon request a paid leave during which they were required to carry out all duties that did 
not require their presence at the university, for a maximum duration of four weeks. In 
addition, paid leaves of a two months duration were also provided for adoptive mothers and 
fathers and could be followed with an unpaid parental leave for a maximum of two years.  
Professors on maternity leave cumulated seniority, but not those on unpaid leave. 
Thus, women who interrupted their careers for this period would have cumulated less 
seniority than men hired at the same time. In addition, they could have cumulated fewer 
publications. However, no written information is available on how many women may have 
actually taken the unpaid leave; one informant within the institution mentioned that to the 
best of their knowledge, none did. On the other hand, the reduction in teaching assignments 
following a maternity leave may have freed some time for research for those who did not 
take the unpaid leave, limiting the potentially negative effects of childcare responsibilities 
on their publication records. 
Family leave policy became less gender-specific with the 2004 collective 
agreement.  Whereas in the previous agreement, professors whose partner had given birth 
could obtain a paid leave upon request, starting 2004 the agreement simply states that they 
obtain it upon request. This change implies that parental leaves are now seen as a right, in 
the same way that maternity leaves are. Adjustments to the teaching schedule of professors 
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whose partner has given birth are now available. In addition, upon request, professors have 
their teaching schedule adjusted if they have a child under 12 who attended daycare 
services. This arrangement likely makes it easier for both men and women professors who 
have children to fit work and family responsibilities in their schedule.  
Despite these changes towards a more gender-neutral family leave policy, the 
potentially adverse effects of previous, more gender-specific family leave policies on 
female faculty members may have had a long-lasting effect in their careers. It may have 
translated into a weaker cumulative publication record for these women, which may in turn 
affect remuneration. However, it is important to keep in mind that the potential impact of 
family leave on the careers of men and women professors is necessarily mitigated by the 
fact that women professors are less likely than male professors to become parents and when 
they do, they tend to have fewer children (Ginther & Hayes, 2001). In addition, as 
mentioned previously the results of research investigating the impacts of family 
responsibilities on the career outcomes of academics are mitigated. 
Gender-relations as an organizing concept 
Gender-relations provides a useful organizing concept for this case study. Ridgeway 
(2009) argues that in order to better understand gender differences on the labor market, 
sociologists ought to try to elucidate how processes at different levels affect each other 
“beyond simply saying that they generally but not always reinforce one another” 
(Ridgeway 2009: 146). In an effort to contribute to this endeavor, to go beyond the 
individual/structural dichotomy, this thesis relies on the organizing concept of gender-
relations. This concept is useful for the analysis of the gender pay gap because it provides a 
general framework that brings together various explanations of the gap. We use the 
expression “gender-relations” to refer to two very similar concepts used by French and 
Anglo-Saxon sociologists, i.e. “rapports sociaux de sexe” and “gender-relations” (Daune-
Richard & Devreux, 1992; Kergoat, 2005; Ferree & Hall, 2000; Ferree, Khan & Morimoto, 
2007). 
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Gender-relations refer to the idea that the categories “male” and “female” can be 
understood as groups that are socially constructed as opposed to exclusively biological 
categories. This model is theoretically opposed to that of “sex roles”, which posits that 
women and men belong to stable categories and adopt social roles which more or less 
correspond to sex stereotypes. Instead, the processes through which personality traits, 
behaviors and statuses become associated with men and women can be changing, even 
contradictory (Ferree et al., 2007). Gender is structural rather than individual, but 
individuals develop gender identities by internalizing some aspects of gender. Because it 
manifests in interaction, the settings in which gender is salient is crucial. All social systems 
are gendered because gender is an integral part of these systems (Acker, 1988).  
The existence of biological differences between male and female is not denied 
within a gender-relations framework, but since gender is considered a social construction, 
the focus is on what society does with these biological differences (Ferree et al., 2007). 
Biological sex may be taken into account in gender analysis, but it is not deemed to 
determine the social relations system of gender (Scott, 1988). Power and domination are 
central to this model, but they apply as much to men as they do to women:  
… for the gender relations model, both men and women are caught up in gendered 
social relations. The operation of gender within all-male institutions, be it football or 
fraternities, is no less interesting than the interactions of women and men across this 
gendered boundary. Gender as a source of hierarchy, exclusion, and violence is far 
more sociologically interesting than ‘difference’ alone could be (Ferree et al., 2007, p. 
470).  
This historically and socially situated perspective is opposed to dualistic 
conceptualizations where inequalities between men and women are considered as ensuing 
necessarily from differences between these groups. Rather, in a gender-relations 
framework, the processes and structures that may produce inequalities are examined and 
differences between men and women are considered as resulting from these processes and 
structures (Ferree & Hall, 2000). For instance, rather than being associated primarily with 
gender differences in propensity to pursue promotions, gender gaps in promotion may be 
analyzed as possible outcomes of processes within organizations that make it more difficult 
for women to reach the higher levels of hierarchies. The situations of men and women are 
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not homogenous: not all men are in dominant positions and not all women are in 
subordinate positions. The differences between these groups call for social explanations. 
One important explanation is the hierarchically organized division of labor along gender 
lines, which tends to translate into a devaluation of activities associated with females. In 
addition, the relative positions of males and females are dynamic; they vary according to 
location and period (Daune-Richard & Devreux, 1992; Kergoat, 2005).  
The literature review suggests that there are two types of gendered division of labor 
among professors, i.e. horizontal (men and women are unevenly distributed among a large 
proportion of academic units) and vertical (women are underrepresented among full 
professors). In addition, there may be a cultural devaluation of traditionally feminine 
activities within academia. This thesis is partly based on an articulation of these concepts. 
The impact of horizontal segregation on the gender pay gap and the extent of vertical 
segregation within the organization under study are analyzed. We also analyze the 
relationship between the proportion of females within academic units and the remuneration 
of faculty members; finding an inverse relationship would be consistent with the idea that a 
cultural devaluation of traditionally feminine activities influences the remuneration of 
professors. In order to investigate other potential structural explanations of the gender pay 
gap, the influence of formalization of pay components on the gender pay gap is analyzed, 
and processes through which it may occur are suggested.  
The three articles 
The body of the thesis comprises three articles. The first analyzes the impact of 
common explanations of the gender pay gap among professors on the receipt of market 
supplements, regrouped along five dimensions: field of study, research activity, seniority, 
attitudes towards pay and family constraints. We use the expression “research activity”, not 
“research productivity”, because our data does not include indicators of actual research 
productivity such as number of publications or citations. Instead, available indicators 
provide information on research contracts received, grants, research chairs, integration in 
research teams and presence of research assistants, agents and post-doctoral fellows. These 
are all resources that certainly affect research productivity. Securing those resources also 
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most certainly results from previous research productivity. For these reasons, the 
indicators of research activity can be considered proxies of research productivity and we 
use them as such, but they cannot fully account for the actual research productivity of 
professors.  
This is the first study of gender differences on the access to market supplements 
among faculty members. One important contribution of this research is that it uses several 
indicators pertaining to attitudes towards pay and family constraints, two dimensions on 
which there is much speculation but not much data, in analyses of the gender pay gap 
among university faculty. Given data limitations, this article focuses on average differences 
by gender, a measure that paints only a partial picture of women’s and men’s access to pay 
supplements. This research thus leaves unexplored the potential variations within the 
organization on the gender gap in access to market supplements on the one hand, and 
remuneration as a whole on the other. 
The second article addresses this limitation by examining the conditions under 
which remuneration differences occur. Specifically, it seeks to determine the extent to 
which differences vary according to formalization of remuneration practices and female 
representation within units. The respective contribution to the gender gap of four 
remuneration components is estimated, i.e. base pay, access to full professorship, access to 
pay supplements and amount of pay supplements. These are characterized by various levels 
of formalization. Variations of gender differences on each remuneration component 
according to the relative representation of female faculty members within units are also 
examined. Separate analysis of gender differences are perfomed for three outcomes, i.e. 
total remuneration, promotion and receipt of either market supplements or CRCs. The use 
of multilevel analysis allows for the estimation of the respective contributions of individual 
and institutional determinants of remuneration.  
The last article seeks to understand the mechanisms that may have produced gender 
differences with regard to market supplements among faculty members. It is based on semi-
directed interviews conducted with 17 administrators aimed at understanding the processes 
through which these pay supplements are attributed and how their amounts are determined. 
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Content analysis of the interviews is performed to uncover the practices and processes that 
could have produced disadvantages for female faculty. Throughout the interviews and 
analysis, close attention is paid to claims regarding the rules and procedures that framed 
decisions because these may limit the possibilities for gender bias (Ridgeway, 2009). The 
information on market supplements provided to faculty members and academic 
administrators is examined as well because gender bias may also be limited through the 
imposition of accountability, for instance by requiring that decision-makers justify 
discrepancies by gender (Reskin, 2000b) or by publishing information that allows for the 
detection of evidence of discriminatory practices (Petersen & Saporta, 2004).  
It should be noted that although the two first articles account for the receipt of a 
CRC, their use differs within each article. In the first article, the presence of market 
supplements since the beginning of professors’ appointments is analyzed based on survey 
data collected in 2002. The dependent variable indicates whether or not faculty members 
declare having received a market supplements since they were appointed. The analysis 
includes a control for the receipt of a CRC as an indicator of professors’ market value as 
researchers. This is done because it is plausible that faculty members who were eventually 
awarded a CRC were also likely to have been recipients of market supplements in 
recognition for their research performance since the beginning of their appointment.  
The data used for the second article includes indicators for the presence of market 
and chair supplements for each year between 1997 and 2006, for all faculty members who 
were employed at the institution. A decision was made to analyze market and chair 
supplements jointly given the relatively small numbers of CRC recipients at the institution 
and the fact that these measures share important characteristics (their allocation processes 
are discretionary, they share common goals and the evolution of their use within the 
institution is closely linked).  
 Chapter 2 
 
Article 1 : Doucet, C., Durand, C. & Smith, M. (2008). Who Gets Market 
Supplements? Gender Differences within a Large Canadian University.  
Published in : Canadian Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 67-103. 
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Abstract 
This study examines the gender pay gap among university faculty by analyzing 
gender differences in one component of faculty members’ salaries – “market premiums.” 
The data were collected during the Fall of 2002 using a survey of faculty at a single 
Canadian research university. Correspondence analysis and logistic regression analysis are 
performed in order to identify the characteristics related to the award of market premiums 
and whether these characteristics account for gender differences. The correspondence 
analysis produces a two-factor solution in which the second axis clearly opposes faculty 
who receive market premiums to those who do not. Gender is strongly related to this factor, 
with the female category on the side of the axis associated with the absence of market 
premium. The results of the logistic regression confirm that field of specialization, 
frequency of external research contracts, faculty members’ values and attitudes towards 
remuneration and seniority within rank are all related to the award of market premiums, as 
hypothesized. However, women were still almost three times less likely than men to have 
been awarded market premiums after controlling for these relationships. Overall, the results 
suggest that within a collective bargaining context, reindividualization of the pay 
determination process — notably, the payment of market premiums to faculty — may 
reopen pay differences by gender. 
Résumé 
Cette recherche examine les écarts salariaux selon le genre chez les professeurs 
d’université en procédant à l’analyse des écarts selon le genre sur une composante 
spécifique du salaire des professeurs, soit les primes dites “de marché”. Les données 
proviennent d’un sondage effectué en 2002 auprès des professeurs d’une grande université 
canadienne. L’analyse des correspondances de même que la régression logistique sont 
utilisées dans le but d’identifier les caractéristiques liées à la présence de primes de marché 
et d’examiner si ces caractéristiques peuvent expliquer les différences selon le genre. 
L’analyse des correspondances donne une solution à deux facteurs dans laquelle le second 
facteur oppose clairement les professeurs qui ont reçu une prime à ceux qui n’en n’ont pas 
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reçue. Le genre est fortement associé à ce facteur, la catégorie “femme” se retrouvant du 
côté de l’axe associé à l’absence de primes de marché. Les résultats de la régression 
logistique confirment que le secteur d’activité, la fréquence des contrats de recherche, la 
valorisation du salaire ainsi que le rang combiné à l’ancienneté sont reliés à la présence de 
primes de marché, tel que proposé par les hypothèses. Toutefois, même après avoir contrôlé 
pour ces relations, les femmes sont toujours près de trois fois moins susceptibles de s’être 
vu attribuer des primes de marché que leurs homologues masculins. Dans l’ensemble, les 
résultats suggèrent que dans un contexte où les salaires sont déterminés par convention 
collective, la réindividualisation du processus de détermination des salaires — en 
particulier le versement de primes de marché aux professeurs d’université — peut favoriser 
la réapparition d’écarts de salaire selon le genre. 
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Introduction 
On average, women faculty members in Canadian universities have been paid less 
than their male colleagues. Using Statistics Canada’s Survey of Full-Time University 
Faculty in Canada, Ornstein, Stewart and Drakich (1998) found a 16.8% gender pay gap in 
1994. There had been little change by 2002-2003: also using Statistics Canada data, 
Sussman and Yssaad (2005) reported a gap of 15%. What explains this difference in pay by 
gender? Ornstein et al. (1998) found that after controls for age, degree, field of 
specialization, and institutional affiliation, the gender pay gap fell from 16.8% to 8.1%. 
When rank was added, the difference fell to 3.9%. Sussman and Yssaad (2005) also found a 
gender pay gap within rank, ranging from 4% to 6%, depending on rank. An unexplained 
gap thus remains and did not seem to decrease substantially during the period between the 
two studies. 
Clearly, further research on the gender pay gap among academics is warranted. 
There should and no doubt will be continued efforts to refine the methods and diversify the 
data sources used to estimate the coefficients of the sort of earnings equation tested by 
Ornstein et al. (1998). In this paper, however, a complementary analytic approach is 
proposed. Generally speaking, earnings of faculty members in Canadian universities reflect 
some combination of the following components: (a) pay at the point of hire; (b) seniority, 
often summarized in a detailed pay scale by years of service; (c) promotion through the 
ranks; (d) merit increments based on judgments of performance; (e) stipends to compensate 
for administrative responsibilities; and (f) market supplements paid to attract new faculty 
members and retain those likely to leave. Scale increases with years of service are 
mechanical and cannot lead to an unexplained gender gap. However, the other four sources 
of pay increase as well as pay at the point of hire might do so because they may or do 
involve discretion. 
This paper focuses on one of these discretionary forms of pay increase – market 
premiums. The rationale for market premiums is to cope either with distinctly robust 
demand for faculty in various disciplines or with the (sometimes potential) robust demand 
for individuals because of the excellence of their academic records. These appear to have 
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become an increasingly important component of the earnings determination process in 
Canadian universities. At least, this has been claimed by several Quebec faculty unions 
(Pelletier, 2004; SGPUM, 2001, 2002; SPPUS, 2002; SPUL, 2003). 
How pervasive is the use of market supplements among Canadian universities? 
According to the Canadian Association of University Professors (CAUT), in 2001 most 
universities either used market supplements or were considering doing so (Fraser & 
Newark, 2001). Our review of the collective agreements and other salary agreements of the 
90 member universities of the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) 
shows that 39% (35/90) of universities openly use this practice. This proportion is an 
underestimate because not all institutions that use market supplements provide public 
documentation of the fact. For example, the only mention of market premiums in the 
collective agreement of the university where this research was conducted states that global 
remuneration comprises a base salary and, if the case arises, an individual premium. 
According to the agreements reviewed, most institutions allocate supplements on an 
individual basis (27 institutions). Seven other institutions allocate supplements to specified 
fields, and one does not provide information on the allocation method. The specified fields 
include engineering, business administration, law, dentistry, economics, and computer 
science. In some cases, supplements are part of faculty member’s base salary (11 
institutions) while in others, they are distinct from it (23 institutions). 
In this paper we examine differences by gender in the assignment of market 
premiums within one major Canadian university. There are interesting features to the 
process of assigning market premiums at this university. Base salary is fixed by collective 
agreement while market premiums are discretionary. Premiums may be assigned at the 
point of hire or at any subsequent point in a person’s career. There has been a considerable 
amount of secrecy surrounding their award (provoking an article by a department chair in 
the newsletter of the faculty union in April 2000 that expressed outrage at the secrecy 
surrounding market supplements). No written trace of the criteria used to allocate such 
supplements can be found in the organization’s documents. In principle, they exist to 
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respond to the market demand for individuals and for academic fields. In practice they 
seem often to be awarded in response to requests. 
Until about 1998-2000, market premiums were normally used as a temporary 
adjustment to the basic salary. They were seen as the difference between the basic salary 
that was prescribed by the collective agreement and a target salary. As the basic salary 
increased with seniority and negotiated raises, the premiums diminished until the basic and 
target salary matched. Since 2001, premiums have been negotiated for a period of five 
years and the amount remains the same for the duration of the agreement. After five years, 
the agreement may be extended after a performance assessment. 
Administrative data from the institution indicate that premiums represented 1.8% of 
the total payroll in 1997 (the earliest data available) and 4.6% in 2002 (the year of the 
survey used for the present research). They had reached 6.1% by 2006. The proportion of 
faculty receiving premiums grew from 22.6% in 1997 to 31.9% in 2002 and 38.6% in 2006 
(including premiums to Canada Research Chair holders). The average amount of these 
awards has more than doubled over the years, from about 5,600$ in 1997 to 11,800$ in 
2002 and 15,000$ in 2006. Thus, they represent a growing proportion of the total earnings 
of faculty employed at this university and an even more significant component of those to 
whom they have been awarded: in 1997 they represented 7.5% of the salary of the 
recipients, in 2002 11.8%, and in 2006 12.8%.  
We begin our analysis of gender and market premiums with a discussion of the 
broader literature on pay differences by gender, since that is a source of hypotheses that are 
most closely relevant to the subject. 
The pay gap: potential explanations 
Part of the gender pay gap is known to be due to gender differences in various 
characteristics related to pay. Previous research has shown that work experience and 
education help explain the gap. Unionization and work preferences resulting from different 
socialization are also possible explanatory factors. Another part of the gap however may be 
due to employers’ discriminatory attitudes towards women. In Canada, the gender pay gap 
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tended to fall over the 1970’s and 1980’s. Using data from Canadian censuses and the 
Survey of Consumer Finances, Baker et al. (1995) found that the gender pay gap among 
full-year, full-time workers fell from 40% in 1970 to 36% in 1980, to 33% in 1990. This 
decline is attributed to two types of factors. First, there was a decline in the portion of the 
gap that is due to gender differences in characteristics related to pay. The average amount 
of experience and education of women rose during that period. Increasing numbers entered 
better paid occupations and the proportion unionized increased (Baker et al., 1995; Kidd & 
Shannon, 1997). Second, the unexplained part of the gap was also decreasing, which may 
have resulted from a decline in discrimination towards women and/or the convergence of 
women’s and men’s unobserved characteristics (Baker et al., 1995; Kidd & Shannon, 
1997). Both explanations are plausible. A parallel decrease in the gender pay gap has been 
observed among university faculty (Ornstein et al., 1998). However, data from the 1996 
and 2001 Canadian censuses suggest that the gap tended to remain relatively stable over the 
1990’s in the general population, at approximately 29% (Statistics Canada, 2003).  
The gender pay gap among faculty tends to be higher in the United States. Using 
data from 1999, Barbezat and Hughes (2005) found a 20.7% unadjusted gender pay gap 
among American faculty, a figure closer to the 1970’s Canadian gender pay gap among 
Faculty than to the one observed in the early 2000’s. Unionization almost certainly partly 
explains this difference. It tends to be associated with a smaller gap (Baker and Fortin, 
1999; Doiron and Riddell, 1994) and Canadian faculty are more highly unionized than their 
U.S. counterparts. One mechanism through which unionization may reduce the gender pay 
gap is by promoting transparency and limiting discretion in pay determination processes. In 
general, transparent pay determination systems are associated with greater equality in pay 
(Rubery et al., 1998).  
Factors accounting for the pay gap between male and female faculty members have 
been assigned to two models: the difference model and the deficit model (Sonnert & 
Holton, 1995). The difference model refers to aspects of biography and preferences that 
may distinguish men and women. The deficit model refers to formal and informal processes 
that exclude women. As Sonnert (1999) explains, the difference model focuses on factors at 
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the individual level. The deficit model refers to the way women are treated; it focuses on 
structural, organizational and social factors. Empirically, the boundary between the two 
models is not clear-cut. Nonetheless, the factors associated with the deficit model 
approximately coincide with those that might be considered discrimination. 
Five potential explanations of the gender pay gap among faculty are relevant for our 
purposes. First, fields within which women tend to be underrepresented command higher 
salaries. Data compiled by the Canadian Association of University Teachers (2004) shows 
that in 2001-2002, 29.8% of all Canadian full-time faculty members were female but they 
were underrepresented in two of the four highest paid sectors. The percent female in 
engineering and applied sciences were 9.9%, and in mathematics and the physical sciences, 
13.3% (their presence in the other two – agricultural/biological sciences and social sciences 
approximately coincides with their presence in the profession as a whole). Conversely, they 
were over-represented in all four sectors offering the lowest average salaries — 36.9% in 
health professions and occupations,25 38.3% in fine and applied arts, 38% in humanities and 
related sciences, and 45% in education. 
Second, women’s average research activity could be lower than men’s. Over 50 
American studies (Cole & Zuckerman, 1984, in Cole & Singer, 1992), as well as one 
Canadian study (Nakhaie, 2002), have detected a gender gap in publication rates. Using 
survey data from 1987, Nakhaie (2002) has shown that when no adjustments were made for 
factors commonly associated with publication, male faculty members published roughly 
twice as much in their lifetime as females. Most of this gap was associated with gender 
differences in rank, field of specialization, seniority, type of institution and time devoted to 
research. However, as noted by the author, the causal relationship implied by these 
associations was unclear26 and the data used for this research was collected in 1987. The 
                                                 
25 This sector includes the following fields: basic sciences-medicine, dental specialities, dentistry, medical 
specialization, medical technology, medicine, nursing, optometry, paraclinical science, pharmacy, public 
health, rehabilitation medicine, surgery and other health occupations. There is great variability of salaries by 
field within this sector, and women are greatly over-represented in the fields that command the lowest salaries 
(i.e., rehabilitation medicine and nursing, where women comprise respectively 74.2% and 93.6% of faculty). 
26 Women tend to hold lower ranks than their male counterparts. Publishing is crucial to rank progression, but 
it could also be that holding a higher rank leads to publishing more — that faculty members in higher ranks 
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situation of women faculty members has significantly changed since then, and gender 
differences in publication rates may no longer exist (Nakhaie, 2002). A recent study on 
American science faculty revealed very little, if any, gender difference in publication rates 
in recent cohorts (Xie & Shauman, 2003). 
Of course, gender differences in publication rates – if present – could themselves 
reflect women’s lesser integration into the academic culture (O’Leary & Mitchell, 1990, 
Sonnert & Holton, 1995) and their limited access to resources that promote research 
productivity. In 1999, a highly-publicized report from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology concluded that its women faculty members had limited access to space and to 
research grants and were excluded from positions of power. The report concluded that 
“Differences resulted in women having less or in their being excluded from important 
professional opportunities” (MIT, 1999, p. 13). In Canada, there has been concern 
expressed about poor female representation among Canada Research Chair holders, which 
led to a human-rights complaint (PAR-L Electronic Network, 2005) that was recently 
settled by an agreement on equity in the nomination process for chairholders. The Fifth-
Year Evaluation of the Canada Research Chairs Program showed that although the 
proportion of new female chair recipients had increased from 14.1% to 32.0% between 
2000 to 2004, only 19.8% of chairholders were women in 2004 (R.A. Malatest & 
Associates Ltd, 2004) and 22% in 2006 (Canada Research Chairs Program Website). 
Publication rates are likely to indirectly influence salary in two ways: (a) they may 
generate a track record that increases the likelihood of better salary offers from other 
institutions (that may be either accepted or used to bargain with the current employer); (b) 
they may affect salary through their impact on rank progression. A study conducted by 
Ornstein and Stewart (1996) suggested a negligible effect of publication record on salary. 
                                                                                                                                                     
benefit from a process of accumulation of advantages such as better access to resources for research, a wider 
professional network, and the recognition that leads to invited publications (Nakhaie, 2002). At least two 
other reasons could account for the higher publication rate of senior faculty. First, in universities with 
substantial tenure requirements in terms of publication, junior faculty who do not publish may not receive 
tenure, leaving only more productive faculty at higher ranks. Second, senior faculty may be more productive 
as a result of their experience in publication and teaching: experience in publishing may lead to a reduction in 
the time needed to write publications; experience in teaching, which implies an accumulation of lecture notes, 
may free up time for publication. 
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But the study used data from 1986. For the reasons given earlier, in many universities the 
relation between track record and salary has probably strengthened since then. 
Third, women and men may differ in terms of values and attitudes towards work 
and pay. One form of this argument suggests that gender role socialization may have made 
males more competitive, aggressive, and disposed to dominate in one way or another and 
women more inclined to prize sensitivity and to be somewhat submissive (Blau, Ferber & 
Winkler, 2006). Were these characterizations correct, the gender gap in salaries might be a 
result of men’s greater aggressiveness when it comes to negotiating salaries or playing the 
game of seeking better offers from other institutions in order to force the current employer 
to match them (Blackaby et al., 2005; Svarstad et al., 2004). However, the evidence on 
differences in attitudes to work by gender is mixed. A meta-analysis of 21 studies, 19 of 
which were laboratory-based, revealed only small gender differences in the outcomes from 
salary negotiations (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). A recent study based on a survey 
investigating the actual experiences of salary negotiation by university graduates in 
business, psychology, sociology, and history found no gender difference in the incidence of 
negotiation or in the relative success of negotiation (O’Shea & Bush, 2002). Finally, to our 
knowledge, no research has examined whether women and men academics differ in their 
attitudes towards salary negotiation.  
Another form of the argument that there are gender differences in attitudes to work 
and pay is based on the idea of compensating differentials (Shirazi, Biel & Fransson, 2002). 
According to this model, there are gender differences in preferences with respect to job 
attributes. The results of recent studies on this topic are mixed. Using different data sources 
and studying different occupations, Tolbert and Moen (1998), Browne (1997), and Shirazi 
et al. (2002) all report no differences between men and women in the job attributes they 
most value. In contrast, Barbezat (1992) found significant gender differences in the job 
attributes preferred by Ph.D. graduates entering the academic job market. Men displayed a 
greater tendency to prioritize salary than women. Women were more likely to prioritize 
student quality, collegiality and opportunities for collaborative work (Barbezat, 1992). 
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However, this research is by no means definitive since it was limited to economists and 
subjects were at the beginning of their career.  
Fourth, men on average have more seniority than their female counterparts 
(Ornstein & Stewart, 1996) and occupy higher academic ranks (Ornstein & Stewart, 1996; 
Ornstein et al., 1998; Sussman & Yssaad, 2005). There are several possible reasons for this. 
The presence of women in the academic profession in large numbers is relatively recent. It 
is more likely that, because of family constraints or for other reasons including 
discrimination, their careers were interrupted or that they delayed the start of their careers 
(Ornstein & Stewart, 1996; Ornstein et al., 1998; Sussman & Yssaad, 2005).  
Finally, the academic career is said to have been shaped to match life pattern more 
typical of males in that it hardly tolerates interruptions, requires working long hours as well 
as a willingness to travel, and in which large pay increases may require a willingness to be 
mobile. According to several studies reviewed in an American Sociological Association 
report (2004: 5), “Mothers often bear the primary family obligations that conflict with the 
demands and rhythms of academic life.” The years when child-bearing and the care of 
young children are concentrated often coincide with the critical time when an academic 
must work relentlessly to obtain tenure. Child care may limit the capacity of women to 
build their reputations and networks through conference participation. And broader family 
commitments may limit the willingness of women to take jobs that require geographic 
mobility. The fact that, within couples, women are on average younger than men may play 
a role. The age differential may imply that women’s spouses have been on the labour 
market for a longer time than the women themselves and are more likely to have an 
established career. This simple fact may hamper women’s choice. In short, women faculty 
are more likely to be part of dual-career couples. 
The evidence on these factors is mixed. The research on child-rearing and 
promotion has yielded inconsistent results. Ginther and Hayes (2001) and studies reviewed 
by Bentley and Adamson (2003) suggest that child-rearing slows promotion. Long (2001) 
and Perna (2003), however, found no effect. In a study of four Australian universities, 
many women faculty members expressed a reluctance to participate in conferences while 
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their children were young (Deane et al., 1996). In their research on fellowship recipients of 
the National Science Foundation and the National Research Council, Sonnert and Holton 
(1995) found that mothers were more likely to say that they had accepted post-doctoral 
fellowships in order to be with their partner. Men, on the other hand, displayed the opposite 
tendency; the ones who were childless were more likely than the ones who had children to 
say that they had accepted post-doctoral fellowships in order to be with their partner. 
There has been some interesting and relatively recent work on the issue of 
geographic mobility. In a recent study of academic economists in the United Kingdom, 
Blackaby, Booth and Frank (2005) found that women were less likely than men to have 
received an outside offer in the five previous years. They argue that this finding is 
consistent with what Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2003) call the “loyal servant 
hypothesis.” This argues that the fact that family commitments more often limit female than 
male mobility and that prospective employers know this, means that those employers are 
less likely to make offers to women. Current employers exploit the opportunity this 
provides by paying their female employees less. Note, however, that the fact that women 
had received less outside offers over the five previous years was the only evidence 
provided. The article contained no direct evidence bearing on the loyal servant hypothesis.  
Since market supplements have not been specifically addressed by previous 
research, this study derives its hypotheses from the literature reviewed above, which deals 
with pay differentials by gender. Some of the hypotheses reviewed below have not been 
supported in previous research. We retain them here because access to market premiums 
may provide a more precise way to test them than is the case for aggregate pay. 
Transposing the possible explanations proposed for gender differences in pay to gender 
differences in market premiums generates the following hypotheses. 
A first question asks whether female faculty members are disadvantaged in their 
access to market premiums as well as in their overall salary. This leads to our first 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 – Women are less likely to receive market premiums than men. 
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Our second question is whether this difference – if present – can be understood as 
an outcome of gender differences in the presence of characteristics that increase the 
likelihood of having received a market premium. There are four hypotheses related to this 
question. 
Market premiums are aimed at compensating individual or collective differences in 
the market situation of faculty members. The most common indicators of market situation 
are field of specialization and faculty members’ research activity. So: 
Hypothesis 2 – The receipt of market premiums is related to research activity and field of 
specialization.  
The three remaining hypotheses deal with characteristics that are less clearly related 
to the reasons for which systems of market premiums are introduced. Suppose that market 
premiums are more likely to be awarded to those inclined to negotiate for them. It is 
possible that those who rank pay highest in their list of desirable job attributes negotiate 
with more determination, therefore:  
Hypothesis 3 – Those who most value pay raises are more likely to have received market 
premiums. 
Late starts, career disruptions and academic career characteristics are frequently 
used to account for lower female pay. We would expect, then, that career characteristics of 
this sort play some role in the process through which market premiums are secured.  
Hypothesis 4 – Career characteristics are related to the reception of market premiums. 
Finally, in the literature there is much speculation – and not much data – on the 
consequences of family constraints for the career of faculty members. Therefore:  
Hypothesis 5 - Family constraints reduce the likelihood that someone will have received a 
market premium. 
Our core question is, then: after controlling for all the characteristics related to the 
presence of market premiums, does a gender difference in the receipt of them persist?  
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Methodology 
This is a case study of a single university. This particular university provides an 
interesting context for an examination of the operation of a system for awarding market 
premiums. The university is unionized, but the system for awarding market premiums falls 
outside the collective agreement. The university’s administration has not made available to 
the broader university community information on the operation of the system. In this 
context, then, market premiums are an area where administrators can exercise complete 
discretion and have a strong incentive to do so because they cannot exercise discretion in 
basic pay, which is governed by a collective agreement. Our interest is in whether or not the 
exercise of discretion produces equivalent outcomes for male and female faculty members. 
Data 
The data come from a survey conducted in the Fall of 2002, sponsored by the 
university’s faculty union. Questionnaires were sent to all 1249 tenure-track faculty, 
researchers, lecturers and research associates who were members of the union27. The 
response rate was 51.6%. For the objectives of this research it is a suitable data source since 
it includes information related to all of the factors discussed above. There are, however, 
two possible weaknesses. Non-response might be a source of bias. There might also be bias 
because the data are self-reported.  
To check for possible bias the demographic and occupational results from the 
survey were compared with available administrative data from the university. Note that in 
the administrative records market supplements and administrative stipends are combined. 
In the survey data, these are distinguished. For comparative purposes, we combined them. 
Data presented in appendix A shows that there is little difference in the distributions of 
characteristics between the two data sets.  
                                                 
27  Detailed methodological information, including the questionnaire, is available from the authors.  
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Measures 
The indicator of presence of market premiums available in this analysis is whether 
or not one had been received since appointment to a tenure-track position. This creates a 
methodological problem that is addressed in the next section. There are four sets of 
variables, each set corresponding with the content of hypotheses 2 to 5. There is descriptive 
information on these variables in appendix B. In addition, appendix C presents the 
distribution of these variables by gender. 
For hypothesis 2, academic sector of employment (reflecting the general market 
value of various fields of specialization) provides a collective measure of faculty market 
value. Indicators of individual value are how often faculty members have accepted a private 
research contract in the last year, being a member of a research team, currently receiving 
research grants, being the recipient of a Canada Research Chair, being the recipient of any 
other kind of research chair, and the presence of research assistants, research professionals 
and post-doctoral fellows. For hypothesis 3, attitudes to remuneration are measured by a 
question on the priority given to increases in salary as opposed to other aspects of 
employment. For hypothesis 4, indicators of career stage are seniority within rank, age at 
appointment, number of years of professional experience prior to appointment, type of 
previous work experience as well as presence of administrative stipends since 
appointment.28 Finally, for hypothesis 5 there are four indicators of family constraints: 
presence of children under 12, main occupation of spouse, perceived level of difficulty 
associated with combining professional and family obligations, and presence of demanding 
family responsibilities over the previous two years.  
                                                 
28 Faculty members who have received administrative premiums have been part of the administration at one 
point, which is an indicator of their career. However, having been part of the administration also means that 
they have been normally informed of the availability of market premiums, which is not necessarily the case 
for other faculty members. Thus, they may be more likely to request – and receive – market supplement than 
faculty members who were never part of the administration. This consideration is particularly relevant in the 
context of the institution at which this research was conducted, where the presence of a market supplements 
policy is kept relatively secret. 
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A measurement gap 
Our measure of the salary component under study allows respondents to report 
receipt of a premium at any point during their appointment at the university under study. 
Before 1998, the university’s practice was to diminish the amounts of the premiums until 
extinction. So some respondents may have received a premium in the past that had been 
terminated by the time of the survey. This is a problem: the data available means that we 
are obliged to examine the relationship between information on respondents’ attitudes and 
research output from 2002, on the one hand, and the receipt of a market premium that may 
have occurred several years earlier, and may have disappeared, several years earlier.  
We have carefully explored this issue. Administrative data from the institution 
shows that, of those who were receiving premiums between 1997 and 2002, only 9.1% lost 
them at some point over this period. Moreover, as discussed earlier, it is only since 1998 
that market premiums have been widely used. Overall, it seems safe to assume that most 
market premiums to which faculty referred in their answers were awarded fairly recently 
and that most faculty who were awarded a market premium still received it at the time of 
the survey. This information is unfortunately not available in the survey data however. 
What about the fact that we are looking for associations between 2002 responses to 
questions and a market premium award that in some cases would have taken place several 
years previously? What is at issue here is the relative stability of our measures. Many are 
(almost) completely stable – this would be true of age at appointment, gender and, for the 
most part, academic sector.  
There is a set of variables related to research performance that may not be stable. A 
person who received a market premium in 1998 may not have supervised a post-doctoral 
fellow at that time but have acquired one by 2002. But we know that there is considerable 
continuity over time in research performance. It is, for example, in the nature of the 
program, that somebody who had a Canada Research Chair in 2002 normally had stronger 
than average research performance five or ten years earlier. Then there are family 
responsibilities – actual and perceived. A professor with a child under 12 in 2002 may not 
have had one in 1998, when he or she received a market premium. But since the range of 
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ages spanned is birth to 12 and since there was a marked growth of market premium 
awards at the end of the 1990s it is likely that in most cases the added family responsibility 
would have coincided with the period during which the award was made. Moreover 
responses to the question on the perceived difficulty in combining professional and family 
responsibilities are likely to have been shaped over some time. Finally, those who have 
used different valuations of the importance of pay to explain differences in pay by gender 
must assume that those valuations are relatively stable. Were they not, it is difficult to see 
how women’s pay disadvantage could be produced by a (relative) disinterest in pay, as 
compared to men. 
None of this is to suggest that the use of responses to questions in 2002 to predict 
awards that in some cases were made several years earlier poses no problems. It is, rather, 
to suggest that the seriousness of the problem should not be exaggerated. We return to the 
issue in the interpretation of our results, in the conclusion. 
Analyses 
Two procedures are used to analyze the data. They differ in the extent to which they 
assume causal sequencing. First, a correspondence analysis using SPAD v6 is used in order 
to describe the relationships between variables without an assumption of causal sequence. 
The procedure is a special case of principal components analysis in which variables are 
measured at the nominal or ordinal level. Consequently, chi-square instead of correlation is 
used to assess distances. It is a technique used to visualize data. It projects on a single 
geometric plane all the relationships between variables so that categories that are chosen by 
the same respondents are close to each other on the plane (Lebart, Morineau and Piron, 
2002) 
In correspondence analysis variables may either be used as active or supplementary 
elements. Active variables and their interrelations determine a map – or maps if more than 
two factors are retained. For the results to be interpretable, active variables must all relate 
to the same theme (Morineau, 1993). Supplementary variables do not contribute to the 
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computation of the factors. Their relationship with the active map determines their 
projection on the bi-dimensional space defined by the factors  
In the present research, the active variables retained are all those that should be 
related to the receipt of market supplements because they are the prime factors used to 
justify their presence (i.e. sector of activity, frequency of research contracts, and the 
indicators of research activity), as well as the receipt of market supplements. Therefore, the 
active plane provides information on the relationships between market value, research 
activity and market premiums. It is related to Hypothesis 2 which states that there is a 
relationship between the market value of faculty and receipt of market premiums.  
The supplementary variables that are projected on this plane are those that might be 
expected not to be related to market supplements, if market premiums were only a 
reflection of market value and, of particular interest for our purposes, gender. They are 
related to hypotheses 1, 3, 4, and 5. If the supplementary variables are related to market 
premiums, they will load significantly on the same factor that includes the presence of 
market premiums. This is a first test of our hypotheses.  
A limit to correspondence analysis is that it is difficult to compare its results with 
those of studies published elsewhere. Another is that it does not generate an estimate of the 
extent of gender differences that are unaccounted for by other variables. This sort of 
residual difference is a major focus of interest in most of the relevant research. To 
supplement the correspondence analysis, then, we also present analyses using logistic 
regression, which tends to assume a causal sequence. As observed before, we return to the 
plausibility and implications of this assumption in the conclusion. 
Hierarchical logistic regressions are used in order to assess the impact of adding 
explanatory variables on the relationship between gender and the receipt of market 
premiums. Therefore, gender is entered first, followed by the variables found to be related 
to the presence of market premiums in the correspondence analysis. These variables were 
entered in blocks in order to estimate their added contribution and to check for possible 
interactions. Finally, we present the most parsimonious model which retains only the 
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variables that have a significant or substantial relationship with the receipt of market 
premiums. 29  
Results 
Correspondence Analysis 
The Cattell Scree test yielded two factors. The first accounts for 15.6% of the total 
variance, the second for 10.0%, for a fairly substantial 25.6% of the total variance. There is 
little difference between the eigenvalues of the following factors, which suggests that the 
second factor is the threshold for retaining factors to be considered.  
Figure 1 describes the results of the analysis30. Significant t-test scores of the factor 
loadings are presented in appendix D. The first factor is clearly and almost solely defined 
by research activities, opposing the more active researchers to the less active. The t-tests of 
the significance of the factor loadings of the different categories vary from 5.1 to 19.9. The 
variables that most contribute to this axis are, in descending order of importance, research 
grants, being a member of a research team, presence of research assistants, research agents 
and post-doctoral fellows, frequency of research contracts and sector of activity. On the 
more active researcher side of the axis, the characteristics that reflect the presence of 
human and financial resources for research tend to be present while on the less active 
researcher side, they are absent. Academic sector is also related to this factor. Those in the 
Faculty of Medicine are most active, those in “other faculties” (Architecture, Law, 
Theology and Kinesiology) less active. Receipt of a market premium is not related to this 
axis.  
                                                 
29 This study uses the entire population of union members as opposed to a sample of this population. For this 
reason, the statistical tests that are used do not apply in a strict sense. The term “significant” should thus be 
understood as an indication of substantial differences. 
30 In examining the graph, the reader has to be conscious that the position of the various categories of 
variables on the map is not uniquely determined by the importance of the relationship between a given 
variable and its categories and the factors as illustrated by the axes.  It is the structure of relationships that 
determines the plan. Hence, a category with very few cases may be positioned further on a given axis but it 
may not be a significant contributor to the axis if there are not enough cases to warrant signification. The 
interpretation uses the statistical contribution of the different categories, not their positioning on the axes. 
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1.2Figure 1. Graphical representation of the first two factors – correspondence analysis31 
 
The presence of market supplements is by far the largest contributor to the second 
factor, as indicated by the high t-test associated with the yes category of this variable 
(15.9). This factor clearly opposes faculty who receive market supplements to those who do 
not and is orthogonal to the first factor. The remaining variables contributing to this axis 
may all be thought of as being more or less directly related to the market value of faculty. 
Receipt of a market premium is on the same side of the axis as working in the pure and 
applied sciences or in specialized medicine (Dentistry, Optometry, Pharmacy, Veterinary 
Medicine), holding a Canada Research Chair, post-doctoral supervision, and at least 
occasional research contracts. On the absence of market supplements side of the axis are 
the Humanities, Literature, Nursing, and Education. This shows that research activity of a 
                                                 
31 In order to make the results more readable, the central area of the graph produced by Spad is magnified. 
Since the ‘yes’ category of the variable ‘award of a Canada research chair’ lies outside of this area 
(coordinates: 1.26 on axis 1 and 3.41 on axis 2), it does not appear in the graph. Italics indicate supplementary 
variables. Characters in bold indicate both active and supplementary variables that load the most significantly 
on axis 2.   
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particular kind was related to the award of market supplements – the sort of activity that 
leads to a Canada Research Chair and involves post-doctoral fellows – both of which have 
been more common in the natural and biological sciences. 
The contribution of the supplementary variables is consistent with the interpretation 
of the first factor as more/less active researcher. The variables that are most related to this 
factor are seniority within rank and type of prior professional experience. Full professors 
with six years or less of seniority within rank and faculty who had prior research experience 
tend to be found on the more active researcher side of the axis, while assistant professors 
and those who had teaching experience and a substantial work history prior to their 
appointment at the university under study tend to be found on the less active researcher side 
of the axis. The relationship between this factor and the remaining categories is fairly weak 
(t-test <2.5). They include, on the more active researcher side, some characteristics that are 
related to age like the presence of children under the age of 12 and having a spouse who has 
another type of professional occupation. 
The supplementary variables that interest us in this analysis are those related to the 
factor dominated by the award of market supplements. The variable most related to this 
factor is gender. Women are clearly on the side of the axis where those not receiving 
market supplements cluster. In order of importance, on the side of the axis where those who 
received market supplements cluster, we find those who assigned the most importance to 
salary, were recently appointed to the rank of full professor, were appointed to the 
university under the age of 30, and had entered directly into an academic position. These 
are all consistent with a portrait of a faculty star. 
This correspondence analysis is informative. It shows that gender is associated with 
the receipt of market supplements. The limit to this analysis is that it does not allow us to 
determine whether or not the relationship between gender and market supplements is due to 
the fact that men and women tend to differ on various other characteristics related to the 
award of a supplement. This issue is addressed in the next section. 
Logistic Regression Analysis 
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The variables in the correspondence analysis related to the factor determined by the 
presence of market supplements are retained for this new analysis. They are entered in five 
sets – as defined in the literature review and in the hypotheses. This allows us to estimate 
the relationship between each set and the award of a market supplement as well as the 
impact of their inclusion on variables already present in the analysis. The order of entry is 
the same as the order of the hypotheses. Gender is entered first, followed by the variables 
that, most obviously, should be related to market supplements. The variables related to 
attitude, career, and family constraints are entered subsequently. Thus, at each step, it is 
possible to estimate whether the inclusion of the variables has an impact on the relationship 
between gender and the presence of market supplements. Finally, we fit a parsimonious 
model that includes only the variables that are related to the odds of receiving market 
supplements.  
The results of the hierarchical logistic regression are displayed in table 1. The first 
column shows that the likelihood of receiving a market supplement is associated with 
gender, with women being 2.4 times32 less likely than their male counterparts to receive 
market supplements. In fact, 3.9% of the variance in market supplement awards is related to 
gender33. This result is consistent with those obtained using correspondence analysis. 
Five indicators of market value were components of the second factor identified in 
the correspondence analysis – academic sector, frequency of research contracts, holding a 
Canada Research Chair, having research assistants, and post-doctoral fellows. Of these, 
academic sector and research contracts are related to market supplements in the logistic 
regression analysis. Holding a Canada Research Chair is close to significance. As compared 
to faculty members in the Humanities, members in all other sectors – except the Faculty of 
Medicine34 – were more likely to have received market supplements. The odds range from 
                                                 
32 To make the description of the results more readily understandable, the negative odds (exp β of less than 1) 
are presented as 1/exp β. A value of 0.42 for exp β gives a value of 2.4 for 1/exp β, which means that women 
are 2.4 times less likely than men to receive such supplements. 
33 Values of Nagelkerke R2 can be interpreted in the same way as Pearson’s R2. 
34 Professors at the Faculty of medicine in this sample are the non clinicians who teach in the Faculty. They 
may be professors/researchers in physical and occupational therapy, public health, health administration, etc. 
They benefit from a different and higher basic pay scale.  
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4.4 in Nursing and Education to more than 25 in specialized medicine. Faculty members 
who had often or occasionally accepted private research contracts were 2.3 times more 
likely to have received market supplements than those who had never accepted such 
contracts35. Canada Research Chair holders were almost 8 times more likely than others to 
have been awarded a market supplement. The remaining market value indicators – the 
presence of post-doctoral fellows and of research assistants – are unrelated to the receipt of 
market supplements, net of the presence of the other indicators. Their relationship with 
market supplements reflects differences between academic sectors36. 
With these indicators of market value the variance explained by the model rises to 
26.1%. Hypothesis 2 is supported. Note, furthermore, that the coefficient for gender falls 
somewhat: the odds ratio goes from 2.4 to 2.1, but this change is not large enough to be 
significant. 
The third column shows that those who most value salary scale improvements were 
more likely to have received market supplements – 2.7 times more likely than those who 
saw it as a low priority. Adding this indicator has a negligible effect on the coefficients of 
the other predictors and increases the variance explained by 2 percentage points. 
Hypothesis 3 is supported, but there is no evidence that differences in this attitude explain 
the women’s lower probability of being awarded market supplements. In fact, in this 
sample, the relationship between gender and priority given to salary scale improvement is 
weak (see appendix C).  
Of the five available indicators of career characteristics, only seniority within rank 
is clearly related to receipt of a market premium. The broad pattern is that assistant 
professors were most likely to have been awarded a market premium. As compared to 
them, full professors in the rank for seven or more years were 4 times less likely to have got 
                                                 
35 The impact of research contracts on the market value of faculty may differ substantially by field. These 
contracts are highly valued in engineering and management, but less so in humanities and social sciences. 
However, our data does not include faculty from engineering and management because they are not members 
of the university’s faculty union. 
36 Research assistants are more likely to be used in Pure and Applied Sciences and in Specialized Medicine 
(Chi square=42.1, p=0.000). Post-doctoral fellows are more likely to be found in Pure and Applied Sciences 
and in the Faculty of Medicine (Chi square=62.1, p=0.000). 
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one, full professors with less than seven years seniority 3.6 times less likely, and associate 
professors with seven or more years seniority 2.4 times less likely. 37 This result differs 
from what we found using correspondence analysis which put full professors with less than 
seven years of seniority on the “presence of market supplements” side of axis 2. This 
discrepancy may be explained by the relationship between variables already in the analysis, 
in particular academic sector.  
Faculty members who had previously received administrative stipends were almost 
twice as likely to have obtained market supplements than those who never received such 
stipends. Age at appointment, number of years of work experience prior to academic 
appointment, and type of prior experience are unrelated to the probability of receiving a 
market supplement in this analysis. 
Adding career characteristics to the model increases the explained variance from 
28.1% to 33.9%. Hypothesis 4 is also supported. However, most important for our 
purposes, adding seniority in rank and administrative stipends does not significantly change 
the gender coefficient. 
Finally, neither of the indicators of family constraints (children under 12, spouse 
employed or not) is significantly related to the award of market supplements and the 
coefficients of the indicators already in the model remain roughly the same when these new 
variables are introduced. Their presence in the correspondence analysis is likely due to their 
relationship with career variables, which are related to age. The fifth hypothesis is thus 
rejected.  
 
                                                 
37 This may seem odd. However, market supplements have been substantially attached to hiring and faculty 
are generally hired at the assistant professor level and, as at other Canadian universities, standards have been 
increasing at this institution.  
  
Table 1. Hierarchical logistic regression of the presence of market supplements 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variables in analysis ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß 
Gender W: 11.77 p=0.001 W: 6.82  p=0.009 W:6.50 p=0.011 W: 10.20 p=0.001 W: 10.88 p=0.001 W: 12.41  p=0.000 
Women -0.88** 0.42 -0.74** 0.48 -0.73* 0.48 -1.00** 0.37 -1.08** 0.34 -1.05*** 0.35 
Sector (ref.: humanities)  W: 52.34  p=0.000 W: 49.13 p=0.000 W: 44.31  p=0.000 W : 45.46 p=0.000 W: 54.91 p=0.000 
Pure and applied science   2.63*** 13.88 2.57*** 13.08 2.82*** 16.73 2.92*** 18.48 2.41*** 11.18 
Social science/psychology   1.82** 6.15 1.74** 5.70 1.77** 5.88 1.83** 6.21 1.36* 3.89 
Medicine   0.83 2.28 0..77 2.15 0.82 2.28 0.91 2.49 0.10 1.10 
Specialized medicine   3.25*** 25.73 3.14*** 23.08 3.13*** 22.76 3.27*** 26.41 2.67*** 14.49 
Nursing/education   1.48* 4.41 1.47* 4.34 1.33 3.80 1.46 4.30 0.98 2.65 
Other sector   1.78** 5.91 1.82** 6.14 1.81** 6.09 1.89** 6.59 1.45** 4.27 
Frequency of research 
contracts (ref. : never) 
 W: 8.38 p=0.015 W: 6.58  p=0.037 W: 5.96 p=0.051 W: 5.72 p=0.057 W: 8.02 p=0.018 
Often or occasionally    0.82** 2.28 0.74* 2.10 0.77* 2.16 0.76* 2.14 0.84** 2.31 
Rarely   0.49 1.64 0.43 1.54 0.39 1.48 0.43 1.54 0.35 1.41 
Award of Canada 
Research Chair   W: 3.82 p=0.051 W: 3.68 p=0.055 W: 3.10  p=0.078 W: 2.97 p=.085 
 
Yes   2.07+ 7.93 2.21+ 9.10 2.05+ 7.73 2.04+ 7.68   
Research assistants   W: 0.93 p=0.335 W: 0.89 p=0.34 W: 2.926  p=0.087 W: 3.37 p=.066 W: 2.28  p=0.131 
Yes   0.25 1.28 0.25 1.28 0.48+ 1.62 0.53+ 1.70 0.40 1.49 
Post-doctoral fellows   W: 1.38 p=0.240 W: 1.58 p=0.208 W: 0.54 p=0.464 W: 0.40 p=0.526  
Yes   -0.35 0.71 -0.38 0.69 -0.25 0.78 -0.22 0.80   
Priority: improv.  of salary 
sc. (ref.: low/not a priority) 
   W: 7.28 p=0.026 W: 7.20 p=0.027 W: 7.50 p=0.023 W: 7.62 p=0.022 
High priority     1.03* 2.80 1.00* 2.71 1.03* 2.80 0.87* 2.38 
Medium priority     0.53 1.71 0.42 1.53 0.43 1.54 0.27 1.31 
Seniority within rank (ref.: 
assistant prof. ) 
      W: 17.14  p=0.002 W: 18.00 p=0.001 W: 19.79 p=0.001 
Associate prof. 6 years -       -0.28 0.76 -0.28 0.76 -0.20 0.82 
Associate prof.  7 years +       -0.90* 0.41 -1.01* 0.36 -0.97* 0.38 
Full professor 6 years -       -1.28** 0.28 -1.33** 0.27 -1.10** 0.33 
Full professor 7 years +       -1.48*** 0.23 -1.63*** 0.20 -1.52*** 0.22 
Table 1 continues 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variables in analysis ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß 
Age at appointment (ref.: 
under 30) 
      W: 2.35 p=0.504 W: 2.13 p=0.546  
31-35 years old       0.07 1.07 0.07 1.07   
36-40 years old       -0.40 0.67 -0.40 0.67   
41 years old +       0.19 1.21 0.14 1.16   
Nb. years of prior  
experience (ref.: None) 
      W: 2.28 p=0.516 W: 2.30  p=0.513  
1-4 years       0.69 1.99 0.68 1.97   
5-9 years       0.58 1.79 0.57 1.77   
10 years+       0.70 2.10 0.73 2.07   
Type of experience (ref.: 
teaching) 
      W:0.19  p=0.91 W:0.21  p=0.90  
Research       -0.05 0.95 -0.05 0.95   
Other       0.12 1.13 0.13 1.14   
Receipt of administrative 
stipends 
      W: 2.77  p=0.096 W: 2.82 p=0.093 W=3.13 p=0.077 
Yes       0.61+ 1.83 0.62+ 1.85 0.60+ 1.82 
Presence of children         W: 0.88 p=0.349  
Yes         -0.28 0.76   
Spouse main occupation 
(ref.: univ. prof.) 
        W: 1.16 p=0.762  
Other profes. occupation         -0.34 0.71   
Other occupation         -0.10 0.91   
No spouse         -0.05 0.95   
Nagelkerke R2 0.039 0.261 0.281 0.339 0.345 0.317 
-2Log likelihood 528.290 446.217 438.452 414.132 411.512 458.003 
df 1 12 14 27 31 17 
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To construct a final parsimonious model we initially only included the indicators 
related to the award of market supplements at a p-value of 0.1 or less in the complete 
model. Subsequent tests were performed to examine whether the variables with a p-value 
greater than 0.05 in this more parsimonious model might also be excluded. The conclusion 
drawn from these tests was that the award of a Canada Research Chair could be left out. 
Doing so did not substantially change any of the coefficients and the model fit remained 
about the same. However, receipt of administrative stipends and the presence of research 
assistants were retained because their inclusion did improve model fit. The fit provided by 
the final parsimonious model presented in the last column of table 1 is as good as that of the 
complete model. We compared the two models using the difference in deviance and 
degrees of freedom which is distributed as chi square. A common criterion of significance 
is a chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom that exceeds 4. In this case, the difference 
between the models is not significant (chi square = 46.5 with 14 degrees of freedom, 
criterion=3.3).  
The results displayed in the last column of table 1 show that the direction of the 
effects is the same as in the complete model. Taken together, the predictors included in the 
final model account for 31.7% of the variance in the receipt of market supplements which 
constitutes a substantial proportion for this type of research.  
The central question addressed in this article is whether gender differences in the 
receipt of market premiums are fully accounted for by the other characteristics associated 
with market premiums. The results of this analysis indicate that they are not. On the 
contrary, after controlling for the effects of market value, attitude toward remuneration, and 
career characteristics, women’s disadvantage in access to market premiums is not modified 
They remained almost three times (2.85) less likely than men to be awarded one. 
Discussion and conclusion 
Our results are consistent with all but one of our hypotheses. Market premiums were 
more likely to have been awarded to faculty members likely to have a higher market value, 
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to those who most stressed pay as a job attribute, and to those at the beginning of the career. 
Most importantly for our purposes, however, women were less likely to have received 
market premiums than men and that disadvantage persisted even after the significant 
number of controls we added. Our results provide substantial support for Hypothesis 1. 
Interestingly, Hypothesis 5 was not supported. There was no evidence that family 
constraints influenced the likelihood that someone would be awarded a market premium, 
whether that person was a man or a woman. 
Clearly, one should not exaggerate the importance of the results of an analysis of an 
aspect of salary policy in a single university. Nor, we would argue, should the importance 
of these results be underestimated. Pay differences by gender increasingly originate within 
occupations rather than between them (Fortin & Huberman, 2002). We also know that the 
magnitude of the pay difference by gender varies by occupation. For example, Robson and 
Wallace (2001) found no gender pay gap among Canadian lawyers in 1994, after suitable 
controls. For a similar period, Tanner (1999), in contrast, did find a pay disadvantage for 
women among pharmacists. There is good reason to think that the largest pay-offs to the 
study of pay differences by gender will come from studies that, implicitly, control for a 
wide range of effects by focusing on a single occupation. This study, of course, is within a 
single occupation within a single organization. This means that we have controlled more 
effectively for a wider range of effects than is the case in the bulk of the research on pay 
differences by gender. What do the results suggest? 
First, in this university context family constraints had no effect on the likelihood of 
receipt of a market premium. How is this possible? Note first that there is little direct 
evidence in the existing research of a family constraint effect.  Furthermore, universities 
may provide more flexibility in work hours than most employers. Family obligations may 
make it difficult for a faculty member to devote the amount of time to research that he or 
she would wish to, given the performance requirement built into the tenure process. On the 
other hand, the limited number of student contact hours in a research university do allow 
many faculty members to move between work, in particular research, and family 
obligations in a way that is less likely to be possible in many other highly paid professions. 
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Consistent with the sort of argument found in Esping-Andersen (2004), our results may 
suggest the importance of family-friendly work arrangements for gender equity in pay 
(though, in a comparison of the rates of access to senior management positions in the U.S. 
and Sweden, Milgrom and Petersen (2006) raise the possibility that family-friendly policies 
of the Swedish sort damage women’s careers by facilitating choices that reduce the amount 
of career-enhancing experience acquired by women). 
Second, it remains the case that in the results presented, women were less likely to 
receive market premiums than men, after the inclusion of a wide range of controls in the 
estimation of the various equations discussed above. A likely explanation could be that 
relevant factors were not sufficiently controlled for. Academic fields were too aggregate. 
For example, the market demand for social scientists may on average be greater than is the 
case for humanists, but the market demand within the social sciences is greater for 
economists than for anthropologists. The measures used are not sufficiently refined to allow 
us to control for that. Clearly, we would prefer to have had more direct measures of 
research productivity — say, number and quality of publications. The indirect controls that 
were included in the analysis to cover various aspects of research activity are likely to have 
accounted for most of the effect of faculty members’ individual market value as 
researchers. Still, they may not entirely account for this effect. Nor do we adequately 
control for differences in values and attitudes. We had no direct measures of attitudes 
towards salary negotiation, a characteristic that was hypothesized to differentiate genders 
and to contribute to explaining the gender gap in pay (Blackaby et al., 2005; Svarstad et al., 
2004). Finally, we may not have adequately controlled for relevant factors because of the 
lag between our measurements of faculty characteristics and the fact of having been 
awarded a market supplement.  
These are limitations to our capacity to draw conclusions from the research 
described above. But a reasonable case can be made that the measurement limitations in 
this work are no greater, and are probably less, than are those in most of the other relevant 
work. In some cases, our measures are distinctly superior to those used in the bulk of the 
relevant literature. This is the case, in particular, for our measures of career and of family 
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constraints. In addition, we do have attitudinal controls that are not present in the research 
described earlier on the pay of university professors described earlier. Moreover, with a 
survey from a single university, we implicitly control for differences across universities in 
the characteristics of faculty members and in the policies through which salaries are 
determined. That, in our view, is a substantial advantage. All this is to say that a 
conservative interpretation of our results would still allow the conclusion that women are 
disadvantaged in the pay-determination process, even within the highly meritocratic context 
of a modern Canadian research university.  
The occupation of university faculty member has some interesting characteristics 
that are relevant to the understanding of the pay-determination process. Where pay is 
determined by a collective agreement with rates set by rank and seniority, it is very difficult 
for gender differences to emerge. The introduction of discretionary components does allow 
gender differences to emerge. The introduction of market premiums by universities – as 
noted earlier, a recently common phenomenon – has the effect of individualizing 
compensation. In this case study, at least, individualized compensation appears to have 
operated, on average, to the disadvantage of women. Why that should be so remains an 
important question for future research. 
A reasonable position is that unexplained gender differences in pay, for example, 
those produced by differences in the awarding of market premiums, ought to be explained 
or eliminated. The results presented here suggest a plausible line of research and, perhaps, 
policy concern. In this study women proved to be disadvantaged within a system of 
discretionary awards of market premiums, a system probably introduced precisely because 
of the limits on discretion imposed by the collective agreement that sets the basic rates of 
pay. The development of a program of market premiums moved the pay determining 
process at this university in an individualizing direction. There may be much to be said for 
a more individualized pay determination process. But such a policy comes with the risk that 
particular groups may be disadvantaged, groups that are less likely to be disadvantaged 
within a pay system governed by a collective agreement. The conclusion to be drawn from 
the analyses is that market premiums require care when implemented. 
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There is, of course, the more fundamental problem of the relative roles of structure 
and individual choice in the production of pay differences by gender. This distinction 
underlies that between the deficit and difference models that we discussed earlier, two 
models that organize much of the discussion in the literature on differential labor market 
outcomes by gender. In fact, these issues are more complicated than would be implied by 
the mechanical application of these two models. Consider the effect of academic sector. 
Suppose that the pay disadvantage of women were substantially explained by their sector of 
employment. That might indicate an effect of personal choice on pay differences. It also 
might reflect a process through which pay is lower in the sectors in which women are 
employed because women are employed in them rather than because of a neutral market 
process. This research, alas, does not much advance our capacity to answer that question. 
We think, however, that our capacity to do so would be much improved by more studies of 
individual universities, like the study reported here, that examine in detail processes of pay 
determination. Such studies are more likely to provide the institutional detail that makes it 
possible to tease out these more complicated issues. Further insight is likely to be gained 
from longitudinal studies. Administrative records, when available, will often provide such 
data. 
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2Appendix A. Comparison of survey data with administrative data 
  Survey Admin. data Resp. rate 
Total (N)  N = 645 N = 1249 51.6% 
     
Gender Male 65.0% 68.2% 48.4% 
Female 35.0% 31.8% 55.8% 
Total 100.0% 100.0%  
 (637) (1249)  
Field of 
specialization 
Male — Humanities 9.8% 7.3% 68.1% 
Female — Humanities 5.1% 3.4% 74.4% 
Male — Social science and psychology 10.4% 13.0% 40.7% 
Female — Social science and psychology 5.2% 6.2% 42.9% 
Male — Pure and applied science 13.1% 12.7% 52.2% 
Female — Pure and applied science 1.9% 1.9% 50.0% 
Male — Medicine 13.6% 14.3% 48.0% 
Female — Medicine 8.2% 7.5% 55.9% 
Male — Specialized medicine38 8.5% 9.1% 47.4% 
Female — Specialized medicine 4.3% 3.8% 57.4% 
Male — Nursing/education 2.5% 2.6% 48.5% 
Female — Nursing/education 5.9% 5.1% 58.7% 
Male — Other 6.8% 9.2% 37.4% 
Female — Other 4.7% 3.9% 62.5% 
Total 100.0% 100.0%  
 (633) (1249)  
Seniority 
within rank 
Male assistant professor 12.6% 11.5% 55.9% 
Female assistant professor 13.1% 9.5% 70.3% 
Male associate professor 6 years - 13.0% 12.3% 53.6% 
Female associate professor 6 years - 7.4% 7.3% 51.6% 
Male associate professor 7 years + 7.4% 7.2% 52.2% 
Female associate professor 7 years + 4.6% 3.6% 64.4% 
Male full professor 6 years - 10.7% 12.0% 45.3% 
Female full professor 6 years - 4.1% 5.3% 39.4% 
Male full professor 7 years + 21.0% 24.0% 44.3% 
Female full professor 7 years + 6.0% 5.1% 59.4% 
Male — other n/a 1.4% n/a 
Female — other n/a 0.9% n/a 
Total 100.0% 100.0%  
 (633) (1249)  
Gender by 
receipt of 
market 
supplement or 
administrative 
stipend 
Male — yes 26.7% 24.9% 54.7% 
Male — no 38.3% 43.4% 45.0% 
Female — yes 8.3% 8.2% 52.0% 
Female — no 26.7% 23.5% 58.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0%  
 (637) (1249)  
 
                                                 
38 Veterinary medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, optometry 
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 3Appendix B. Descriptions of variables 
Variable set Variable Description 
Dependent 
variable 
Receipt of market 
supplements  
Having received market supplements since 
appointment: 0 = no; 1 = yes. 
Gender Gender 0 = male; 1 = female. 
Market value / 
Research 
activities 
Sector Sector in which faculty is employed: 1 = humanities; 
2 = social science and psychology; 3= pure and 
applied science; 4 = medicine; 5 = specialized 
medicine (veterinary medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, 
optometry); 6 = nursing/education; 7 = other (law, 
physical education, environmental design, music, 
theology.) 
Frequency of research 
contracts 
Frequency at which faculty have accepted private 
research contract over the last year: 1 = often/ 
occasionally; 2 = rarely; 3 = never. 
Member of a research 
team 
Being a member of a research team within the 
institution or outside the institution: 0 = no; 1 = yes. 
Research grants Currently receiving research grants: 0 = no; 1 = yes. 
Award of a Canada 
Research Chair 
Being the recipient of a Canada Research Chair: 0 = 
no; 1 = yes. 
Award of other kind 
of research chair 
Being the recipient of a research chair other than 
Canada Research Chair: 0 = no; 1 = yes. 
Research assistants Presence of research assistant supervised over the last 
year: 0 = no; 1 = yes. 
Research agents Presence of research agents supervised over the last 
year: 0 = no; 1 = yes. 
Post-doctoral fellows Presence of post-doctoral fellows supervised over the 
last year: 0 = no; 1 = yes. 
Values and 
attitudes 
towards 
remuneration 
Prioritization of salary 
scale 
Level of priority attributed to the improvement of the 
salary scale: 1 = high priority; 2 = medium priority; 3 
= low priority/not a priority. 
Career 
characteristics 
Seniority within rank Variable created by combining rank and seniority: 1 
= assistant professor; 2 = associate professor six 
years and under; 3 = associate professor seven years 
and over; 4 = full professor six years and under; 5 = 
full professor seven years and over. 
Receipt of 
administrative 
stipends  
Having received administrative stipends since 
appointment: 0 = no; 1 = yes. 
Number of years of 
prior experience 
Number of years of professional experience prior to 
appointment, followed by categorization: 1= none; 
2=1-4 years; 3=5-9 years; 4=10 years+. 
Type of experience Type of previous work experience: 1 = none; 2 = 
teaching; 3 = research; 4 = management/other.  
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Variable set Variable Description 
Age at appointment Variable created by subtracting year of birth from 
year of appointment, followed by categorization: 
1=30 years old or less; 2=31-35 years old; 3=36-40 
years old; 4=41 years old +. 
Family 
constraints 
Main occupation of 
spouse 
1 = university professor; 2 = other professional 
occupation; 3 = other occupation; 4 = no spouse. 
Presence of children  Presence of children aged 12 years old and under 
living in the household at least half the time: 0 = no; 
1 = yes. 
Difficulty of 
combining 
professional and 
family obligations 
Perceived level of difficulty associated with 
combining professional and family obligations: 1 = 
often difficult; 2 = sometimes difficult; 3 = rarely 
difficult; 4 = never difficult. 
Demanding family 
responsibilities 
Having fulfilled demanding family responsibili-ties 
over the previous two years: 0 = no; 1 = yes. 
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4Appendix C. Differences between men and women faculty on the variables of interest 
Variable set Indicator Categories Men Women N 
Market value/ 
research 
activities 
Academic sector  
(χ2= 50.84; p=0.000) 
Humanities 15.1% 14.3% 95 
Social science and psychology 16.1% 14.8% 99 
Pure and applied science 20.2% 5.4% 94 
Medicine 21.0% 23.3% 138 
Specialized medicine  13.2% 12.1% 81 
Nursing/education 3.9% 16.6% 53 
Other 10.5% 13.5% 73 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 633 
Frequency of 
research contracts 
(χ2=10.45; p=0.005) 
Often or occasionally  23.8% 13.7% 119 
Rarely 13.8% 11.3% 76 
Never 62.4% 75.0% 392 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 587 
Member of a 
research team  
(χ2=0.33; p=0.565) 
Yes 26.6% 28.7% 174 
No 73.4% 71.3% 463 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 637 
Research grants 
(χ2=1.26; p=0.261) 
Yes 83.2% 79.4% 483 
No 16.8% 20.6% 106 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 589 
Award of a Canada 
Research Chair 
(χ2=4.81; p=0.028) 
Yes 2.3% 0.0% 9 
No 97.7% 100.0% 577 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 586 
Award of other kind 
of research chair  
(χ2=0.09; p=0.767) 
Yes 2.0% 1.6% 10 
No 98.0% 98.4% 519 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 529 
Presence of research 
assistants 
(χ2=2.55; p=0.111) 
Yes 60.5% 67.0% 391 
No 39.5% 33.0% 232 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 623 
Presence of research 
agents 
(χ2=0.27; p=0.601) 
Yes 23.7% 21.8% 145 
No 76.3% 78.2% 485 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 630 
Presence of post-
doctoral fellows 
(χ2=5.27; p=0.022) 
Yes 28.4% 20.0% 160 
No 71.6% 80.0% 469 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 629 
Values and 
attitudes 
towards 
remuneration 
Prioritization of 
salary scale 
(χ2=6.15; p=0.046) 
High priority 54.8% 45.5% 315 
Medium priority 34.3% 37.9% 217 
Low priority or not a priority 11.0% 16.6% 79 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 611 
Career 
characteristics 
Seniority within 
rank (χ2=32.99; 
p=0.000) 
Assistant professor 19.5% 37.2% 163 
Associate professor  
6 years - 20.0% 21.1% 129 
Associate professor  
7 years + 11.5% 13.0% 76 
Full professor 6 years - 16.6% 11.7% 94 
Full professor 7 years + 32.4% 17.0% 171 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 633 
Receipt of admin. 
stipends  
(χ2=8.43; p=0.006) 
No 80.2% 88.8% 530 
Yes 19.8% 11.2% 107 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 637 
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Variable set Indicator Categories Men Women N 
 
 
 
Number of years of 
prior experience 
(χ2=1.34; p=0.720) 
 
 
 
None 
 
 
 
18.2% 
 
 
 
17.9% 
 
 
 
113 
1 - 4 years 35.6% 32.1% 215 
5 - 9.5 years 21.6% 21.6% 135 
10 years + 24.6% 28.4% 162 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 625 
Type of experience 
(χ2=8.66; p=0.034) 
None 18.4% 17.9% 113 
Teaching 18.9% 22.0% 124 
Research 50.2% 40.4% 290 
Management/other  12.4% 19.7% 93 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 620 
Age at appointment  
(χ2=6.21; p=0.102) 
30 years old or less  28.0% 23.0% 159 
31-35 years old 37.3% 34.9% 221 
36-40 years old 23.4% 23.9% 143 
41 years old + 11.3% 18.2% 83 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 606 
Family 
constraints 
Main occupation of 
spouse 
(χ2=53.85; p=0.000) 
University professor 5.8% 18.4% 64 
Other professional occupation  50.0% 42.9% 299 
Other occupation 28.2% 10.6% 139 
No spouse 16.0% 28.1% 127 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 629 
Presence children 
ages 12 and under 
(χ2=0.99; p=0.319) 
Yes 36.2% 32.3% 222 
No 63.8% 67.7% 415 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 637 
Difficulty of 
combining profes-
sional and family 
obligations 
(χ2=8.29; p=0.040) 
Often difficult 25.6% 31.7% 162 
Sometimes difficult 39.1% 41.7% 234 
Rarely difficult 19.2% 18.6% 111 
Never difficult 16.1% 8.0% 78 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 585 
Demanding family 
responsibilities- 
previous year 
(χ2=2.85; p=0.091) 
Yes 25.1% 31.4% 170 
No 74.9% 68.6% 453 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 623 
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5Appendix D. Correspondence analysis – t-tests of significant effects on the two factors 
Factor 1 : Significant active categories in order of importance  
Variable label Category label Test-Value Weight 
Research grants No -19,91 149 
Member of a research team  No -18,99 164 
Research assistants No -14,94 221 
Research agents No -13,29 457 
Post-doctoral fellows No -12,00 445 
Frequency of research contracts Never -8,91 423 
Sector  Other -5,11 67 
CENTRAL AREA       
Frequency of research contracts Often or occasionally  6,01 109 
Sector  Medicine 7,09 128 
Post-doctoral fellows Yes 12,29 151 
Research agents Yes 13,70 140 
Research assistants Yes 15,09 370 
Member of a research team  Yes 18,73 439 
Research grants Yes 19,62 454 
    
Factor 1 : Significant supplementary categories in order of importance 
Variable label Category label Test-Value Weight 
Seniority within rank Assistant -5,33 156 
Type of experience  Teaching -4,14 117 
Number of years of prior experience  10 years + -2,99 158 
Prioritization of salary scale Low priority or not a priority -2,55 77 
Main occupation of spouse Other -2,45 132 
Presence of children ages 12 and under No -2,36 391 
Type of experience  Other -2,21 86 
Seniority within rank Associate professor 7 years + -2,05 76 
CENTRAL AREA       
Seniority within rank Full professor 7 years + 2,12 163 
Presence of children ages 12 and under Yes 2,20 212 
Main occupation of spouse Other professional occupation  2,28 284 
Seniority within rank Full professor 6 years - 3,42 84 
Type of experience  Research 5,01 278 
 
 
95 
 
 
Factor 2 : Significant active categories in order of importance 
Variable label Category label Test-Value Weight 
Receipt of market supplements  No -15,72 457 
Award of a Canada Research Chair No -9,89 594 
Research assistants Yes -9,53 370 
Post-doctoral fellows No -8,24 445 
Sector  Humanities -6,73 91 
Frequency of research contracts Never -5,66 423 
Sector  Nursing/education -5,10 52 
CENTRAL AREA     
Post-doctoral fellows Yes 8,19 151 
Frequency of research contracts Often or occasionally  8,88 109 
Research assistants Non 9,45 221 
Award of a Canada Research Chair Yes 10,31 9 
Sector  Specialized medicine 10,92 74 
Sector  Pure and applied science 12,82 91 
Receipt of market supplements  Yes 15,89 146 
    
Factor 2 : Significant supplementary categories in order of importance 
Variable label Category label Test-Value Weight 
Gender Female -5,63 206 
Prioritization of salary scale Low priority or not a priority -2,88 77 
Number of years of prior experience  10 years+ -2,78 158 
Age at appointment 36-40 years old -2,44 135 
Receipt of administrative stipends  No -2,41 492 
Presence of children ages 12 and under No -2,29 391 
Type of experience Teaching -2,22 117 
Main occupation of spouse No spouse -2,06 119 
CENTRAL AREA     
Presence of children ages 12 and under Yes 2,40 212 
Number of years of prior experience  1-4 years 2,79 198 
Age at appointment 30 years or less 2,86 153 
Seniority within rank Full professor 6 years - 2,94 84 
Main occupation of spouse Other 3,03 132 
Prioritization of salary scale High priority 3,71 293 
Gender Male 5,91 393 
 Chapter 3 
 
Article 2 : Doucet, C., Smith, M. & Durand, C. (Under revision). It’s Not Only 
About Who You Are, What You Do or How Good You Are at it: Pay 
Structure, Female Representation and the Gender Pay Gap among University 
Professors.  
Submitted to : Relation industrielles/Industrial relations in January 2011; Revise and 
resubmit, June 2011. 
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Abstract 
This study uses a case study of faculty members in a large Canadian research university to 
explore the sources of the gender pay gap. We examine the contributions to the total pay 
gap of the following: base pay, promotion to full professor, access to pay supplements, and 
amounts of pay supplements. We show that the effects of these factors vary with the 
proportions of female faculty members within units, that pay is lower in units with a high 
proportion of females, and that the magnitude of gender differences may vary with the 
degree of formalization in remuneration practices.  
 
Keywords: Gender pay gap, organization, pay structure, female representation. 
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Despite women’s increasing labor market success over the last decades gender pay 
differences persist. Researchers advance explanations of these differences pitched at two 
levels (Marry, 2003; Sonnert & Holton, 1996). At the individual level, differences in labor 
market outcomes are sometimes attributed to gender-specific preferences. At the 
structural/institutional level, organizational practices may penalize women, or laws may 
offset the effects of these practices. Recent work has sought to transcend this theoretical 
dichotomy by simultaneously examining the processes at both levels that may cause gender 
pay gaps (Ridgeway, 2009). The research on gender differences in pay at a large Canadian 
research university takes this latter, synthetic, approach. 
Universities provide an interesting context for the examination of gender pay gaps. 
First, “...academics often cloak their role in the garb of enlightenment and progressive 
thinking and so, to the degree that this is more than intellectual posturing, sexist pay 
practices might be expected to disappear early in this milieu” (Guppy 1989: 744). Second, 
most research universities attempt to tie pay to performance. In principle, if applied 
properly, this should reduce or eliminate gender bias. Higher education, then, might be 
expected to set a standard in terms of gender equality. 
The pay gap in academia is relatively low. In 2006 female faculty members earned 
18.2% less than males as compared to gaps of 29.4% in the general population, 34.1% 
among lawyers, 27.1% among general practitioners, and 40% for senior executives 
(Statistics Canada, 2006). Nonetheless, the difference is appreciable. Moreover, as we will 
see, the introduction of the Canada Research Chair (CRC) program has influenced the 
relative pay of males and females, to some degree to the disadvantage of the latter.  
Female Faculty in Canadian Universities 
Since the 1970s both the presence of women in faculty positions (at all ranks) and 
their relative pay has increased. The proportion of full-time female academics rose from 13 
percent in 1973 (Ornstein, Stewart & Drakich, 1998) to 30 percent in 2002-2003 (Sussman 
& Yssaad, 2005). Ornstein, Stewart & Drakich (1998) reported a fall in the female pay 
disadvantage from 22 to 17 percent between 1970 and 1994. More recent studies report 
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gaps of 14% and 15% respectively (Warman, Woolley and Worsick, 2010; Sussman and 
Yssaad, 2005). The gap decreases further when field and rank are controlled. Still, even 
after controls the gap does not disappear and the proportion of women who are full 
professors remains small (17% according to Sussman and Yssad, 2005). 
Perhaps the trend means that gender differences in labor market outcomes will 
disappear? There is reason to doubt this. Universities are more aggressively tying pay to the 
market value of either fields or individuals. A study of the award of ‘market premiums’ at 
one Canadian research university found that female academics were almost three times less 
likely than their male colleagues to have received a market supplement since their 
appointment (Doucet, Durand & Smith, 2008), after controls for career stage, research 
activities, academic field, individual attitudes towards remuneration, and family situation. 
The more aggressive exercise of discretion seemed to reduce the relative pay of females.  
The competitive allocation of CRCs since 2000 seems to have had a similar 
outcome. Relatively few women have been awarded CRCs (R.A. Malatest and Associates 
Ltd, 2004). In 2003 a group of female academics filed a complaint with the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission, observing that only 15% of chairs went to women in 2001 and 
18% in 2002.39 The situation has since improved. Still, in 2006 only 22% of chairholders 
were women.40 Significant pay supplements are attached to CRCs, so their effect will have 
been to increase the gender pay gap.  
Further evidence on the effect of the exercise of discretion on gender pay 
differences is provided by Finland, often considered a model in terms of gender equality. It 
does indeed have the highest number of female academics in Europe. However, during the 
1990s, professorships were awarded both by invitation and through open competition. 
Women were relatively disadvantaged when the very discretionary invitation method was 
used. In 1997-1998 the proportion of female academics hired was twice as high in cases 
where there were open competitions (Husu, 2000).  
                                                 
39 See http://www.unb.ca/PAR-L/PCR1.htm. 
40 See http://www.unb.ca/PAR-L/PCR8.htm. 
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Our general point is that, in Canadian academia, salaries are increasingly 
individualized and there is some evidence that this process disadvantages women. 
Gender Pay Gaps, Gender Relations and Gendered Organizations 
Gender pay gaps, it is argued, reflect socially constructed gendered relations within 
organizations (Daune-Richard & Devreux, 1992; Kergoat, 2005). For example, they may 
originate in a division of labor that is hierarchically organized along gender lines. Or they 
may originate in informal practices or job descriptions. Whatever the organizational 
practice, the result may be a devaluation of women’s activities (Acker, 1990). Evidently, 
gendering processes are likely to change over time and across locations. In universities, 
organizational components or practices likely to influence pay include research 
productivity, research networks, evaluations of research contributions, vertical and 
horizontal segregation, and remuneration procedures.  
Research productivity, research networks and evaluations of research contributions 
Women’s pay might be lower because they publish less. The evidence on this is 
mixed. Using Canadian data for 1987 and 2002 Nakhaie (2002, 2007) found lower 
publication rates on the part of women. However, the difference with men was substantially 
explained by gender differences in rank, field, seniority and university type (research versus 
others). An American study of science professors suggests that differences have been 
minimal in recent cohorts (Xie & Shauman, 2003). 
Suppose women do publish less than men: why might that be so? Given their 
relatively recent entry in academia, female faculty members may be less integrated into 
professional networks than males – effectively, strangers in academia (Sonnert & Holton, 
1995), excluded from dominant ‘old boys networks’ (McKenna et al., 2002 MIT, 1999; see 
also R.A. Malatest and Associates Ltd, 2004). Networking may provide career-relevant 
resources: knowledge of professional norms, expectations and opportunities at the 
institutional level, opportunities to meet and influence powerful decision makers, 
recognition by peers as well as affective and professional support (Lin, 2001).  
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Also, male and female research contributions may be evaluated differently. 
Wennerås and Wold (1997) found that women’s applications to postdoctoral fellowships 
were underrated compared to those of males and that at equal levels of scientific 
productivity, the evaluations of women’s scientific competences were inferior to those of 
men. Nakkhaie reports that accumulating publications translated more readily into the 
promotion of males than females which, the author said, “…tends to support the allegation 
of discrimination in Canadian universities.” (2007: 382). There is contradictory evidence, 
however. Sandström & Hällsten (2008) replicated the Wennerås & Wold study, examining 
relative success by gender across a wider range of competition, and found that women did a 
little better than men. 
Vertical and horizontal segregation 
Academic pay is tied to rank (vertical segregation) and academic field (horizontal 
segregation). Ornstein, Stewart and Drakich (2007) found no gender difference in the 
probability of promotion to associate professor but promotion to full professor took women 
about a year longer than men. This average conceals fairly substantial variation across 
fields of study. Men were promoted to full professorship more than two years earlier than 
women in rehabilitation, physical education/kinesiology/ recreation, and about one year in 
science, engineering and biology. Interestingly, women were promoted to full professor 
more rapidly than men in disciplines with higher female representation: about 1.25 years 
and 0.68 years earlier in education and humanities respectively.  
With respect to horizontal segregation, women are overrepresented in relatively 
poorly paid fields (Canadian Association of University Teachers, 2004). The concentration 
of women in a field may itself depress that field’s pay (England, 1992; England, 2005). 
Evidence in Bellas (1994; see also Umbach, 2007) confirms that average salaries in a field 
fall as the proportion of women rises, even after controls for individual characteristics, jobs, 
and labor market conditions.  
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Quebec’s Bill 143 (adopted in 2000) required that universities adopt equal access 
employment programs to increase their proportion in fields where women were 
underrepresented. In principle, then, horizontal segregation in Quebec universities should 
have fallen over the last decade.  
Characteristics of pay systems 
Pay-setting procedures that are formalized in a way that limits discretion reduce the 
likelihood that women will be paid less than men (Reskin, 2000a, 2003; Kulis, 1998; 
Silvera, 1996; Rubery et al., 1998; Elvira & Graham, 2002). Collective agreements, in 
particular, tend to tie pay to seniority and to impose salary caps, the effect of which is to 
prevent one group being advantaged through its members network ties or the preferences of 
decision-makers (Ridgeway, 2009). In fact, gender differences in pay are greater in 
universities where salaries are determined using discretionary judgments of merit rather 
than seniority (Warman et al., 2010). 
Research hypotheses 
The review above suggests that gender differences in pay are likely to be influenced 
by formalization and the concentration of women in an academic field. Hence, the 
following two hypotheses: 
H1: The magnitude of gender differences varies according to the degree of formalization in 
remuneration components. 
H2: All else being equal, the level of female representation in a given context is negatively 
related to remuneration. 
Methodology 
Data 
We use administrative data from a major Canadian research university. Information 
collected by the university administration between 1997 and 2006 on faculty members’ 
remuneration is provided annually to the Faculty Union. This data set excludes clinicians in 
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the Faculty of medicine and faculty who occupy administrative positions during their 
mandate because they are not Union members. It is population data, not a sample. It 
comprises 1,882 faculty members, for which there are from one to ten records (depending 
on the number of years each faculty member was employed and a union member at the 
university), for a total of 11,170 observations across 64 units. Units are either non 
departmentalized Faculties, Schools (within Faculties or autonomous) or departments 
(within Faculties). Data can be conceptualized as being at three levels: level 1 is the level of 
time. It is nested within individuals (level 2) who are themselves nested within units (level 
3).  
Measures 
Given the longitudinal character of the data, some of the variables are time-varying 
while others are not. The main dependent variable is total salary. It varies with time. The 
natural log of the variable is used because it is usual with this type of distribution and 
because it allows for comparability with other studies. The second dependent variable is the 
speed of access to promotion as full professor. Finally, the third dependent variable is 
access to pay supplement. 
At the time level, the main independent variables include year, rank and access to 
pay supplements. These variables vary with time. Rank has three categories, assistant, 
associate and full professor. There are two variables measuring pay supplements, one for 
so-called “market supplements” and one for Canada Research Chairs (CRC). 
At the individual level, stable characteristics of faculty members are considered. 
These include gender together with career characteristics such as year of appointment and 
pay grade at the first measurement occasion. This latter variable is a proxy for recognized 
experience at hiring. Year of appointment is only used in the analysis of promotion to full 
professor. It allows a control of the evolution in promotion policies as well as taking into 
account the fact that faculty members hired in the 50’s, 60’s or early 70’s who have not yet 
been promoted are most certainly less likely than those hired later to become full professor 
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at each observation point. It is grouped into three categories, i.e. those hired between 1958 
and 1972, between 1973 and 1984 or between 1985 and 1996. This allows for the detection 
of possible threshold effects.  
Finally, at the unit level, sector of activity of the unit and proportion of female 
faculty within units at the beginning of the period of observation in 1997 are considered. 
Female representation per quintile is used instead of the variable in its continuous form to 
allow for detection of threshold effects and nonlinearities. Given the small numbers of 
female faculty members in units at quintiles 1 to 3, those are aggregated. The female 
representation variable thus comprises three categories: units at quintiles 1 to 3 (0-29% 
female), at quintile 4 (30-39% female) and at quintile 5 (40%+ female). The sector of 
activity is measured using eight dichotomous variables reflecting professorship in pure and 
applied science, in social sciences/psychology, in humanities, in medicine, in specialized 
medicine41, in nursing/education, in a sector combining economics, law and computer 
science, or in the “other” category42. Academic sector partly accounts for the variations in 
faculty members’ job opportunities which may in turn affect pay. In addition, men and 
women are unequally represented in the various academic sectors (cf. Appendix 1), and this 
factor may explain part of the gender pay gap.   
Analyses 
Multilevel models are used for the analyses of total salary and of access to pay 
supplements. These models deal with the fact that individuals are “nested” within social 
structures (Hox, 2002). The nesting – or clustering -- of the data violates a major 
assumption of regression analysis, i.e., that sampling units are independent from each other. 
Multilevel models deal with this problem, producing accurate standard errors. In addition, 
they allow the partitioning of variance between levels of analysis, making it possible to 
quantify the proportion of variation attributable to differences between individuals and 
between contexts respectively. For the analyses of total salary and access to market 
                                                 
41 This sector includes faculty members in optometry, pharmacy, dentistry and veterinary medicine. 
42 This sector includes the School of environmental design as well as the departments of music, theology and 
kinesiology. 
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supplements or CRCs, three-level models are used with time as level 1, faculty as level 2 
and unit as level 3. This approach is used because information for each year is nested 
within faculty members, themselves nested within units.  
Survival regression (Cox model) is used for the analysis of promotion to full 
professor. This model is suitable for event outcomes for which data is right censored. Such 
is the case of our data on promotion: some faculty members were promoted to full 
professor during the observation window while others were not, and we know the number 
of years each faculty member was eligible for promotion to full professor. This analysis is 
thus restricted to these cases - 314 women and 734 men who cumulated at least 10 years in 
seniority during the observation window, for a total of 1,048 faculty members. 
The strategy used for analysis is to enter gender first in order to detect initial 
differences according to gender and then enter the other variables in order to detect whether 
and to what extent they explain the gender gap. These latter variables are entered in a 
hierarchical fashion where first, when applicable, variables related to the passage of time 
are entered, then, variables related to faculty – whether stable with time or not -- and 
variables related to units. Finally, cross-level interactions are entered when relevant. At 
each step, it is possible to assess whether there is a significant contribution of the variable 
to the explanation of the dependent variable and whether this contribution mediates the 
effect of gender. The final models are parsimonious and retain only the variables that have 
a significant relationship with the outcomes. 
To test hypothesis 1 we first estimate the size of gender differences in total salary, in 
promotion to full professor and in access to pay supplements. Since base pay and 
promotion to full professor are determined by formal procedures within the institution, we 
expect gender differences in them to be small. We expect larger gender differences in 
access to pay supplements and in their amounts because these are substantially 
discretionary. To test hypothesis 2, we estimate the effect on remuneration of the 
proportion of female within units. 
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Results 
Total salary 
Table 1 presents the results of the first analysis, pertaining to total salary. Variables 
are indented in the table to indicate the level of analysis to which the variable is assigned – 
from lowest to highest from left to right.  
The base model (0), includes only year as an independent variable. It indicates that 
variance is significant at each of the three levels: 7.8% of the salary variance is intra-
individual, 85.5% between individuals, and 6.7% is between units. Consequently, 
predictors are added at all three levels in subsequent models.  
Model 1 estimates variance in salary associated with gender, a level 2 variable, in 
1997. It shows that females were paid significantly less than their male counterparts. 
Evidently, gender does not account for intra-individual variance over time but does account 
for 5.7% of the faculty member variance within units and 21.7% of the variance between 
units.43  
Rank which varies with year and is therefore a level 1 variable together with pay 
grade at the start of the period, a level-2 variable, are added in model 2. This substantially 
reduces female pay disadvantage - from -0.113 to -0.015, a coefficient which nonetheless 
remains significant. Adding these controls substantially reduces the variance to be 
explained: by 29.1% at level 1, by 86.6% at level 2 and by 52.6% at level 3. This is not 
surprising: seniority and rank are the principal determinants of total pay.  
  
                                                 
43 These variances are calculated for each level by dividing the difference between the variances to be 
explained in models 0 and 1 by the variance to be explained in model 0. Thus, the equation used to calculate 
the contribution of gender in the explanation of the level 1 variance is (0.0037 – 0.0037)/0.0037 = 0; that used 
to calculate the level 2 variance is (0.0403 – 0.0380)/0.0403=0.057, etc. 
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6Table 1. Longitudinal multilevel regressions on natural log of total pay 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept model        
Salary in 1997 11.073*** 11.108*** 10.757*** 10.720*** 10.720*** 10.715*** 10.710***
Female on salary in 1997  -0.113*** -0.015** -0.006 -0.004   
Academic sector on salary in 1997        
Social science/psychology      ref ref 
Pure/applied science      0.002 0.006 
Humanities      0.004 0.000 
Medicine      0.039*** 0.041***
Specialized medicine      -0.009 -0.010 
Nursing/education      0.012** 0.014***
Econ., law, computer sc.      0.010  0.002  
Others      0.000 0.002 
Female represent. on salary in 1997        
0-29%      ref    
30-39%      -0.011  
40%+      -0.003  
Pay grade   0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
Change model        
Year 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041***
Associate professor   0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141***
Full professor   0.275*** 0.274*** 0.274*** 0.273*** 0.273***
Market supplement    0.121*** 0.122*** 0.103*** 0.115***
Female on market suppl.      -0.003   
Academic sector on market suppl.        
Social science/psychology      ref ref
Table 1 continues
108 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Pure/applied science      -0.015 -0.026+
Humanities      -0.051* -0.038*
Medicine      0.047** 0.041*
Specialized medicine      0.001 -0.004 
Nursing/education      -0.015 -0.018 
Econ., law, computer sc.      0.043  0.052  
Others      -0.027 -0.030*
Female represent. on market suppl.        
0-29%      ref    
30-39%      0.030  
40%+      0.014  
CRC    0.285*** 0.293*** 0.287*** 0.289***
Female on CRC     -0.045   
Variance components               
Within-person 0.0037*** 0.0037*** 0.0026*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0015*** 0.0015***
Between person: salary in 1997 0.0403*** 0.0380*** 0.0051*** 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0038*** 0.0038***
Between units : salary in 1997 0.0032*** 0.0025*** 0.0012*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
Deviance -23 383 -23 497 -30 196 -35 467 -35 482 -35 848 -35 812
Difference (df)  113.86 (1) 6699.94 (3) 5270.11 (2) 15.05 (2) 366.84 (15) -36.22 (4)
N at level 1 (within-person) 11 170 11 170 11 170 11 170 11 170 11 170 11 170
N at level 2 (individuals) 1 882 1 882 1 882 1 882 1 882 1 882 1 882
N at level 3 (units) 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
p<,001*** p<,01** p<,05* p<,10 + 
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The gender coefficient becomes insignificant when receipt of market premiums and 
CRC awards are added in model 3. Clearly, gendered access to these contributes to the 
gender pay gap. Given that we now control for receipt of market premiums and CRC 
awards, the coefficients for intercept and year respectively reflect the base salary in 1997 
and the average yearly increments in base salary. Since the gender coefficient associated 
with the intercept is no longer significant, we can therefore conclude that there are no 
gender differences in base salary. 
Models 4 and 5 add cross-level interactions. Model 4 reveals no significant 
difference by gender in the effect of market supplements and CRCs on total pay. The point 
estimate for CRCs is, however, quite large: -0.045 for women. Given that few chairholders 
are women (12 compared to 53 men), a gendered effect may be undetectable in our data.  
Models 5 and 6 remove non significant level 2 variables related to gender and focus 
on level 3 variables, i.e. academic sector and percent of female within units and their 
possible impact on salary and on market supplement. There are not enough faculty 
members holding CRCs to separately examine these same effects among them. Model 5 
shows that total salary tends to be higher in Medicine and Nursing/education than in the 
Social sciences/psychology sector and that the size of market supplements – their effect on 
total pay – is larger in Medicine and smaller in Humanities than in the Social 
sciences/psychology sector. The percent female in a unit does not influence salary nor the 
size of market supplements after control for rank. In Model 6, then, we drop proportion 
female from the final, parsimonious, model. This does not substantially modify the impact 
of sector of activity though one effect now appear significant, namely a negative impact in 
the “others” sector. The variables in the model account for 58.2% of the intra-individual 
variance in total salary, 90.6% of the variance between individuals and 94.0% of the 
variance between units.  
This analysis has shown that the effect of gender on pay is explained by gender 
differences in rank, pay grade at entrance, and access to market premiums and CRCs. It is 
not due to gender differences in the value of market premiums. In addition, female 
representation within units is not related to total pay or to the value of pay supplements. 
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Since the gender pay gap is partly attributable to differences in rank and in access to pay 
supplements, the remainder of the analysis will determine whether male and female faculty 
members have equal access to full professorships, market premiums, or CRCs. 
Promotion to full professor  
Model 1, Table 2, shows that, before controls, at each observation point female 
faculty members were 1.3 times less likely to granted full professorship. Model 2 adds year 
of appointment. Faculty members hired between 1985 and 1996 were 1.37 times more 
likely than those hired between 1958 and 1972 to become full professors at each 
observation point. Adding this control decreases the female coefficient from -0.261 to -
0.303, a change due to the fact that female faculty members were on average hired more 
recently.  
7Table 2. Cox regressions of promotion to full professor 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 B B B B B B 
Female -0.261** -0.303*** -0.198** -0.196** -0.167* - 
Year of appointment        
1958-72  ref ref ref ref ref 
1973-84  0.051 0.043 0.112 0.106 0.108 
1985-96  0.316*** 0.291*** 0.294*** 0.288*** 0.284 *** 
Academic sector        
Social sc./psycho.    ref ref ref 
Pure & applied sc.    0.606*** 0.561*** 0.592 *** 
Humanities    0.148 0.081 0.145 
Medicine    0.150 0.151 0.150 
Specialized med.    0.185 0.136 0.169 
Nursing/education    -0.333** -0.284* -0.312 ** 
Econ., law, computer. sc.    -0.370** -0.397*** -0.382 ** 
Others    0.565*** 0.500*** 0.560 *** 
Female representation       
Quintiles 1-3   ref  ref - 
Quintile 4   0.012  0.038 - 
Quintile 5   -0.337***  -0.159 - 
Female*female represent.       
Male      ref 
Female quintiles 1-3      -0.097 
Female quintile 4      -0.204 
Female quintile 5      -0.272 
-2Log likelihood 9553.7 9541.9 9528.4 9478.3 9475.7 9477.3 
χ2 (df) 9.98 (1) 22.10 (3) 34.18 (5) 89.28 (10) 91.30 (12) 89.96 (12) 
N 1 048 1 048 1 048 1 048 1 048 1 048 
p<,001*** p<,01** p<,05* p<,10 + 
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Model 3 adds female representation. It shows that faculty members working in units 
where female representation is highest were 1.4 times less likely to become full professor at 
each observation point than those in units where female representation is lowest. Adding 
this variable substantially increases the female coefficient.  
Model 4, which replaces the proportion female with academic sector, shows that 
time to promotion was lower in Pure and applied sciences and in Economics, law, and 
computer science and higher in Social sciences/psychology, Nursing/education, and in the 
‘Other’ category.  
Model 5 estimates the joint effects of academic sector and female representation. It 
shows that the negative effect of proportion female disappears when sector is added. 
Evidently, women are concentrated in sectors for which promotion rates are low.  
Model 6 provides a final test of the influence of female representation within units 
by replacing the gender and female representation variables with an interaction of these two 
variables. The results indicate that the interaction is not significantly related to time to 
promotion.  
We take model 4 as our final, parsimonious model. The corresponding survival 
curves are displayed in Figure 1. After ten years seniority the proportion of men promoted 
increases progressively relative to that of women, then after 15 years the difference 
stabilizes.  
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3Figure 1. Survival function of time to promotion to full professor (males and females) 
 
Access to market supplements and CRCs 
Table 3 reports estimates of the determinants of access to either a market 
supplement or a CRC during the observation period. Model 0 is the base model. It shows 
that year is positively related to access to market supplements or CRCs, i.e., that access to 
these supplements has increased from 1997 to 2006.  
Model 1 adds gender. The coefficient for female is negative and significant. Without 
controls, female faculty members were 1.3 times less likely to access market supplements 
or CRC’s.  
Model 2 adds rank. Being an associate or a full professor rather than an assistant 
professor was negatively related to access to market supplements or CRCs: assistant 
professors were more likely to have access to them. The coefficient for gender is hardly 
affected by the addition of rank.  
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The level 3 variables are entered separately in models 3 and 4, and then jointly in 
model 5. In model 3, the level 3 variance estimate is reduced by 15.6% when proportion 
female is added to the analysis. The coefficients for units with 30-39% female faculty 
members are negative for both males and females, but only the former reaches statistical 
significance. Furthermore, in units with 40 percent or more female faculty members, the 
odds of accessing market supplements or CRCs are significantly lower for both males and 
females compared with their counterparts in departments where less than 30 percent of 
faculty are female: 2.2 and 2 times lower respectively.  
Model 4 replaces the proportion female with academic sector. Compared to model 2 
(which contains no level 3 variables), the addition of academic sector reduces level 3 
variance by 79.5%. As expected, academic sector is a major contributor to the explanation 
of access to supplements or CRCs. Compared to the Social sciences/psychology sector, 
access to supplements was 6.6 times higher in Economics, law and computer science, 5.9 
times higher in Specialized medicine, but 1.8 and 1.5 times lower in Humanities and 
Nursing/education respectively. It also shows that the impact of being female on access to 
supplements and CRCs varies by sector. As compared to faculty members in Social 
sciences/psychology, those in the ‘Others’ sector were 3.1 times less likely to have access 
to market supplements or CRCs.  
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8Table 3. Multilevel logistic regressions of the presence of market supplements and CRCs 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept model β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β)
Intercept  -1.24*** 0.29 -1.17*** 0.31 -1.00*** 0.37 -0.77** 0.46 -1.26*** 0.28 -1.16*** 0.31 
Academic sector on intercept            
Social science/psychology        ref  ref  
Pure/applied science        0.31 1.36 0.22 1.25 
Humanities        -0.59* 0.55 -0.44+ 0.64 
Medicine        -0.39+ 0.68 -0.43+ 0.65 
Specialized medicine        1.78*** 5.93 1.75*** 5.76 
Nursing/education        -0.41 0.67 -0.34 0.71 
Econ., law, computer sc.        1.88*** 6.55 1.90*** 6.69 
Others         -0.19 0.83 -0.21 0.81 
Female represent. on intercept               
0-29%         ref    ref  
30-39%         -0.53* 0.59   -0.34 0.71 
40%+         -0.71* 0.49   -0.13 0.88 
Female on intercept   -0.28* 0.76 -0.33** 0.72 -0.11 0.89 -0.30 0.74 0.17 1.19 
Acad. sector on female             
Social science/psychology            
Pure/applied science        0.36 1.44 -0.09 0.91 
Humanities        -0.28 0.76 -0.32 0.73 
Medicine        -0.57 0.56 -0.71* 0.49 
Specialized medicine        0.11 1.12 -0.24 0.79 
Nursing/education        -0.02 0.98 0.02 1.02 
Econ., law, computer sc.        0.28 1.32 0.14 1.15 
Others         -1.14** 0.32 -1.34** 0.26 
Female represent. on female             
0-29%      ref    ref  
Table 3 continues
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 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
30-39%      -0.24 0.79   -0.45 0.64 
40%+      -0.77* 0.46   -0.82* 0.44 
Change model            
Year 0.08*** 1.08 0.08*** 1.08 0.09*** 1.09 0.09*** 1.09 0.11*** 1.11 0.11*** 1.11 
Associate professor      -0.20* 0.82 -0.20* 0.82 -0.23* 0.79 -0.23* 0.80 
Full professor    -0.27* 0.76 -0.26* 0.77 -0.28* 0.75 -0.27* 0.76 
Variance components                  
Between person: intercept 7.104*** 7.081*** 7.153*** 7.172*** 7.201*** 7.227*** 
Between units : intercept 3.370*** 3.236*** 3.261*** 2.751*** 0.668*** 0.540*** 
N at level 1 (within-person) 11 170 11 170 11 170 11 170 11 170 11 170 
N at level 2 (individuals) 1 882 1 882 1 882 1 882 1 882 1 882 
N at level 3 (units) 64 64 64 64 64 64 
Estimation using full Penalized Quasi-Likelihood (PQL) with Bernoulli distribution at level-1. Parameter estimates are reported from the 
population-average model. p<,001*** p<,01** p<,05* p<,10 + 
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Finally, model 5 contains estimates of the joint effects of female representation and 
sector on access to supplements or CRCs. Relative to model 2, the level 3 variance estimate 
shrinks by 83.4% when both level 3 variables are included in the analysis. The joint effect 
of the variables is thus larger than their separate impact, which means that they both 
contribute to explaining access to market supplements and CRCs. The net impact of 
proportion of female is insignificant for males but significant for females. Women working 
in units with 40 percent plus females were 3.8 times less likely to have access to pay 
supplements than those working in units with less than 30% of women. Furthermore, 
adding proportion of female in units brings the effect of gender within Medicine to 
significance; female faculty members in Medicine were 2 times less likely to access market 
supplements or CRCs than faculty members in the reference sector. Both female 
representation and sector, then, contribute to the explanation of gender differences in access 
to pay supplements.  
Discussion and conclusion 
Hypothesis 1 suggested that formalized pay-setting reduces gender differences in 
earnings. Base pay at the University studied is determined through collective bargaining. It 
is highly formalized. There are procedures that govern promotion to full professor. 
Nonetheless, when someone is reviewed for promotion involves substantial discretion as do 
judgments with respect to what constitutes a suitable track record to warrant promotion. 
The award of market supplements or CRCs is highly discretionary. We therefore, expected 
no difference in base pay by gender, some difference in promotion rates, and a larger 
difference in the numbers of pay supplements awarded and their amounts. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, we found no gender differences in base pay, some evidence that it took 
longer to promote women, and large differences in the probability of receiving a 
supplement. However, we find no gender difference in supplement amounts, after controls. 
This result is inconsistent with our hypothesis. Given the large gender difference in the 
probability that a supplement will be awarded, however, we think this result requires 
further research rather than the rejection of Hypothesis 1.  
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Our results tend to confirm Hypothesis 2 which suggested that larger proportions 
female tend to depress remuneration. After controls, proportion female reduced the 
likelihood that either a market premium or CRC would be awarded. Interestingly, men’s 
access to supplements and CRCs was the same, whatever the proportion female in a unit. 
The relation between remuneration and female representation appears not to be a 
consequence of a depreciation of stereotypically feminine activities. Were this the case, we 
would have expected male faculty members in those units to have been equally 
disadvantaged, which they were not. 
 Two factors may have produced the proportion female result. One is the 
University’s affirmative action policy. Québec’s Bill 143, adopted in 2000, mandated 
increased employment of females in fields where they were underrepresented. This may 
have generated inter-university competition for females in the relevant fields which, in turn, 
would have improved the bargaining position of women in those fields. This advantage 
would only have applied to market supplements because they are the sole negotiable pay 
component at this institution. Conversely, women in units disproportionately composed of 
females may not have benefited from this bargaining advantage because the policy did not 
apply to their units. Given the informal character of the University’s market supplements 
policy, administrative positions membership in intra-University networks might plausibly 
facilitate access to information on the policy and ways to exploit it. To the extent that 
women are less likely to access these networks or key institutional positions, they might 
have been less likely to secure market supplements.  
 Our results should be considered with caution. They do not take into account one 
potentially important factor - gender differences in research productivity. One of the goals 
of market supplements and CRC policies is precisely to attract or retain the most productive 
researchers and some studies have found gender gaps in research productivity (Cole & 
Zuckerman, 1984; Nakhaie, 2002, 2007; Xie & Shauman, 2003). There is not space for a 
detailed review of the research on gender differences in research productivity. Still, a case 
can be made that accounting for these differences is not essential to the validity of our 
results.  
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Most of the research on gender gaps in publication includes multiple institutions. 
Nakhaie (2002) shows that gender differences in publication rates are partly accounted for 
by differences in university types. The present study deals with a single university. 
Evidently, institution type is irrelevant to the research. If differences in publication rates by 
gender exist they must be weaker compared to those found in studies investigating several 
institutions. Moreover there is evidence from this University that research activity did not 
differ by gender (identifying reference).44 Finally, research productivity may be considered 
a ‘corrupt’ variable. There is some evidence that women receive less than their fair share of 
research funding (MIT, 1999; R.A. Malatest and Associates Ltd, 2004) and that their 
research contributions may not be valued as much as males’ contributions (Wennerås & 
Wold, 1997; Nakhaie, 2007). Insofar as this is the case, controlling for productivity may 
lead to an underestimate of female disadvantage. Finally, there is another reason why our 
results may underestimate earnings female disadvantage. From the very beginning of the 
analysis we control for salary level. It is possible, however, that the salaries of women at 
the point of hire are lower than those of men. Overall, then, these results from a single 
Canadian research university are consistent with continuing female pay disadvantage, even 
in an ostensibly ‘progressive’ institutional context. 
                                                 
44 The analysis did not include publication rates but did use several indicators of research activity - research 
grants, research contracts, use of research assistants, research agents or post-doctoral fellows, and 
membership in a research team. 
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9Appendix A. Descriptive statistics for years 1997 and 2006  
 1997 2006 
 Males Females Total Males Females Total 
Dependent variables 
Rank  (χ2 = 53.698; p=0.000) (χ2 = 42.777; p=0.000) 
Assistant professor 11.7% 23.0% 170 16.5% 29.8% 249 
Associate professor 32.0% 44.0% 407 28.4% 33.3% 357 
Full professor 56.4% 33.0% 580 55.1% 36.8% 582 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 1157 100.0% 100.0% 1188 
Average total pay (F(1, 1155)=67.658; p=0.000) (F(1, 1189)=62.302; p=0.000) 
$74 700 $68 167 $72 955 $104 916 $95 263 $101 674 
Presence of market supplement (χ2 =14.912; p=0.000) (χ2 = 6.934; p=0.008) 
No 73.6% 84.5% 885 63.0% 70.7% 779 
Yes 26.4% 15.5% 272 37.0% 29.3% 409 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 1157 100.0% 100.0% 1188 
Presence of chair supplement 
n/a 
(χ2 =7.052 ; p=0.008) 
No 93.3% 97.0% 1123 
Yes 6.7% 3.0% 65 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 1188 
Independent/control variables 
Gender 73.3% 26.7% 1157 66.4% 33.6% 1188 
Academic sector (χ2 =88.692; p=0.000) (χ2 = 54.608; p=0.000) 
Social sciences/psycho. 18.3% 21.4% 221 17.7% 21.6% 226 
Pure and applied sciences 19.1% 3.6% 173 15.5% 5.8% 145 
Humanities 12.3% 14.9% 150 12.0% 12.3% 144 
Medicine 13.9% 16.5% 169 16.2% 19.5% 206 
Specialized medicine 11.7% 8.7% 126 12.8% 12.3% 150 
Nursing/education 5.5% 18.8% 105 4.8% 13.3% 91 
Econ., law, computer sc. 9.7% 6.1% 101 10.4% 6.3% 107 
Others 9.6% 10.0% 112 10.5% 9.0% 119 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 1157 100.0% 100.0% 1188 
Female representation within 
unit (quintiles, base: 1997) (χ
2 =198.102; p=0.000) (χ2 =104.966; p=0.000) 
Quintile 1 (0-6%) 19.6% 1.6% 171 14.2% 7.8% 167 
Quintile 2 (7-17%) 28.2% 10.0% 270 27.4% 14.3% 273 
Quintile 3 (18-29%) 21.6% 18.1% 239 23.3% 17.0% 252 
Quintile 4 (30-39%) 17.8% 25.3% 229 15.5% 24.8% 237 
Quintile 5 (40%+) 12.8% 45.0% 248 14.6% 36.1% 259 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 1157 100.0% 100.0% 1188 
Year of appointment  (F(1, 1155)=38.351 p= 0.000) (F(1, 1189)=38.599 p= 0.000) 
1978.54 1982.58 1979.62 1989.73 1993.96 1991.15 
Average pay grade (F(1, 1155)=46.020 p=0.000) (F(1, 1189)=32.658; p=0.000) 
18.51 15.59 17.73 24.10 21.62 23.26 
Average market supplement 
(among recipients) 
(F(1, 258)=0.000; p=0.989) (F(1, 402)=3.423; p=0.065) 
$5 891 $5 880 $5 889 $13 295 $11 029 $12 646 
Average chair supplement  
(among recipients) n/a 
(F(1, 63)=1.559; p=0.216) 
$35 602 $28 028 $34 204 
 Chapter 4 
 
Article 3 : Doucet, C. Gender and the Use of Discretionary Pay Supplements 
among University Faculty Members.  
To be submitted following revisions, journal to be determined. 
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Abstract 
This research examines the mechanisms that may lead to gender differences in 
access to ‘market supplements’ at a large Canadian research university. The process of 
awarding pay in excess of the amounts provided for in a collective agreement are examined 
based on interviews with 17 administrators at all hierarchical levels and in various 
academic units. Results suggest that gender differences in the likelihood of receiving a 
supplement may be related to specific features of the award process and to an unequal 
distribution of awards which disadvantages units with strong female representation. 
Keywords: Gender pay gap; faculty; pay discretion; content analysis. 
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Introduction 
The use of market premiums to supplement the base salary of faculty members has 
become widespread in universities in Canada (Doucet, Durand & Smith, 2008) and 
Australia (Lyons & Ingersoll, 2006). These policies have been criticized for their 
potentially adverse effects (Pelletier, 2004; SGPUM, 2001, 2002; SPUL, 2003; SPPUS, 
2002)45, for being unnecessary if the same results can be achieved with a sensible 
promotion system (Stilwell, 2003), and for being potentially discriminatory towards female 
faculty members (Canadian Association of University Teachers, 2004). There have been 
studies of the operation of market-based pay systems in university settings. Doucet et al. 
(2008) examined gender differences in the receipt of market supplements at a large 
Canadian university. Nichols-Casebolt (1993) studied faculty perceptions of the attribution 
process of salary market adjustments in one large American research university. However, 
there has been no research on the operation of these pay systems in practice or on the 
mechanisms through which they may lead to gender differences in pay. The research 
reported here addresses these two issues. 
Market-based pay: general principles and potential problems 
Scholars working on compensation describe market-based pay as a mean to 
establish optimal salary levels for the attraction and retention of qualified employees 
(Leavitt & Morris, 2008). This is usually done by comparing the compensation levels of 
target positions to similar positions in the relevant market (Milkovich & Newman, 2005). 
Organizations use wage surveys to find out how much competitors pay to fill comparable 
jobs.  
Organizations may run into several problems when implementing these pay 
systems. First, decision-makers may use survey data to justify decisions that have been 
made on other grounds (Nelson & Bridges, 1999).  
                                                 
45 SGPUM, SPUL and SPPUS are the faculty unions of Université de Montréal, Université Laval and 
Université de Sherbrooke. 
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Second, market-based pay may lead to faculty morale problems. Linking wages to 
market demand may produce situations where poor performers in a high demand field 
receive higher wages than strong performers in a low demand field (Nichols-Casebolt, 
1993). It may also lead to salary compression, where the difference between the wages of 
junior and senior faculty members is reduced or even eliminated (Hearn, 1999; Amey 
VanDerLinden, 2002). Either outcome may negatively impact collegiality (Amey 
VanDerLinden, 2002). 
Finally, market data may “reflect discriminatory practices by employers against 
minorities and women” (Heneman, 2003, p. 50). Within the academic profession, women 
and men are to some degree segregated by discipline. Using American data for 1999, 
Umbach (2007) found a negative relationship between the proportion of female faculty 
members and average wages within fields after a range of controls (e.g., human capital, 
academic rank, the percentage of faculty members in the field with funded research, 
proportion of time spent on teaching). The negative relation between the proportion of 
women in an occupation and wages may reflect the devaluation of work done by women 
(Bellas, 1994).  
The academic labour market 
Academia, it is generally agreed, involves multiple labour markets (Hearn, 1999; 
Toutkoushian, 2006). There are field-based differences in the salaries paid to faculty 
members in Canada (Sussman and Yssaad, 2005) as there are in United States (Thornton, 
2007). Faculty salaries also vary between individuals within fields: they are influenced by 
rank, mobility, and performance - mostly research performance (Perna, 2003). Definitions 
of performance may vary within universities (Hearn, 1999). Administrators may sometimes 
assign a broad value to the reputation of faculty members based on student enrollments in 
their courses and the grants they receive (Grant, 1993).  
Several processes within academic departments are likely to mediate the assignment 
of market premiums. Departments vary in the decision-making discretion they are 
permitted. Unconvinced by available candidates they may not appoint at all. Conversely, if 
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they become aware that a suitable candidate is available they may be able to open a 
position. Variations in governance practices and composition may also be relevant. Pfeffer 
and Langton (1988) found less variation in salaries within departments characterized by 
greater social contacts between faculty members, demographic homogeneity, and 
democratic and participative governance. Salary variation was greater in larger 
departments, in private institutions and in departments where faculty members tended to 
work alone. There is some evidence that the negotiating of market premiums may be easier 
for chairpersons who benefit from their deans’ support (Musselin, 2005). This support may 
depend on criteria such as departments’ centrality to the mission of the institution, 
productivity and quality, as well as demographic composition, departmental power and 
service to dominant external constituencies (Volk et al., 2001).  
The production of gender differences in pay at the organizational level 
There are two types of explanations of pay differences by gender among faculty 
members: those referring to gender differences in characteristics related to pay and those 
based on structural, social and organizational factors (Sonnert, 1999). Doucet et al. (2008; 
submitted) consecutively focused on each type of explanation. In a first study they found a 
gender gap in the receipt of market supplements even after controls that one might expect 
to be associated with their award: field of specialization, research activities46, attitudes 
towards remuneration and seniority within rank. After controls female faculty members 
were almost three times less likely than males to report that they had received a market 
supplement since their initial appointment (Doucet et al., 2008). 
In a second paper the same authors focused on two potential organizational 
determinants of gender differences in pay: formalization of pay practices and female 
representation in units (Doucet, Smith & Durand, submitted). Their main findings were the 
                                                 
46 This research uses indicators of research activities (research contracts received, grants, research chairs, 
integration to research teams and presence of research assistants, agents and post-doctoral fellows). These 
resources for research certainly affect research productivity and securing them also most certainly results 
from previous research productivity. Thus, they are used as proxies of research productivity; however they do 
not account for actual research productivity. 
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following: after relevant controls,47 i) there was no difference in base pay by gender; ii) 
women were slightly less likely to be have been promoted to full professor; iii) consistent 
with the first paper, there were substantial gender differences in access to pay supplements; 
iv) there were no gender differences in the size of the pay supplements awarded; v) the 
probability that a woman would receive a pay supplement was substantially decreased if 
she worked in a unit containing a large proportion of women. All this leaves open the 
question: what mechanisms produced these outcomes differences? 
Stereotypes, cognitive bias, and in-group preferences are likely to influence 
judgments, including judgments of performance. Organizations may allow or limit the 
impact of such biases (Reskin, 2000b). Suitable rules and procedures limit the possibilities 
for gender bias (Ridgeway, 2009). So might the imposition of accountability, for example, 
by requiring that decision-makers justify discrepancies by gender (Reskin, 2000b) or 
publish information that allows the detection of evidence of discriminatory practices 
(Petersen & Saporta, 2004). It has been argued, more generally, that gender differences in 
pay may be limited in settings where compensation is established through formalized 
processes (Reskin, 2000a; Kulis, 1998; Silvera, 1996; Rubery et al., 1998; Elvira & 
Graham, 2002).  
Still, unexplained gender differences in pay can be found in formalized pay systems. 
Roth (2006) shows how women can be disadvantaged in a merit pay system despite a 
highly formalized process based on evaluations by managers, peers and subordinates. 
Homophily among coworkers, subordinates and managers, as well as cognitive bias in 
evaluations generated these differences. Nelson and Bridges (1999) find that processes of 
organizational politics and organizational reproduction of cultural advantage play a role in 
maintaining differences between the salaries paid in jobs predominantly held by women 
and those predominantly held by men, despite the use of methods designed to tie salary 
levels to market.  
                                                 
47 Separate analysis were performed for total pay, access to full professorship and access to pay supplements, 
using for each relevant controls among the following : year of appointment, pay grade at the beginning of the 
observation period, yearly increments in base pay, rank and academic sector. 
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Research on academe has identified a number of mechanisms producing 
disadvantage. Women’s pay may be lower because they receive less outside job offers 
(Reskin, 1992; Blackaby, Booth, and Frank, 2005) either because women are less willing to 
be geographically mobile or are perceived to be less mobile. Salary variability between 
departments in response to differences in labour market conditions may largely reproduce 
the depression of salaries in fields traditionally occupied by women (Reskin, 1992). The 
individual negotiation of starting salaries may penalize women if they negotiate less 
forcefully and effectively or if those with whom they negotiate take a harder line against 
women (Babcock & Laschever, 2003).  
In sum, the literature on compensation suggests that the need to attract and retain 
faculty members and external equity concerns may motivate the use of market supplements. 
Organizations may face certain difficulties when operating these pay systems: the use of 
survey data to inform decisions may be challenging, the recourse to market supplements 
may lead to morale problems among employees and may even be discriminatory. In 
academia, market supplements may be associated with fields or individuals but determining 
which fields and individuals should be rewarded may be problematic, for the reasons given 
above. Generally speaking, we might expect that, to varying degrees, rules, procedures, and 
transparency are all likely to reduce the likelihood of discriminatory behavior. Conversely, 
discretion and secrecy are likely to encourage it. 
Research design 
Understanding how inequalities are generated requires not only taking into 
consideration the point of view of those who are subjected to these inequalities, but also 
that of decision-makers. With the exception of the research conducted by Nelson and 
Bridges (1999), based on the court defenses of organizations in pay equity cases, research 
on gender inequalities has neglected this point of view. This study uses semi-directed 
interviews conducted during the summer and fall of 2007 with academic administrators at 
all hierarchical levels in one large Canadian research university. Base salary at this 
institution is established by collective agreement while market supplements are negotiated 
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separately on an individual basis. This is an important methodological advantage because it 
allows isolating the possible effects of individual negotiation and administrative discretion 
on pay. Over the last decade there has been a large increase in the use of market 
supplements at that institution. This case offers a good opportunity to observe how 
practices that may potentially generate inequalities are put in place, justified, and used. 
The institution at which this research was conducted is located in a competitive 
environment for the hiring and retention of faculty members. It is a large research 
university situated in a metropolitan area where there are several universities, one of which 
is, along with the institution under study, considered to be among the top ten research 
universities in the country. Other important competitors include several universities in the 
neighboring province and American states as well as private industries in the area, such as 
pharmaceuticals, aerospace, software engineering and telecommunications. 
Informants were selected in relation to their unit affiliation, which could mean 
school, department, or faculty, depending on whether or not faculties are departmentalized. 
Using administrative data from the institution for 2006, units were classified along two 
dimensions: the proportion of faculty who were receiving supplements (coded as low, 
moderate or high) and the proportion of women in the units (also coded as low, moderate or 
high). Table 1 presents details of this classification and of the selection of informants.  
The classification yielded nine unit types, each including between 5 and 16 units. 
One exception to this was the type characterized by high percentages of women as well as 
of supplement recipients; there were only three of these. Within each type, the selection 
process excluded small units (less than ten faculty members) because it seemed likely that 
informants would be reluctant to share information were it likely that the interview would 
allow the identification of specific faculty members. The selection process favored units 
where one could find potential informants who had held administrative positions between 
1999 and 2005, a period characterized by substantial increases in the awards of 
supplements and in their amounts. In addition, informants who no longer held 
administrative positions were preferred since we expected that they would share 
information more freely. The selection process was designed to include all seven academic 
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sectors of the institution,48 but collaboration could be obtained with administrators for six 
sectors. For every unit selected, the administrator at the next hierarchical level was also 
interviewed when possible (deans or vice-presidents, depending on the type of unit).  
10Table 1. Details of unit selection 
% of faculty members 
who are  recipients  
Female representation within units 
Low (0-23%) Moderate (24-45%) High (46%+) 
Low (0-14%) AA1 : 1 Chairperson 
16 units in total 
AB1 : 1 Chairperson 
8 units in total 
AC1 : 1 Chairperson 
7 units in total 
Moderate (15-38%) BA1 : 1 Chairperson 
7 units in total 
BB1c : 1 Chairperson 
BB1d :1 Dean 
14 units in total 
BC1 : 1 Dean 
5 units in total 
High (39%+) CA1 : 1 Chairperson 
7 units in total 
CB1 : 1 Chairperson 
6 units in total 
CC1 : 1 Dean 
3 units in total 
The final sample included seven chairpersons, two vice-deans, six deans, one vice-
president and the former President, for a total of 17 informants. This sample covers the 
range of situations that theory suggests may have an influence on the allocation of market 
supplements: it includes units that vary in terms of their labour market situation, 
departmental influence within the institution and the amount of institutional support 
provided to it, governance processes, customs, and proportion of women. 
The interviews were designed with two purposes: 1) to understand the various ways 
in which market supplements are allocated in different units; 2) to uncover the practices and 
processes that could have produced disadvantages for female faculty members. To this end, 
the following themes were discussed: how the decision to award a market premium was 
made, the rules that framed these decisions, the information on market supplements 
provided to faculty members and academic administrators, changes in the practice over 
time, and criticisms of market supplements. The issue of gender differences was not 
directly raised. Because it is a sensitive issue at the institution under study, raising it in 
interviews could have discouraged open discussion by making informants adopt a defensive 
                                                 
48 Sectors at this institution are Pure and Applied Science, Social science/Psychology, Humanities, Medicine, 
Specialized Medicine, Law, Nursing/Education and Others. 
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posture. Instead, a final question about equity between faculty members in general was 
used to prompt informants able and willing to share information in relation to gender 
differences, to do so.  
The analytical strategy consisted in a two-stage content analysis of the interviews. 
The first stage focused on four aspects: the justifications for the use of supplements, the 
award process, the use of market indicators to inform decisions and the criticisms directed 
at the use of market supplements. The second stage focused on identifying processes that 
might have generated gender differences in access to supplements.  
The context: a substantial increase in the use of market supplements 
Administrative data collected by the institution shows that there was a significant 
increase in the use of market supplements between 1999 and 2005. The proportion of 
faculty members receiving market supplements increased from 22% in 1999 to 34.2% in 
2005, which represents a 55.5% relative growth over six years (see figure 1). Gender 
differences tended to diminish over time but did not disappear. The decrease in gender 
differences was mainly limited to senior faculty members. In 1997, among junior faculty 
members, 29.7% of males and 19% of females were receiving market supplements, a 10.7 
percentage point difference. In 2006, 42.5% of male and 33.5% of female junior faculty 
members were receiving market supplements, a 9.1 percentage point difference. Among 
senior faculty members, 23.7% of males and 9.2% of females were supplement recipients in 
1997, a 14.5 percentage point difference. In 2006, these proportions had reached 31.6% and 
24.1% respectively, a gap of 7.5 percentage points. Thus, there was a 1.6 percentage point 
decrease in the gender gap among junior faculty members during the observation period, 
while among senior faculty members, the gender gap was reduced by seven percentage 
points. 
Previous research (Doucet et al., 2008) has shown that a substantial part of this 
gender gap could not be explained by field of specialization, research activity, attitudes 
towards remuneration, career stage, or family constraints. Related research reveals no 
gender gap in base salary and in the amounts of supplements received, and weak 
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differences in access to full professorship, after relevant controls (Doucet et al., 
forthcoming). Access to market supplements, then, appears to be the main source of pay 
disadvantage for women at this institution.  
4Figure 1. Proportions of faculty members receiving supplements by gender and seniority, 
1997-2006 
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Results 
Why use market supplements? 
Market supplements have been used for both hiring and retention. The President 
explained that the institution had a long history of using market supplements, sometimes 
because of competition with the private sector, but the decision to transform the institution 
into a leading research university mandated an increase in their use. Recruitment efforts had 
increasingly extended beyond national borders, the university sector had expanded, and 
competition for academic staff became stiffer. In addition, confronted with a financial crisis 
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at the end of the 1990s, the institution offered retirement incentives the take-up of which 
had caused understaffing at the senior level. While the base salary at this institution was 
high compared to other equivalent Canadian institutions it was deemed insufficient for the 
hiring and retention of the most eminent academics, the President said. Supplements were 
considered almost unavoidable in some fields, but their award to all faculty members within 
these fields was never considered a viable option because supplements go to individuals, 
not fields.  
However, one senior administrator reported that an exception was made to this 
unwritten rule in order to “save” a faculty. On several occasions, the faculty dean had 
approached senior administrators for assistance with allegedly acute recruitment and 
retention problems. He was asked for a report with specific details on these problems and a 
proposition to solve them. As a result, a “supplement scale” was devised for this Faculty, 
which translated into the award of supplements to nearly all members of it. 
Two senior administrators claimed that hiring supplements were necessary because 
the more recently hired were, on average, better qualified than their predecessors. Most had 
held post-doctoral appointments prior to being hired and came to the institution with a 
publication record, accomplishments that were less common among earlier cohorts.  
There was disagreement among informants about the impact of teaching 
performance on the award of market supplements. The Vice-President, the Dean and the 
Vice-Dean of one departmentalized faculty all argued that teaching performance played a 
role in decisions to award supplements. But only one chairperson (out of seven) reported 
that this was the case and the President was categorical: to him, supplements were 
completely unrelated to teaching performance.  
Attitudes towards, and justifications of, market supplements varied across units 
according to the extent of their use. All three chairpersons of units where supplements were 
rarely used mentioned that the scarcity of available jobs and the ease of finding excellent 
candidates to fill faculty positions meant that supplements were rarely necessary. One said 
that, in a context where the senior administration was reluctant to let some units replace 
retired faculty members, “Being authorized to hire new faculty members is a premium.” A 
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Chairperson and a Faculty Dean identified features of their field that tended to limit the use 
of market supplements: the salaries of professionals in their field were modest and the field 
itself lacked of prestige, requiring a constant battle for recognition. 
For us, [market supplements are] inaccessible. In Medicine, of course, to begin 
with they are paid on a different salary scale, they command higher salaries. 
We are in no position to negotiate. Our profession is not recognized, not 
prestigious. […] It fights for its survival and recognition. So market 
supplements in this context…we [have] no way of getting our hands on those. 
[…] We [are] in the minor league with regard to wages. (Informant AB2)49 
This informant also said that market supplements clashed with the field’s 
disciplinary culture, which tended to value the collectivity rather than individuals. The 
informant was able to provide evidence of this orientation to the collectivity: 
Some faculty members were extremely generous. During periods of financial 
difficulties, they would try to obtain a bit more money when negotiating 
external contracts. This was used, for instance, to create a fund that offered 
grants to attract students. […] This is a good example of the spirit and 
mentality of this department. […] There is a very strong collective spirit. 
(Informant AB2) 
The President argued that some units rarely recommended market supplements 
because of concern at the tensions their use might cause. Corroborating this, a chairperson 
from one such reported that he played no part in the few awards made in his unit; all 
requests had come from hierarchical superiors. 
Informants from all three units where supplement use was low emphasized the 
exceptional nature of the awards. One Dean strongly resisted the use of market supplements 
based on a perception that the practice was inequitable; the informant only used 
supplements to match the salaries to ensure that newly appointed faculty members leaving a 
position at another institution would not suffer a wage cut. In another unit, supplements 
were only used for retention, and were dependent upon outstanding research performance, 
                                                 
49 The first letters in the labels associated to informants refer to the extent of supplements use in informants’ 
units and the second letter refers to the extent of female representation in the informants’ units (A=low; 
B=moderate; C=high). The numbers refer to the hierarchical level (1=unit level; 2=faculty level). 
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as reflected by the quality of publications and the extent of research funding. In the 
remaining unit, the only award ever approved by the chairperson was to a full professor 
who received an employment offer from a competitor, who was deemed exceptional, and 
whose wages had been at the top of the salary scale for some years. 
In units where the use of supplements was moderate, informants justified them as a 
way of recognizing outstanding research performance and on the grounds that the base 
salary provided by the collective agreement was sometimes insufficient to attract or retain 
faculty members. Indeed, as mentioned previously, although the base salary was considered 
high compared to equivalent Canadian institutions, this university did not have a formal pay 
differentiation system like other institutions. Another distinct characteristic of these units 
was the fact that informants tended to portray negotiations with hierarchical superiors for 
the awards as collaborative. 
As in units where supplement use was moderate, in units where they were widely 
used, informants emphasized the need to recognize research performance and the perceived 
insufficiency of the base salary at this institution. Two of the three chairpersons from these 
units emphasized the ease of finding employment outside academia and the shortage of 
academic staff in many institutions. In fact, in these two units, all faculty members hired in 
recent years had received a supplement. Chairpersons in these units spoke readily of 
strategic negotiations with senior administrators and portrayed themselves as advocates for 
faculty members. They tended to approach supplements in a proactive way; all three 
chairpersons of these units said that there had been instances where they took the initiative 
to request a supplement for a faculty member. One Chairperson mentioned going through 
the professional record of every faculty member on a yearly basis and offering to request a 
market supplement for those that he thought deserved one. This was done to prevent faculty 
members from seeking offers from other employers and was considered altogether less 
costly than waiting and letting faculty members initiate requests for pay increases that 
might prove very large.  
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The award process 
All informants in the sample agreed on a number of elements. First, information on 
supplements had not been directly transmitted to faculty members, most had been unaware 
of the award process and did not know who received supplements in their units. Nor had 
chairpersons been systematically informed about the award process; their knowledge of it 
was highly variable. Second, there was no pre-established institutional or unit-specific fund 
for market supplements; the informants who had used supplements reported that they 
requested them as and when they were needed. Third, no instructions were given to 
chairpersons on how to evaluate the “market value” of faculty members.  
The general award process tended to be similar across units: no difference was 
observed according to unit type. Whether supplements were used for hiring or retention, 
chairpersons first consulted with their “hierarchical superior”, who made the final decision 
to award a supplement and determined the amount. In departmentalized faculties, the 
hierarchical superior who made these decisions were the deans while in other faculties, this 
responsibility belonged to a vice-president. When requests exceeded a specified range 
(usually between $5,000 and $10,000, however in more recent years, amounts could reach 
$20,000), they were asked to justify the requests in front of a committee composed of three 
vice-presidents (executive, research and academic affairs). When the members of the 
committee could not agree, the President could be approached to settle the case. In the 
words of one senior administrator, “there were multiple filters in award decisions, more so 
when requests were substantial”.  
Requests were usually initiated at the unit level. However, they may also have been 
initiated by hierarchical superiors, either on their own initiative or following requests by 
faculty members themselves. This happened, for instance, when a chairperson refused to 
award a requested market supplement. Resorting to supplements can create tensions within 
units; this is why, according to senior administrators, chairpersons were free to use them or 
not.  
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Supplements were usually awarded for five years, at which point a performance 
review determined whether or not the award would be renewed for another five years. This 
was purportedly done to promote continuing performance in recipients. However, 
administrative data reveal very few instances of faculty members actually losing a 
supplement after five years.  
The use of market indicators 
By definition, market supplements should be related to some aspect of the labour 
market. So, which market indicators were used? In fact, at the unit level, nearly all 
informants who ever had to request supplements on behalf of faculty members said that 
information on publications and grants were the main indicators used. Only one chairperson 
mentioned using external labour market indicators - that is, wage information collected and 
published by a professional organization.   
Senior administrators (some deans, vice-deans, the President and a vice-president) 
did report that they had consulted external labour market indicators. Two main sources of 
information were used: salary information on other comparable universities Canadian and 
American research universities and wage surveys. Wages in the private sector were also 
examined, but several informants vigorously insisted that the institution refused to compete 
with the private sector. They considered the two sectors to be in parts of the labour market 
too different to be compared and emphasized the financial limitations of the institution as 
well as the non financial advantages of working in academe. Internal sources of information 
were used to inform decisions and to ensure internal equity. Such information included the 
professional track-records of faculty members and unit-specific, recent, information on 
voluntary turnover, difficulties in hiring first choice candidates or, more generally, 
difficulty in filling academic positions. In determining the amounts to award administrators 
took into account previous hiring supplements in the targeted unit and in the institution as a 
whole. In addition, all senior administrators said that when retention supplements were 
requested based on outside offers they asked for written proof.  
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Criticisms directed at the use of market supplements 
Despite the strong criticisms of market supplements expressed by some informants, 
none was altogether opposed to the practice. Even informants who, on ethical grounds, 
were reluctant to use supplements in their own units nonetheless believed that the practice 
was justified in units facing significant hiring and retention problems.  
Chairpersons of units in which market supplements were widely used expressed 
few, and mostly superficial, objections to the practice. Informants from units where 
supplements were used scarcely or moderately were much more critical. Furthermore, all 
informants from the senior administration were critical with respect to some aspects of the 
practice. The most vivid and frequent criticism was related to the perception that market 
supplements were inequitable; out of 17 informants, 10 spoke of perceived inequities 
resulting from the award process. Most often viewed as problematic was the fact that some 
faculty members who, according to the informants, deserved a supplement had not received 
one because of resistance toward the practice in their unit or because they never asked one 
(an “injustice by oversight”, in the words of one informant). Reservations were also 
expressed about the awarding of retention supplements in response to outside offers. One 
informant cynically recalled being told by a senior administrator: “If you want a 
supplement, get an outside offer.” In this chairperson’s opinion, this method was 
questionable because it entailed making a colleague from another institution waste time on 
a mock job application only to get an offer on paper. Besides, it was suggested, 
encouraging faculty members to consider outside offers was risky; it might turn out that the 
outside offers would induce them to leave.  
Several informants perceived inequities between junior and senior faculty members 
resulting from the award of supplements to newly hired academic staff. One informant was 
worried that morale problems could ensue. There was also a perception among some 
informants that market supplements reinforced existing inequities between units and 
faculties. That is, the advantages of some units with respect to access to research funds and 
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funds for hiring were further consolidated through their opportunities to offer market 
supplements.  
Several informants lamented transparency problems. The lack of precise rules, 
criteria and general information about this policy made it questionable in their eyes. Asked 
how market supplements were introduced at this institution, one senior administrator began 
his answer as follows: 
 …there is a lack of transparency, what I would call ‘hearsay culture’ […] Some 
would have us believe [that the awards are more transparent nowadays] but I am 
under the impression that sleight of hands are still performed sometimes, what we call 
‘discretionary judgments’, I suppose. (Senior administration) 
One informant who was not aware of the existence of market supplements before 
consulting a senior administrator about hiring problems, commented on transparency issues 
at this institution:  
When money matters are brought up [...], people become mute. Because the more you 
understand how things work, the more you ask questions; and the more you ask 
questions, the less clear and precise the answers become. And this is when you 
understand that different faculties are managed in very different ways. […] Our 
faculty was kept in the dark. (Informant BC1) 
According to one informant, cynicism developed among deans of faculties where 
supplements were scarce as a result of this lack of transparency. Some informants were 
particularly suspicious of the extensive use of market supplements in the Economics 
Department. Commenting on the creation by senior administrators of a document 
containing guidelines for the awards around 2004, one informant explained that this had 
become necessary to control the increasing volume of supplement requests, a tendency 
partly attributed by this senior administrator to faculty members in the Economics 
Department:  
Economists have developed the academic market well. They acted as levers [for the 
use of market supplements at this institution]. But in some ways, the phenomenon can 
be artificially created. Everything is not positive in the awards, I believe it is essential 
to have some leverage, but there can be a tendency for inflation to develop […] as 
with hockey players. (Senior administration) 
143 
 
 
Speaking of a yearly job market event for economists, another senior administrator 
explains that 
…economists often have the advantage when negotiating work conditions […] I used 
to tell them: “You guys created a nice market for yourselves, you raise your 
conditions, others raise their conditions, and so on.” We were not fooled by this. 
(Senior administration) 
According to this informant, the administration was aware of possible inflationary 
effects of the salary offers generated by candidates in some fields, such as Economics. The 
senior administration did not try to match these offers; instead, wage information from 
other sources was gathered to inform decisions.  
Some chairpersons and senior administrators tended to see the merit component of 
the existing supplement systems as a deficient alternative to a formal merit pay scheme, 
where part of the salary of faculty members would be dependent upon yearly performance 
evaluations. When asked about possible inequities in the attribution of supplements, one 
informant suggested how these could be solved with a systematic merit pay system: 
We already offer merit pay by giving supplements to faculty members who have the 
nerve to request one or who receive outside offers. Personally, I think it would be 
fairer to do it for everyone. Say, we would automatically examine professional 
records every number of years and based on evaluations by an objective committee, 
using well defined criteria, the best [faculty members] would be offered more 
substantial salary raises than others. This would solve the justice matter. (Informant 
BB1c) 
The senior administration proposed a merit pay policy during the round of collective 
bargaining negotiations at the beginning of the 1990s. It was believed that this system 
would provide internal incentives, which would be especially useful to motivate full 
professors to perform. It would also promote recruiting and retention of the better 
performers while being better structured, more transparent, and equitable than the 
supplements system. The proposition was almost adopted but according to a senior 
administrator, it failed because the employer denied the union’s requests in return for 
approval of the merit pay scheme. According to one informant, the lack of a formal merit 
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pay scheme puts this institution at a disadvantage in the competition for the hiring and 
retention of faculty members. 
Our competitors have tools that we don’t. We’re giving ourselves some tools [market 
supplements], but they are used ad hoc and are inadequate. (Senior administrator) 
In an article published in 2003, another informant lamented the impact of the use of 
supplements instead of a formal internal incentives system:  
While it’s a valuable solution for some [faculty members], supplements become a 
poison for the organization as a whole and a puzzle for administrators who strive to 
maintain equity without being able to rely on a coherent, transparent and accepted 
system of rules for granting these rewards. (Senior administration) 
Features of the award process and gender differences in access to market supplements 
Several features of the award process may have contributed to gender differences in 
access to market supplements, although their influence cannot be directly tested. The 
effects are situated at both the individual and the unit level.  
At the individual level 
Four features of the award process were identified as potential individual level 
explanations of gender differences in access to market supplements: the individualization of 
market supplement negotiations, the lack of formalization of the policy, discretion and 
secrecy in decision making, and the influence of outside offers. 
i) The individualization of negotiations 
One informant from the senior administration commented on how the 
individualization of negotiations might disadvantage women: 
One thing is for sure, women make fewer requests, and this is not limited to salaries. 
[…] It’s as if women are so happy to get a position that when they are presented with 
one, they accept whatever is offered. (Senior administrator) 
According to this informant, gender differences may have reflected a tendency 
among female faculty members to make fewer requests and negotiate less after hiring. This 
senior administrator also wondered whether the fact that fewer requests for female faculty 
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members made their way to the senior administration meant that they were less likely to ask 
for supplements or that as many of them made requests, but were less inclined to pursue the 
matter:  
Perhaps these women asked their chairperson for supplements, but gave up more 
rapidly. No data indicating how many did ask their chairperson is available. (Senior 
administrator) 
Interestingly, the only other spontaneous mention of gender in the interviews was a 
chairperson’s impression that market supplements were more of a “guy thing”, meaning 
something likely to be discussed mostly among male colleagues. This perception was based 
on the informant’s observation of a stronger tendency among males than females within the 
unit to compare their work conditions with those at a nearby university.  
ii) The lack of formalization of the policy on market supplements 
If women were less likely to know that there was a program of market supplements 
they would also be less likely to request one. This might be the result of a lack of 
formalization of the policy. There are indeed some indications in our data that access to 
information about the policy was gendered at this institution. First, of the 17 informants 
interviewed for this research, four were unaware of the existence of market supplements 
before their appointment as chairpersons. Out of these four, three were women (five women 
were interviewed in total). Two of them found out about the existence of supplements 
during meetings with senior administrators where they discussed hiring or retention 
problems within their units. The third woman was unaware, at the time of the interview, 
that some faculty members in her own unit were receiving market supplements. This is 
probably related to the fact that, in this faculty, supplements were negotiated by the dean. 
Given their position as administrators, these women were likely to have greater access than 
regular female faculty members to information on the inner workings of the compensation 
system of the university. Thus, any gender difference at the administration level could 
mean even greater differences at the academic level.  
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Second, the mention by an informant that fewer requests were received for female 
than for male faculty members is consistent with the idea that women faculty members 
lacked the necessary information to request supplements.  
Third, the reduction over time of the gender gap in the receipt of supplements 
observed in the administrative data is consistent with this hypothesis. As more faculty 
members received supplements, more women likely became aware of their existence and of 
the award process, and acted accordingly. The fact that the faculty union wrote about 
market supplements in its newsletter several times between 2001 and 2007 also makes it 
more likely that with time, knowledge about market supplements has become widespread. 
In fact, some of these articles specifically addressed gender-based inequalities in market 
supplements, which would have raised female faculty’s awareness that the program existed 
and that maybe they were not receiving their fair share of supplements.  
The fact that the observed decrease in gender differences is for all practical purposes 
limited to senior faculty members also adds to the plausibility of this hypothesis. Indeed, 
knowledge about supplements may not have been as important in determining the receipt of 
a hiring supplement as it was for a retention supplement. In the former, chairpersons 
usually initiated the request on behalf of faculty members while in the latter, faculty 
members often initiated requests.  
iii) Discretion and secrecy in decision making 
Discretion and secrecy may be conducive to gender bias and favoritism. The 
interviews provided some evidence of this. Two informants alluded to the fact that senior 
administrators sometimes used their influence to facilitate access to market supplements in 
some units. Two other informants mentioned that some influential faculty members 
managed to get supplements through channels higher in the hierarchy than their unit’s 
chairperson (unit types AA and CB). Chairpersons and senior administrators may have 
been more likely to defend the interests of male faculty members if they had stronger 
relationships with them than with female faculty members (as a result of homophily for 
instance) or if male faculty members held more power in their unit or in the university. In 
other words, male faculty members could generally have been more visible to 
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administrators. This in turn may have made them less likely than their female counterparts 
to be subjected to what one informant calls an “injustice by oversight”, meaning that some 
faculty members who were entitled to market supplements did not receive one as a result of 
the way the system works.  
iv) The influence of outside offers 
Given the way the system of market supplements works, female faculty members 
would also be disadvantaged if they were less likely to receive or respond to outside offers. 
Two informants said that they evaluated the limits on faculty members’ mobility (the 
financial and psychological costs of moving) when deciding on counter-offers. If women 
were perceived as less mobile they may be offered less. However, the interviews provide no 
direct information on this question. 
At the unit level 
Gender differences may result from the over-representation of female faculty 
members in units where market supplements are scarce and/or their under-representation in 
units where market supplements are widely used. The experiences of two units at opposite 
ends of the continuum of proportions female and male illustrate how this worked at this 
institution. 
One unit was male-dominated unit with a tradition of using market supplements that 
had developed in response to perceived faculty shortages that were associated with the 
perception that the base salary was too low. Members of this unit accepted this practice. In 
the Chairperson’s experience, most prospective faculty members expressed astonishment at 
the University’s salary scales and responded by initiating negotiation over wages. There 
had indeed been a faculty shortage in this unit in the 1980s, when the informant was hired. 
But they had been much less problematic in recent years. However, administrative data 
clearly shows that there was recently a substantial increase over one year in the use of 
market supplements for faculty members already employed in the unit, long after faculty 
shortages ceased to be a problem.  
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The second case was a female-dominated unit in which the use of market 
supplements was moderate. The Chairperson resisted using them despite the fact that the 
unit was almost constantly short-staffed. This reluctance was in part due to the lack of 
transparency that characterizes the practice: the Chairperson claims to have been unaware 
of the availability of market supplements until after being appointed, when a faculty 
member requested a renewal of his supplement. In addition, it was only later on that this 
informant was told that hiring supplements were also available.  
The informant considered confronting the senior administration about the relative 
scarcity of awards in the unit at one point, but then the senior administration announced 
plans for changes in the budgeting policy: in the future, funds for market supplements 
would have to be drawn from the units’ budgetary envelope. With an already tight budget, 
this Chairperson concluded that awarding more supplements would become impossible. In 
addition, a senior administrator told the informant that market supplements would no longer 
be used in the future; given base salary increases negotiated in 2005, it was believed that 
they would become unnecessary. The informant expressed doubts over this claim, 
wondering what it would mean in practice. It is worth pointing that this Chairperson 
expressed strong distrust towards the senior administration throughout the interview, 
mentioning on several occasions how the unit was kept in the dark on matters such as 
market supplements (see quote: informant BC1,  page 114).  
This Chairperson had observed resistance toward the use of market supplements 
among the academic staff of the unit. They were unhappy that the program sometimes 
created pay inversion - newly hired faculty members were sometimes paid more than senior 
faculty members. Moreover, faculty members who had not received market supplements 
had become reluctant to ask for them after an administrative error caused the unit’s 
academic staff to be informed of the amount of a market supplement awarded to a 
particular faculty member. This information fostered resentment which culminated in a 
stormy faculty meeting shortly after the informant’s appointment, where many faculty 
members denounced what they felt was inequitable treatment. 
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Discussion 
At the beginning of the 2000s a set of circumstances favored a growth in use of 
market supplements at this university. The academic leadership wanted the institution to 
become a leading research university. A program to encourage early retirement at the end 
of the 1990s left the university short-staffed. The higher administration was of the view that 
the institution’s base salaries made it impossible to compete effectively for talent in some 
fields. Base pay was established by collective agreement and there was no merit pay 
scheme, and the administration had failed in its attempt to introduce one. The President, 
known for defending the use of market supplements as early as in the 1980s, argued that 
supplements provided administrators some of the flexibility needed to hire and retain top 
academics.  
Labour market forces were seen as important determinants of market supplement 
allocations at this institution. Informants consistently emphasized that the main 
determinants of market supplement awards were hiring and retention problems in certain 
fields, and the exceptional track records of some individuals. In practice, however, there 
was no formal way of relating the award of supplements to market conditions. The policy 
developed in an ad hoc fashion. Some informants suggested that, strictly speaking, it was 
not a policy at all. In fact there was only one indicator on the use of which all informants 
agreed - an internal one: the professional record of faculty members.  
Processes within academic units strongly affected the use of supplements. In one 
unit the Chairperson explained their infrequent use as a result of the spirit of solidarity 
among faculty members. This finding is consistent with research by Pfeffer and Langton 
(1988) who observed weak variations in salaries in academic units characterized by greater 
social contacts between faculty members, demographic homogeneity, and democratic and 
participative governance. 
Administrators exercised considerable discretion over the decision to make an 
award. Subjective judgments played a role in their reasoning. For instance, two informants 
mentioned that when deciding on counter-offers, they took into account the likelihood that 
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a faculty member might be willing to move. Second, the decision to resort to market 
supplements at all within a unit was, substantially, a prerogative of chairpersons. There may 
also have been instances of misuse of market supplements or at least misinterpretation of 
their functioning. The fact that two informants attributed the recent surge in market 
supplements to greater relative qualifications of newly hired junior faculty members in 
comparison to senior faculty members at the beginning of their career suggests that this was 
present. The relevant comparison should have been with those with whom the applicants 
were competing.   
The market supplement policy created internal equity problems (lamented by 
several informants). Interestingly, however, none of them altogether opposed it. Even in 
cases where the basis for disagreement was ethical informants believed that market 
pressures justified the use of supplements in some units. Universities are sometimes 
characterized as organized anarchies within which disagreements on problems and 
solutions are likely to be common (Cohen & March, 1986). That all respondents were 
willing to accept this solution as valid, for some units at least, is rather odd. One reason for 
this may be that “market value has face validity to employees [and] appears to be more 
objective than other work evaluation approaches” (Heneman, 2003, p. 50).  
Some safeguards may have prevented the system from becoming overly inequitable. 
First, more than one decision-maker was involved in awards. Second, requests for large 
amounts were closely scrutinized. Third, senior administration informants argued that they 
kept a close watch on the use of market supplements across the institution. The fact that 
they intervened to limit the awards around 2004 supports this claim. Fourth, the union had 
been informed of the awards made each year starting in 1997. Although the information 
transmitted to the union was minimal,50 it did allow for the detection of inequalities across 
                                                 
50 The information included the amount received by each faculty member, but no indication was given on the 
reasons for the awards or on the type of supplement each specific award belonged to (administrative stipends, 
chair supplements or market supplements). Without this information, it would have made it difficult for the 
union to determine why each individual supplement was awarded, which would also have made a better 
understanding of eventual inequities difficult. The categorization of awards types, which required several days 
of careful examination of the data, as well as combination with other data sources, was eventually performed 
by the author as part of her doctoral thesis. 
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rank by seniority (union publication, 2001), gender by rank (union publication, 2002), and 
gender by unit membership (union publication, 2004). In the end, administrators exercised 
little discretion over the amounts of supplements, which may partly explain why no gender 
difference in the amounts of supplements was found in a previous stage of this research 
(Doucet et al., submitted). 
However, administrators did exercise discretion in decisions to award supplements. 
There were, in fact, no formal rules and procedures to guide these decisions. Accountability 
was almost nonexistent and the system completely lacked transparency. No information 
was available to allow individual faculty members to judge whether they were being treated 
inequitably. Detection of possible individual-based or unit-based inequities was prevented 
by the lack of information on awards and by comparison problems. The lack of codification 
of the supplements policy meant that awards were characterized by a “one of a kind aspect” 
(Ridgeway & England, 2007, p. 203) which, as suggested by Ridgeway and England 
(2007), may act to limit comparisons and increase the subjectivity of evaluations. In the 
same way, it may be difficult for some administrators at the unit level to compare their own 
units with others, which may make the detection of possible inequities between units 
unlikely. Several informants at the unit level expressed ambivalence with regard to the 
distribution of market supplements across units. While they felt that supplements were a 
necessity in some units they wondered about the extent to which differences across units 
were justified. Overall, the evidence produced in this research makes it clear that the use of 
market supplements at the institution was infused with “opportunities for discrimination” 
(Petersen & Saporta, 2004).  
The comparison of two units at opposing ends of the spectrum in their proportion of 
females suggests that a combination of contextual influences and of processes such as those 
identified in Bridges and Nelson (1989) may have contributed to producing and maintain 
gendered inequalities at the unit level: specifically, organizational politics, the 
organizational reproduction of cultural advantage, and women’s limited access to 
privileged information. In the male-dominated unit there was a strong tradition of market 
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supplement use and faculty members tended to perceive them positively. Even though staff 
shortages had become less problematic in recent years the use of market supplements still 
grew radically. In contrast, there was no such tradition in the second unit. Quite the 
contrary: the Chairperson reported strong resistance towards the practice, which, evidently, 
would have contributed to the relative scarcity of market supplements within the unit.  
Given its tradition and acceptance of market supplements, the unit with high male 
representation was obviously in an advantageous position when the institutional context 
became favorable to the proliferation of the practice. The second unit was unable to take 
advantage of the opportunities provided by the changed context because of both a lack of 
enthusiasm within the unit and, possibly, a lack of institutional support. This, along with the 
tense relationship between the Chairperson of the female-dominated unit and the senior 
administration, may have translated into a weakened capacity to negotiate awards to unit 
members. The opposite was the case in the male-dominated unit. Ill timing may also have 
contributed to the enduring, relative scarcity of market supplements in the female-
dominated unit: at about the same time that the Chairperson decided to confront the senior 
administration on the matter of market supplements a senior administrator announced plans 
to reduce access to them.  
Conclusion 
Overall, organizational processes may have reduced the likelihood of awards to 
women. There were several reasons why female faculty members were particularly 
disadvantaged in this award system. Gender differences in the propensity or ability to 
negotiate were alleged (and assumed) by some of those negotiating. It may also be that 
women had limited access to information about supplements, but given the small number of 
cases used, we can only conjecture. Chairpersons, who were mostly males, may have 
allowed gender bias to influence their evaluations of faculty members, perhaps because 
they tended to favor others like themselves. It may also be that chairpersons from the units 
where women were better represented did not have access to information about market 
supplements or that disciplinary traditions made them reluctant to request them.  
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The impact of compensation policy features such as those observed in this research 
may be greater in cases where the possibilities of accessing pay supplements are 
concentrated in a limited period of time. There was clearly a period at this institution when 
it became more difficult to receive a market supplement. The data presented here suggest 
that some units were particularly disadvantaged by this. The unit apparently most 
disadvantaged had high female representation. 
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 Conclusion 
This thesis examines various sources of the gender pay gap among professors within 
a large Canadian research university for the 1997-2006 period. It comes at a suitable time 
given recent findings that the gender pay gap among American university professors is 
larger among research universities than other types of universities (Porter et al., 2008). It 
covers a longer period of time and analyzes more recent data than the latest studies on the 
topic for Canadian faculty – the most recent data used was for 2002-2003 (Sussman & 
Yssaad, 2005).  
The stated goal is to contribute to a better understanding of gender differences on 
the labour market. Using gender-relations theory as an organizing paradigm, we analyze 
how determinants at individual and cultural/organizational levels contribute to the gender 
pay gap among university professors. We find that determinants at both levels contribute to 
this gap. In the case of the gender difference in the receipt of a market supplement or a 
Canada Research Chair, we find that determinants at both levels interact in the explanation; 
the impact of being female varies according to contexts (i.e. the proportion of females in 
academic units and sectors). This is in line with gender-relations theory, according to which 
the situations of men and women are not homogenous; not all men are in dominant 
positions and not all women are in subordinate positions. Gendered outcomes are 
dependent upon the contexts in which individuals are situated. Also in line with this 
concept, we find that both horizontal and vertical segregations contribute to the gender pay 
gap at the institution studied. However, our results are not consistent with the idea that the 
division of labor along gendered lines translates into a devaluation of activities associated 
to females. In addition, we suggest organizational processes that may contribute to 
explaining the gender pay gap.  
The first article examines potential individual determinants of gender differences on 
one pay component, i.e. market supplements. The determinants pertain to four factors 
potentially related to the receipt of market supplements and to gender, i.e. field of 
specialization, research activity, attitude towards pay, career characteristics and family 
constraints. Only the indicators of field of specialization and research activity are found 
both to be related to the receipt of market supplements and to contribute to explain the 
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female disadvantage in access to market supplements. However, although taking into 
account their impact in the analysis increases the negative female coefficient, the change in 
the coefficient does not reach statistical significance.  
The remaining factors do not contribute to explaining the gender gap in the receipt 
of market supplements. Interestingly, family constraints, a factor for which there is much 
speculation in the literature, but not much data when it comes to accounting for the gender 
pay gap among professors, is unrelated to the receipt of market supplement. A significant 
gender difference is found on attitudes towards pay, but it does not contribute to explaining 
the difference in the receipt of a market supplement. In addition, men and women are more 
similar than expected with regards to indicators of research activity; there is no significant 
gender difference on five out of eight indicators of research activity (presence of research 
grants, membership in a research team, presence of a research chair other than a CRC, 
presence of research assistants and presence of research agents), but we do find a 
significant difference on the other three (frequency of research contracts, presence of a 
CRC and presence of post-doctoral fellowships). Only the frequency of research contracts 
remains significant in the logistic regression analysis of the presence of market 
supplements.    
Our results show that after controls, women are almost three times less likely to 
declare having been recipients of market supplements since the beginning of their 
appointment. With this first article, we are able to make a reasonable case that the gender 
pay gap among professors at the university under study is not entirely accounted for by 
differences in relevant individual characteristics between male and female professors. This 
confirms the necessity of looking beyond gender differences in individual characteristics 
when attempting to understand the often disparate outcomes of men and women on the 
labor market. 
The second article examines the contribution to the gender pay gap of base pay, 
promotion to full professor, access to market supplements and CRCs as well as the amounts 
of market and CRC supplements. We find that the effects of these factors vary with the 
proportions of female faculty members within units. Indeed, the proportion of female 
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faculty members within units is not related to base pay, amounts of market supplements and 
CRCs or promotion to full professor, but it is related to access to these pay supplements. 
Women working in units with 40 percent plus females are 2.3 times less likely to have 
access to pay supplements than those working in units with less than 30% of women. 
Therefore, pay is lower in units with a high proportion of females. We argue that these 
results could be related to two factors, i.e. the University’s affirmative action policy, which 
may have provided an advantage in salary negotiations for women in units where female 
representation was low, and the lack of formalization of the University’s market 
supplements policy, which may have reduced the probability that the remaining women 
would receive market supplements. These findings are significant because they confirm that 
not all women necessarily suffer the same disadvantage within an organization.  
Our second article also demonstrates that the pay gap between male and female 
faculty members at the institution resides in gender differences in access to market 
supplements and CRCs and, to a lesser extent, to full professorship. These findings provide 
some support for the hypothesis that the magnitude of gender differences vary according to 
the degree of formalization in remuneration components. However, the finding that there 
are no gender differences on the amounts of pay supplements received, whether they are 
“market” supplements or supplements associated with a CRC, contradicts this hypothesis. 
Still, this result suggests that degree of formalization in remuneration practices may 
constitute an organizational-level determinant of gender differences in pay. 
The last article examines the mechanisms that may have lead to the gender gap in 
access to market supplements. Mechanism-based explanations of gender differences on the 
labour market may allow for a better understanding of the specific ways in which 
inequalities may be reduced and indicate areas where actions to this end could prove 
fruitful. Four features of the award process were identified as potentially related to the 
gender gap: the individualization of negotiations, the lack of formalization of the policy on 
market supplements, discretion and secrecy in decision making and the influence of outside 
offers. Gender differences in access to market supplements may also have been related to 
an unequal distribution of market supplements between units with strong female 
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representation and those with strong male representation. This unequal distribution may 
have resulted from the influence of several factors: 1) differences between units with 
regards to the approval by faculty members and chairs of the use of market supplements; 2) 
political processes where some actors use their relationships within the institution in order 
to get market supplements; 3) processes of reproduction of cultural advantages in 
“masculine fields”; 4) potentially limited access of female faculty members to privileged 
information on award practices.  
In addition, the results suggest that the impact of compensation policy features such 
as those observed in this research may be more substantial in cases where access is 
concentrated in a limited period of time. With time, it became more difficult to receive a 
market supplement at the institution and some academic units may have been particularly 
disadvantaged by this. Comparing two units at opposite ends of the spectrum with respect 
to female representation, we find that the unit apparently most disadvantaged had high 
female representation. Interestingly, although it was not mentioned in the article, a timing 
factor may also have played a role in the enduring scarcity of female faculty members 
among recipients of Canada Research Chairs at this institution. Following the 2006 
judgment by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, all Canadian universities were 
instructed to implement measures to ensure better female representation among recipients. 
Questioned on the institutions’ actions in response to this directive during a University 
council, a senior administrator answered that the institution was discussing a policy, 
although none had been defined internally. He added that the institution wished to promote 
a better distribution of chairs between men and women faculty members, but had little 
leeway given that they all had already been awarded.  
Some findings from the third article shed some light on two unexplained results 
described in the second article. First, we had found no gender difference in the amounts of 
market supplements awarded to faculty members, which ran against our hypothesis. We 
had expected to find a gender difference in these amounts because they were likely 
determined through an unformalized decision-making process. In our view, this lack of 
formalization meant that unit administrators would be able to exercise discretion when 
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deciding how much to award individual faculty members, which could translate in a 
disadvantage for female faculty members. However, it became clear throughout the 
interviews that despite this lack of formalization, individual administrators did not actually 
exercise discretion with regard to the amounts of awards because these were for the most 
part pre-established by senior administrators.   
Second, with the data used in article #2, we were unable to account for the finding 
that female faculty member in the “others” sector were less likely than all other faculty 
members to access market supplements or CRCs. A plausible explanation came from 
interviews with three administrators from this sector. They argued that market supplements 
were seldom used within their units because these were perceived negatively by faculty 
members and by themselves. The few supplements that were awarded went to faculty 
members deemed exceptional on all accounts. Some research suggests that women are 
underrepresented among the most highly productive researchers (Sax et al., 2002). If this 
were the case at the university under study, then female faculty members could be less 
likely to be perceived as exceptional. As a result, in a context where market supplements 
are exclusively awarded to exceptional faculty members, female faculty members may be 
less likely to receive them. Or, it may also be that the aversion towards the use of market 
supplements in this particular context created a climate where administrators, who were 
mostly males, were inclined to reserve their use for faculty members whom they knew 
better – i.e. male colleagues. Alas, we cannot tell from the present data whether or not these 
explanations can plausibly apply to our findings. 
The study’s contribution 
We provide the first analysis of the potential impact on the pay gap of two recent 
trends among Canadian universities, i.e. the growth in allocations of market supplements 
and the implementation of the CRC program. The average gender pay gap at the university 
was 11.3% in 1997. This is smaller than estimated using national Canadian data around the 
same time, i.e. 16.8% in 1994 (Ornstein et al., 1998) and 13.9% in 2000 (Warman et al., 
2010). This is expected given that our analysis is for a single institution; potential inter-
individual variations are more limited within institutions. Controlling for rank and pay 
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grade at the start of the period decreases the estimated pay gap dramatically, from 11.3% to 
1.5%. Adding controls for the receipt of market supplements and CRCs renders the gender 
coefficient insignificant, which we interpret as an indication that gendered access to these 
contributes to the gender pay gap. Further analysis confirms that there are substantial 
gender differences in access to market supplements and CRCs, both characterized by 
discretionary allocation processes at this institution.  
Analyzing remuneration components separately enables us to determine that the 
extent of gender differences varies by component. Other researchers have studied salary 
and promotion separately (e.g. Smart, 1991; Toutkoushian, 1999), but to our knowledge, 
none have disaggregated salary into base pay and pay supplements. Our results suggest that 
this approach may produce findings that better identify potential sites for intervention; for 
instance, our study suggests that where base pay is determined through a collective 
agreement, a gender pay gap may emerge on pay components determined through 
processes that lie outside of the agreement’s reach.  
Pay components are conceptualized as varying with respect to their level of 
formalization. We estimate the extent of gender differences according to the formalization 
level of pay components, which had never been done for faculty members (a similar 
analysis by Elvira & Graham (2002) was conducted on all employees of a large financial 
firm). Our findings show mitigated support for the hypothesis that the magnitude of gender 
differences varies according to the degree of formalization of remuneration components.    
We estimate the impact of the proportion of female professors in academic units on 
remuneration, which had yet to be done for Canadian professors (Umbach (2007) does it 
for professors in American research universities). We find that larger proportions of female 
professors in units tend to depress remuneration; after controls, proportion of females 
reduces the likelihood that either a market premium or a CRC will be awarded.  
All studies of gender differences in pay among faculty members use controls for 
academic field. Because it uses multilevel analysis, the research presented in our second 
article provides a better control for the gendered distribution of professors by academic unit 
and provides more accurate estimates. In addition, using cross-level interactions, we are 
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able to determine how gender differences vary according to the characteristics of academic 
units. Other studies have used multilevel analysis on gender differences in pay among 
university faculty. Umbach (2007) used separate levels for individuals and detailed 
academic disciplines, but did not estimate how gender differences vary according to 
characteristics of the disciplines. Porter et al. (2008) provided separate estimates of the 
gender gap in three aggregated fields, but the analytical levels used were individuals and 
institutions, not detailed academic units or disciplines. Thus, their estimate of the gender 
pay gap may be biased upwards. 
Reviewed studies of gender differences in values and attitudes towards pay tend to 
either examine the extent of these differences (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Barbezat, 
1992; Browne, 1997; Shirazi et al., 2002; Tolbert & Moen, 1998; see also the research 
reviewed by Kray & Thompson, 2005), or use laboratory experiments or actual experiences 
of salary negotiations to investigate gender differences in outcomes of negotiations 
(Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; O’Shea & Bush, 2002; see also the research reviewed by 
Kray & Thompson, 2005). Our research offers an original contribution by relating a 
measure of attitude towards pay, i.e. the prioritization of salary scale improvements, to an 
actual pay outcome, i.e. the receipt of market supplements. We observe small gender 
differences on this attitude, but they do not contribute to explain the gender gap in the 
receipt of market supplements, all else being equal.    
We also offer a first test of the relationship between family constraints and the 
gender pay gap for Canadian professors. We find that for the institution under study, family 
constraints are not related to the receipt of a market supplement and do not contribute to the 
explanation of gender differences on this outcome. Our results appear to contradict those of 
other studies that observe such a relation (Toutkoushian, 1998; Ginther & Hayes, 2001; 
Perna, 2005), but we cannot exclude the possibility that the divergent findings are due to 
the fact that different outcomes are analyzed (other studies analyzed either salary or 
promotion), or to organizational, time-related or even cultural differences.  
In the third article, we study the decision makers’ point of view with regard to the 
gender pay gap. To our knowledge, the only other research available on this point of view 
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is that by Nelson and Bridges (1999), based on the court defenses of organizations in pay 
equity cases. Our analysis reveals several mechanisms at the individual and unit level that 
could be related to the gender gap in access to market supplements at this institution. Given 
the limited evidence upon which our findings are based, they are by no means definitive 
and merely identify potential areas for future research.  
Finally, our research of one institution is in line with observations by Warman et al. 
(2010) that the salaries of Canadian university professors are becoming increasingly 
differentiated. At the institution under study, this occurs through an increase in the 
frequency of use and amounts of market supplements, and through CRC allocations.  
Limits and strengths of the research 
Studying a single university means that the possibility of generalizing our findings 
to other universities and employers is limited. On the other hand, it enables a close 
examination of both individual and organizational determinants of the gender pay gap and 
of the mechanisms that may produce it. In addition, through our use of varied data sources 
that complement each other, we are reasonably confident that we provided an accurate 
picture of the problem studied. As in any research of the gender pay gap, another important 
limit of this research resides in our inability to control adequately for potentially relevant 
factors, i.e. actual research productivity, academic field (in the first article) and values and 
attitudes towards pay. Another limit is that we are unable to test the impact of family 
constraints on outcomes other that the receipt of market supplements. We review the 
consequences of these limits in more detail.  
Research productivity controls 
As previously mentioned, in the first article, no significant differences according to 
gender were found on five out of eight indicators of research activity. Besides, only one 
indicator out of the other three indicators of research activity – frequency of research 
contracts – remains significant in the logistic regression analysis of the presence of market 
supplements.  
166 
 
The indicators of research activity that we use are indirect controls for research 
productivity; thus they may not account for the actual research productivity of professors. 
This is an important matter because our interviews with administrators reveal that market 
supplements are sometimes used to recognize research performance. However, we also 
control for other variables that are found to account for a large part of gender differences in 
publication rates in other research, such as rank, field of specialization and seniority (see 
Nakhaie, 2002). Given that our study is limited to one institution, we also control for 
institution type. Still, the fact remains that we do not account for all potential gender 
differences in research productivity. It is thus possible that the gender gap in the receipt of 
market supplements is overestimated. 
A potential gender gap in publication rates could also account for some of the 
gender differences that we observe in the second article. Because research performance is 
crucial to rank progression, if women are less productive, it could take them longer to reach 
the rank of full professor. Therefore, it may be that the gender gap in access to the rank of 
full professor that we observe is related to an unmeasured gender gap in research 
productivity.  
In addition, we find gender differences in the receipt of market or chair supplements 
only in academic units with the highest female representation. A potential gender gap in 
research productivity could explain this differential access if one of the two following 
scenarios applies to our data. 
1. All else being equal, there are no gender differences in research productivity in units 
where female representation is lower, but women working in units with the highest 
female representation have lower research productivity than their male counterparts.  
2. All else being equal, all female faculty members have lower research productivity than 
their male counterparts, but this does not decrease the probability that women 
professors in units with lower female representation will receive a market or a chair 
supplement. 
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How plausible is each scenario? Regarding scenario 1, we know that women who 
secure an appointment as faculty members in scientific and engineering fields have already 
successfully crossed three major barriers, i.e. self-selection into science, selection into 
college and university degrees, then selection by their employer (Fox, 2010). If this were 
also true for women at the institution under study, then it could translate in differences in 
productivity rates between women working in these fields – where female representation is 
lowest – and fields where women are better represented, which would be compatible with 
scenario 1. Regarding scenario 2, it is possible that in units with lower female 
representation, special efforts to hire and retain women professors were made in line with 
the institution’s affirmative action policy. Then, women in these units could be more likely 
than men to receive market supplements for hiring or retention purposes, but not for 
research recognition purposes, because being more productive researchers, men would be 
more likely to receive those, as well as chair supplements. The end result would be 
consistent with our observation that there is no gender difference in the receipt of a market 
or a chair supplement in units where the female representation is lower. 
We cannot discriminate between these scenarios, nor can we tell whether or not 
there are actual gender differences in research productivity within this institution. Had we 
been able to match the datasets used for the first and second article, we could have partly 
accounted for the impact of potential gender differences in research productivity using our 
indicators of research activities. Regrettably, this was impossible because the two datasets 
had no common identifier.  
Academic sector controls 
The dataset used for the first article lacks disaggregated data by discipline, so we 
cannot control for variations of market supplements and CRC allocations by disciplines. 
We control for academic sector, but this certainly does not entirely account for gender 
differences in disciplinary affiliation. The sector variable includes a category for 
specialized medicine, but the departments of economics and computer science are attached 
to the social science/psychology sector of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. The 
administrative data used in the second article shows that the proportions of professors who 
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benefit from market supplements or CRCs are the highest in economics, computer science 
and in some units of specialized medicine; between 75% and 88% of professors working in 
these units are recipients of one or the other. Women are underrepresented within these 
units, accounting for between 9% and 21% of the academic staff. Therefore, we likely 
overestimate the gender effect in the first article.  
In our second article, the use of multilevel analysis where effects are partitioned 
between three levels of analysis addresses this problem. The first level accounts for within 
individual change over time on the outcomes. The second level accounts for differences 
between professors on the outcomes. Gender is modelized at this level. The third level 
accounts for differences between the 64 academic units on the outcomes. Therefore, all 
estimates at level 1 and 2, are to be interpreted as estimates holding constant the impact of 
unit affiliation. This means that the underrepresentation of women in some academic units 
where high proportions of faculty members receive market or chair supplements cannot 
account for our end result regarding gender. We find that controlling for year, rank, sector, 
unit affiliation and female representation within units, women are on average 1.6 times less 
likely than men of equivalent academic units to be recipients of market of chair 
supplements (see “Gender main effect only” model in the modified table 3, appendix 6). 
This estimate is the average effect of being female, and we find that it masks considerable 
within-gender variation. Indeed, when it is modelized using cross-level interactions, we 
find that the female disadvantage varies according to female representation within units and 
sector. Women in units where female representation is 40% or more are 2.3 times less 
likely to be recipients of market or chair supplements than women in units where 30% or 
less of professors are female. There are also variations by sector. Compared to women in 
Social science/psychology, those working in medicine are twice less likely to receive 
market or chair supplements and those in the sector “Other”, 3.8 times less likely. 
Controls for family constraints 
In article 1, the two predictors of family constraints included in the analysis are 
unrelated to the receipt of market supplements, after controls for sector, research activity 
and career characteristics. We tested for the possibility that the effects of family constraints 
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appear in the indicators of research activity by running a model without these indicators. 
The results show that both indicators of family constraints remain non significant with the 
removal of all research activity variables (see the last column of the modified table 1, 
appendix 7).  
Our test of the effect of family constraints is, however, limited to the receipt of a 
market supplement. Studies that have shown an impact of family constraints were 
analyzing other outcomes, i.e. salary (Toutkoushian, 1998) and promotion (Ginther & 
Hayes, 2001; Perna, 2005). We are unable to test for the possibility that family constraints 
influence promotion at the institution studied and account for part of the observed gender 
gap in access to the rank of full professor; therefore, this possibility cannot be excluded.  
Controls for values and attitudes 
In the first article, we test for the impact of values and attitudes towards pay. We 
find that the prioritization of salary scale improvements differs by gender and is associated 
with the receipt of a market supplement. However, the inclusion of this indicator in the 
analysis does not significantly alter the gender estimate; thus, we conclude that gender 
differences on the receipt of market supplements are not explained by divergent valuations 
of salary scale improvements.  
However, we are unable to test for other possibly gendered attitudes, such as 
attitudes towards salary negotiation. Babcock and Laschever (2003) find that in general, 
women are less likely than men to negotiate their salaries. One of the administrators that we 
interviewed noticed that women made fewer requests for market supplements. Therefore, 
gender differences in propensity to negotiate may contribute to explain gender differences 
in the receipt of market supplements if it means that women make fewer requests. There 
are, of course, other plausible reasons why women would be less likely to request a 
supplement at this institution, such as a gendered access to information on the market 
supplements policy. In this respect, more information on faculty members’ own experience 
with market supplements would have been welcome for this research. For instance, 
knowing not only who received market supplements, but also who did request them would 
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have allowed us to test whether gender differences in access to supplements may be related 
to differences in request or refusal rates. 
Which estimate of the gender effect on access to market or chair supplements is most 
accurate? 
Given the different estimates of the gender gap obtained in articles 1 and 2, one 
important question is “which is more accurate?” The articles differ in five important ways: 
the type of data used, the time period covered, the dependent variable definition, the 
independent variables used and the method.  
The first article uses survey data while the second uses administrative data. A 
comparison of survey and administrative data led to the conclusion that there were little 
differences in the distribution of comparable variables. Yet, administrative data are 
necessarily more reliable given that they are taken from a population, that no data is 
missing and that they are not self-reported. 
The administrative data covers the 1997-2006 period; it is more recent than the 
survey data, which is limited to the year 2002. However, the dependent variable used for 
the analysis of the survey data is retrospective; it captures the receipt of a market 
supplement since the beginning of each professor’s appointment. Therefore, our first article 
gives an estimate of the gender gap in the receipt of market supplements up to 2002, when 
the changes brought about by the CRC program began taking effect. It likely captures some 
of these changes, i.e. part of the increase in market supplements allocations due to awards 
to some meritorious faculty members in response to the limited availability of CRCs. It 
does not capture the allocation of CRCs itself, because although the data included an 
indicator for being a CRC recipient, surveyed faculty members were not asked whether 
they had actually received a chair supplement. In addition, only 9 surveyed faculty 
members reported that they were CRC recipients at the time.  
The dependent variable used for the analysis of the administrative data is 
longitudinal and includes both market and chair supplements. Therefore, it captures the full 
effect of the CRC program, i.e. the allocations of chair supplements and the increase in 
171 
 
market supplements allocations, as well as the effect of all market supplements allocations. 
Thus, it likely captures more accurately the potentially gendered impact of these two inter-
related, discretionary awards.   
The survey data contains a wider range of controls than the administrative data 
(sector, research activity, career stage, values and attitudes, family constraints). Yet, it lacks 
a precise measure of academic discipline; the administrative data includes such a measure, 
i.e. academic unit affiliation. The survey data is analyzed using logistic regression, while 
the administrative data is analyzed using multilevel longitudinal analysis; the latter is 
definitely superior to the former. Using multilevel longitudinal analysis enables us to 
address the clustering of the data, thus producing more accurate standard errors. It also 
allows us to test effects at separate levels, i.e professors and academic units; variance is 
partitioned between the two levels, which makes it possible to quantify the proportion of 
variation attributable to differences between professors and between academic units 
respectively. As mentioned previously, this partitioning of the effects allows for a gender 
estimate net of the influence of an important explanation of the gender gap in the receipt of 
market or chair supplements, i.e. gender differences in unit affiliations.  
In sum, in the first article we estimate that after controls for sector, research activity, 
career stage and values and attitudes, in 2002 women were 2.9 times less likely than their 
male counterparts to declare that they had received a market supplement since the 
beginning of their appointments. In the second article, we find that controlling for year, 
rank, sector, unit affiliation and female representation within units, women were on average 
1.6 times less likely than men of equivalent academic units to be recipients of market of 
chair supplements. Both estimates may be biased upwards because of insufficient controls 
for potential gender gaps in research productivity, but the latter likely suffers a larger bias 
in this regard because of the complete lack of controls for research productivity. However, 
in the end this latter estimate is likely the most accurate estimate of the actual gender 
difference in receipt of market supplements given that it was produced using more reliable 
and recent data, a more appropriate method given the nested structure of the data and 
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although the range of controls is more limited, this estimate is net of academic unit 
affiliation.  
Directions for future research 
Our findings suggest that some groups may be particularly disadvantaged regarding 
access to pay supplements. There are very few studies of these particular pay components, 
so more research is needed to determine how widespread differences between groups may 
be. Studies of other potentially disadvantaged groups, for instance groups based on ethnic 
origin, would likely add to our knowledge of labour market stratification.  
Our results also suggest that analyses of how administrators make decisions 
pertaining to employees’ work conditions may be a fruitful avenue for a better 
understanding of labor market stratification. In that respect, we urge researchers not to 
assume that administrators will refuse participating. We were able to obtain collaboration 
of most administrators who were solicited, even though the stated topic of the research – 
market supplements – was quite sensitive at this institution.  
Finally, when data is available, multilevel research (preferably longitudinal) is likely 
to produce reliable and useful results. Indeed, the fact that we used a multilevel design 
enabled us to determine in which contexts the women studied were disadvantaged. 
Practical implications 
The broader goal pursued in our research was to produce findings that may be used 
to suggest concrete ways to reduce the gender differences on the labour market. Although 
they are based on limited evidence, our results suggest that access to information on actual 
work conditions, as opposed to strictly formalized aspects of work conditions, may be 
gendered in some workplaces. Therefore, it seems particularly important that female 
workers do not take for granted that they will be informed of all perks and advantages 
offered by their employers and keep an eye open for these. At the organizational level, 
employers, administrators, unions and other associations of workers ought to examine 
actual practices to detect the ones that may disadvantage female workers. In particular, our 
results suggest paying close attention to practices that lack transparency, for which there are 
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no pre-established criteria or for which a clear description is not available to all parties 
involved.  
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Appendix 1. Survey questions used in article #1  
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Q13. Au cours de la dernière année académique, vous est-il 
arrivé d’accepter des contrats de recherche privés? 
•... Souvent .............................................. 1 
•... À l’occasion ........................................ 2 
•... Rarement ............................................ 3 
•... Jamais ................................................ 4 
 
Q48. De façon générale, jusqu’à quel point êtes-vous satisfait(e) … 
  Très 
satisfait(e) 
Assez 
satisfait(e) 
Peu 
satisfait(e) 
Pas du tout 
satisfait(e) 
Q48.1 • .. de votre rémunération actuelle? 1 2 3 4 
Q48.2 • .. de l’allocation de dépenses reliées à la fonction? 1 2 3 4 
 
Q49. En ce qui a trait à l’amélioration de la prochaine convention collective, quelle priorité 
accordez-vous aux éléments suivants : 
  Très 
prioritaire 
Assez 
prioritaire 
Peu 
prioritaire 
Pas du tout 
prioritaire 
Q49.3 • ... Augmentation de l'allocation pour les dépenses reliées 
à la fonction 
1 2 3 4 
Q49.4 • ... Bonification de l’échelle salariale 1 2 3 4 
 
Q57. Quel est votre rang? • ... Adjoint(e) ................................................... 1 
• ... Agrégé(e) .................................................. 2 
• ... Titulaire ..................................................... 3 
 
Q58. Combien d’années d’exercice comptez-vous à votre rang actuel? __  __ années d’exercice 
 
Q59. Au moment de votre nomination à [Nom 
de l’université], combien aviez-vous d’années 
d’expérience de travail à titre professionnel? 
 
_ _ années d’expérience 
 
¾ Si 0, PASSEZ À LA Q61 
 
 
 
Q60. De quel type était surtout cette expérience 
antérieure à votre nomination comme professeur(e) ou 
chercheur(e) à [Nom de l’université]? 
• .. Enseignement ............................................ 1 
• .. Recherche ................................................. 2 
• .. Gestion ...................................................... 3 
• .. Autre .......................................................... 8 
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Q61. Depuis votre nomination, bénéficiez-vous ou avez-vous bénéficié … 
 Oui Non 
• ... d’une prime de marché? 1 2 
• ... d’une prime de fonction liée à des responsabilités administratives? 1 2 
• ... d’un autre type de prime? 1 2 
 
 
Q62. Combien d’années d’ancienneté avez-vous 
cumulées depuis votre nomination à [Nom de 
l’université]? 
 
__  __ années d’ancienneté 
¾ Si moins de 6
années, PASSEZ 
À LA Q71 
 
 
Q73. À quelle faculté êtes-vous actuellement rattaché(e)? 
(Si vous êtes rattaché(e) à la F.A.S., indiquez dans quel 
secteur : sciences sociales, sciences pures ou lettres et 
sciences humaines) 
Aucune : 0 
Aménagement :1 
Droit : 2 
Médecine : 3 
Médecine dentaire : 4 
Médecine vétérinaire : 5 
Musique : 6 
Pharmacie : 7 
Sciences infirmières : 8 
Sciences de l’éducation : 9 
FAS : 10 
FAS – sciences pures :11 
FAS – sciences sociales et psycho. : 12 
FAS – lettres et sciences humaines : 13 
Théologie : 14 
Optométrie : 15 
Éducation physique (kinésiologie) : 16 
Autres : 17 
 
 
Q74. Vivez-vous présentement avec un(e) conjoint(e)? • ... Oui ................................ 1 
• ... Non .............................. 2 ¾ PASSEZ À LA Q76 
 
 
Q75. Quelle est la principale occupation de votre 
conjoint(e)? 
• ... Professeur(e) d’université ...................... 1 
• ... Enseignement (non-universitaire) .......... 2 
• ... Autre emploi professionnel ..................... 3 
• ... Emploi non professionnel ....................... 4 
• ... Sans emploi ........................................... 5 
• ... À la retraite ............................................. 6 
• ... Étudiant(e) .............................................. 7 
• ... Autre ....................................................... 8 
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Q76. Actuellement, combien avez-vous d’enfants qui vivent avec 
vous au moins la moitié du temps? 
• .. Q76.1 : De moins de 6 ans?   __ 
• .. Q76.2 : De 6 à 12 ans ?          __ 
• .. Q76.3 : De 13 à 17 ans?        __ 
• .. Q76.4 : De 18 ans ou plus?    __ 
 
Q77. Jusqu’à quel point est-il difficile pour vous de 
concilier vos obligations comme professeur(e)ou 
chercheur(e) et vos obligations familiales? C’est … 
• .. Souvent difficile ...................................... 1 
• .. Parfois difficile ........................................ 2 
• .. Rarement difficile.................................... 3 
• .. Jamais difficile ou presque ..................... 4 
 
 
Q78. Au cours des deux dernières années académiques, 
avez-vous dû assumer des charges familiales lourdes? 
(parent handicapé, en perte d’autonomie, demandant des soins 
importants) 
• .. Oui .......................................................... 1 
• .. Non ......................................................... 2 
 
 
Q79. Quelle est votre année de naissance? 19 _  _  
  
 
 
Q80. Quel est votre sexe? • .. Homme .................................................. 1 
• .. Femme .................................................. 2 
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Appendix 2. Thematic outline for semi-directed interviews (article #3) 
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Thèmes à aborder Indicateurs 
Règles qui encadrent la prise 
de décision en ce qui a trait à 
l’octroi des primes de marché 
et aux montants à verser. 
• Présence de règles 
• Contenu des règles 
• “Provenance” des règles (établies par le directeur ou provenant 
d’autres instances) 
• Appréciation de la facilité/difficulté d’application des règles 
Processus de décision en 
place pour l’octroi des primes 
de marché et la détermination 
de leurs montants. 
 
• Comment on en vient à la décision de verser une prime à un 
professeur nouvellement embauché.  
• Comment on en vient à la décision de verser une prime à un 
professeur en cours de carrière. 
• Comment on détermine le montant de la prime à verser 
• Description de cas-types 
• Fréquence à laquelle les primes sont octroyées sous l’initiative 
du département ou en réaction à une offre salariale faite à un 
professeur par un employeur potentiel 
• Rôle et pouvoir de la faculté dans l’attribution des primes  
Informations fournies sur les 
primes aux directeurs de 
départements et aux 
professeurs 
• Nature des informations 
• Disponibilité des informations  
Changements dans l’usage 
des primes durant les 
dernières années. 
• Chronologie des changements 
• Nature des changements (règles, leur application, etc.) 
• Contexte des changements 
Critiques par les professeurs 
du département de la pratique 
de versement de primes de 
marché. 
• Nature des critiques 
• Circonstances des critiques  
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Appendix 3. Consent form #1  
(Used for all adminisrators but a Vice-president and the President) 
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FORMULAIRE DE CONSENTEMENT  
 
 
Titre de la recherche : Étude des modes de rémunération des professeurs d’université : le cas des 
primes de marché à [Nom de l’Université]. 
Chercheure : Christine Doucet, étudiante au doctorat en sociologie, Université de Montréal 
Directeur de recherche : Claire Durand, professeur titulaire au département de sociologie, 
Université de Montréal 
Co-directeur de recherche : Michael Smith, professeur titulaire au département de sociologie de 
l’Université McGill 
 
A) RENSEIGNEMENTS AUX PARTICIPANTS 
 
1. Objectifs de la recherche. 
 
Ce projet de recherche vise à mieux comprendre la pratique de versement de primes de marché 
aux professeurs de [Nom de l’Université]. 
 
2. Participation à la recherche 
 
Votre participation à cette recherche consiste à rencontrer la chercheure pour un entretien d’une 
durée d’environ 45 minutes où vous ferez part de vos connaissances concernant la pratique de 
versement de primes de marché qui avait cours alors que vous occupiez un poste de direction dans 
un départment ou une faculté à [Nom de l’Université] entre 2000 et 2005. Votre contribution viendra 
complémenter les résultats obtenus à l’aide de données institutionnelles. Si vous y consentez, 
l’entretien sera enregistré sur enregistreur numérique. 
 
3. Confidentialité 
 
Seule la chercheure aura accès aux enregistrements des entretiens. De plus, chaque participant à 
la recherche se verra attribuer un numéro et seule la chercheure aura la liste des participants et des 
numéros qui leur auront été attribués. Les données seront conservées dans un classeur sous clé 
situé dans un bureau fermé. Toutes les données seront détruites 7 ans après la fin du projet. 
Aucune information permettant de vous identifier d’une façon ou d’une autre ne sera publiée.  
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4. Avantages et inconvénients 
 
En participant à cette recherche, vous pourrez contribuer à l’avancement des connaissances sur les 
modes de rémunération des professeurs d’université. Ce projet ne comporte ni inconvénient ni 
bénéfice personnel pour les participants. 
 
5. Droit de retrait 
 
Votre participation est entièrement volontaire. Vous êtes libre de vous retirer en tout temps par avis 
verbal, sans préjudice et sans devoir justifier votre décision. Si vous décidez de vous retirer de la 
recherche, vous pouvez communiquer avec la chercheure, au numéro de téléphone indiqué à la 
dernière page de ce document. Si vous vous retirez de la recherche, les renseignements qui auront 
été recueillis au moment de votre retrait seront détruits. 
 
B) CONSENTEMENT 
 
Je déclare avoir pris connaissance des informations ci-dessus, avoir obtenu les réponses à mes 
questions sur ma participation à la recherche et comprendre le but, la nature, les avantages, les 
risques et les inconvénients de cette recherche. 
 
Après réflexion et un délai raisonnable, je consens librement à prendre part à cette recherche. Je 
sais que je peux me retirer en tout temps sans préjudice et sans devoir justifier ma décision. 
 
 
Signature : ___________________________       Date : ________________________ 
 
Nom : _______________________________      Prénom : ______________________ 
 
 
Je déclare avoir expliqué le but, la nature, les avantages, les risques et les inconvénients de l'étude 
et avoir répondu au meilleur de ma connaissance aux questions posées.   
 
Signature de la chercheure___________________    Date : ___________________________ 
(ou de son représentant) 
 
Nom : ________________________________    Prénom : ____________________________ 
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Pour toute question relative à la recherche, ou pour vous retirer de la recherche, vous pouvez 
communiquer avec Christine Doucet, étudiante au doctorat en sociologie à l’Université de Montréal, 
au numéro de téléphone suivant : (514) 343-6111, poste 3910, ou à l’adresse courriel 
suivante : ************. 
 
 
Toute plainte relative à votre participation à cette recherche peut être adressée à l’ombudsman de 
l’Université de Montréal, au numéro de téléphone (514) 343-2100 ou à l’adresse courriel 
************. (L’ombudsman accepte les appels à frais virés). 
 
Un exemplaire du formulaire de consentement signé doit être remis au participant 
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Appendix 4. Consent form #2  
(Used for Vice-president and President) 
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FORMULAIRE DE CONSENTEMENT 
 
Titre de la recherche : Étude des modes de rémunération des professeurs d’université : le cas des 
primes de marché à [Nom de l’Université].. 
Chercheure : Christine Doucet, étudiante au doctorat en sociologie, Université de Montréal 
Directeur de recherche : Claire Durand, professeur titulaire au département de sociologie, 
Université de Montréal 
Co-directeur de recherche : Michael Smith, professeur titulaire au département de sociologie de 
l’Université McGill 
 
 
A) RENSEIGNEMENTS AUX PARTICIPANTS 
 
1. Objectifs de la recherche. 
 
Ce projet de recherche vise à mieux comprendre la pratique de versement de primes de marché 
aux professeurs de [Nom de l’Université]. 
 
2. Participation à la recherche 
 
Votre participation à cette recherche consiste à rencontrer la chercheure pour un entretien d’une 
durée d’environ 45 minutes où vous ferez part de vos connaissances concernant la pratique de 
versement de primes de marché qui avait cours alors que vous occupiez un poste au rectorat de 
[Nom de l’Université] entre 2000 et 2005. Votre contribution viendra complémenter les résultats 
obtenus à l’aide de données institutionnelles. Si vous y consentez, l’entretien sera enregistré sur 
enregistreur numérique. 
 
3. Confidentialité 
 
Seule la chercheure aura accès aux enregistrements des entretiens. De plus, chaque participant à 
la recherche se verra attribuer un numéro et seule la chercheure aura la liste des participants et des 
numéros qui leur auront été attribués. Les données seront conservées dans un classeur sous clé 
situé dans un bureau fermé. Toutes les données seront détruites 7 ans après la fin du projet. Si 
votre nom ou des extraits de l’entrevue permettant de vous identifier devaient apparaître dans une 
publication quelle qu’elle soit, la chercheure vous transmettrait au préalable ces informations et 
vous demanderait si vous acceptez qu’elles soient publiées. Vous pourriez alors prendre 
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connaissance du texte et les informations permettant de vous identifier ne seraient publiées que si 
vous donniez votre consentement écrit. Vous pourriez, à la même occasion, indiquer si vous 
acceptez ou non que votre nom apparaisse à la section des remerciements aux différentes 
personnes ayant contribué à la recherche. Vous êtes tout à fait libre de consentir ou non à la 
publication de ces informations.  
 
 
4. Avantages et inconvénients 
 
En participant à cette recherche, vous pourrez contribuer à l’avancement des connaissances sur les 
modes de rémunération des professeurs d’université. Ce projet ne comporte ni inconvénient ni 
bénéfice personnel pour les participants. 
 
 
5. Droit de retrait 
 
Votre participation est entièrement volontaire. Vous êtes libre de vous retirer en tout temps par avis 
verbal, sans préjudice et sans devoir justifier votre décision. Si vous décidez de vous retirer de la 
recherche, vous pouvez communiquer avec la chercheure, au numéro de téléphone indiqué à la 
dernière page de ce document. Si vous vous retirez de la recherche, les renseignements qui auront 
été recueillis au moment de votre retrait seront détruits. 
 
B) CONSENTEMENT 
 
Je déclare avoir pris connaissance des informations ci-dessus, avoir obtenu les réponses à mes 
questions sur ma participation à la recherche et comprendre le but, la nature, les avantages, les 
risques et les inconvénients de cette recherche. 
 
Après réflexion et un délai raisonnable, je consens librement à prendre part à cette recherche. Je 
sais que je peux me retirer en tout temps sans préjudice et sans devoir justifier ma décision. 
 
 
Signature : ___________________________       Date : ________________________ 
 
Nom : _______________________________      Prénom : ______________________ 
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Je déclare avoir expliqué le but, la nature, les avantages, les risques et les inconvénients de l'étude 
et avoir répondu au meilleur de ma connaissance aux questions posées.   
 
 
Signature de la chercheure___________________    Date : ___________________________ 
(ou de son représentant) 
 
Nom : ________________________________    Prénom : ____________________________ 
 
 
Pour toute question relative à la recherche, ou pour vous retirer de la recherche, vous pouvez 
communiquer avec Christine Doucet, étudiante au doctorat en sociologie à l’Université de Montréal, 
au numéro de téléphone suivant : (514) 343-6111, poste 3910, ou à l’adresse courriel suivante :  
************. 
 
 
Toute plainte relative à votre participation à cette recherche peut être adressée à l’ombudsman de 
l’Université de Montréal, au numéro de téléphone (514) 343-2100 ou à l’adresse courriel 
************. (L’ombudsman accepte les appels à frais virés). 
 
Un exemplaire du formulaire de consentement signé doit être remis au participant 
 
198 
 
Appendix 5. Authorizations of co-authors and journal editor 
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Appendix 6. Table 3 (modified). Multilevel logistic regressions of the 
presence of market supplements and CRCs (Article #2) 
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Table 3 (modified). Multilevel logistic regressions of the presence of market supplements and CRCs (Article #2) 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Gender main effect only 
Intercept model β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) 
Intercept  -1.24*** 0.29 -1.17*** 0.31 -1.00*** 0.37 -0.77** 0.46 -1.26*** 0.28 -1.16*** 0.31 -0.97*** 0.38 
Academic sector on intercept              
Social science/psychology        ref  ref  ref   
Pure/applied science        0.31 1.36 0.22 1.25 0.11 1.11 
Humanities        -0.59* 0.55 -0.44+ 0.64 -0.59* 0.56 
Medicine        -0.39+ 0.68 -0.43+ 0.65 -0.65** 0.52 
Specialized medicine        1.78*** 5.93 1.75*** 5.76 1.66*** 5.25 
Nursing/education        -0.41 0.67 -0.34 0.71 -0.32 0.72 
Econ., law, computer sc.        1.88*** 6.55 1.90*** 6.69 1.85*** 6.38 
Others         -0.19 0.83 -0.21 0.81 -0.51* 0.60 
Female represent. on intercept                 
0-29%         ref    ref  ref  
30-39%         -0.53* 0.59   -0.34 0.71 -0.42 0.66 
40%+         -0.71* 0.49   -0.13 0.88 -0.44* 0.64 
Female on intercept   -0.28* 0.76 -0.33** 0.72 -0.11 0.89 -0.30 0.74 0.17 1.19 -0.44** 0.64 
Acad. sector on female               
Social science/psychology        ref  ref    
Pure/applied science        0.36 1.44 -0.09 0.91   
Humanities        -0.28 0.76 -0.32 0.73   
Medicine        -0.57 0.56 -0.71* 0.49   
Specialized medicine        0.11 1.12 -0.24 0.79   
Nursing/education        -0.02 0.98 0.02 1.02   
Econ., law, computer sc.        0.28 1.32 0.14 1.15   
Others         -1.14** 0.32 -1.34** 0.26   
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 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Gender main effect only 
Intercept model β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) β  Exp(β) 
Female represent. on female  
0-29%      ref    ref    
30-39%      -0.24 0.79   -0.45 0.64   
40%+      -0.77* 0.46   -0.82* 0.44   
Change model              
Year 0.08*** 1.08 0.08*** 1.08 0.09*** 1.09 0.09*** 1.09 0.11*** 1.11 0.11*** 1.11 0.11*** 1.11 
Associate professor      -0.20* 0.82 -0.20* 0.82 -0.23* 0.79 -0.23* 0.80 -0.24* 0.79 
Full professor    -0.27* 0.76 -0.26* 0.77 -0.28* 0.75 -0.27* 0.76 -0.29* 0.75 
Variance components                     
Between person: intercept 7.104*** 7.081*** 7.153*** 7.172*** 7.201*** 7.227*** 7.213*** 
Between units : intercept 3.370*** 3.236*** 3.261*** 2.751*** 0.668*** 0.540*** 0.561*** 
N at level 1 (within-person) 11 170 11 170 11 170 11 170 11 170 11 170 11 170 
N at level 2 (individuals) 1 882 1 882 1 882 1 882 1 882 1 882 1 882 
N at level 3 (units) 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
Estimation using full Penalized Quasi-Likelihood (PQL) with Bernoulli distribution at level-1. Parameter estimates are reported from the population-average 
model. p<,001*** p<,01** p<,05* p<,10 + 
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Appendix 7. Table 1 (modified). Hierarchical logistic regression of the 
presence of market supplements (Article #1) 
  
Table 1 (modified). Hierarchical logistic regression of the presence of market supplements (Article #1) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Family /no research 
Variables in analysis ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß 
Gender W: 11.77 p=0.001 W: 6.82  p=0.009 W:6.50 p=0.011 W: 10.20 p=0.001 W: 10.88 p=0.001 W: 12.41  p=0.000 W: 9.87 p=0.002 
Women -0.88** 0.42 -0.74** 0.48 -0.73* 0.48 -1.00** 0.37 -1.08** 0.34 -1.05*** 0.35 -0.91** 0.40 
Sector (ref.: humanities)  W: 52.34  p=0.000 W: 49.13 p=0.000 W: 44.31  p=0.000 W : 45.46 p=0.000 W: 54.91 p=0.000 W: 55.36 p=0.000 
Pure and applied science   2.63*** 13.88 2.57*** 13.08 2.82*** 16.73 2.92*** 18.48 2.41*** 11.18 2.37*** 10.72 
Social science/psychology   1.82** 6.15 1.74** 5.70 1.77** 5.88 1.83** 6.21 1.36* 3.89 1.52** 4.58 
Medicine   0.83 2.28 0..77 2.15 0.82 2.28 0.91 2.49 0.10 1.10 0.41 1.51 
Specialized medicine   3.25*** 25.73 3.14*** 23.08 3.13*** 22.76 3.27*** 26.41 2.67*** 14.49 2.65*** 14.15 
Nursing/education   1.48* 4.41 1.47* 4.34 1.33 3.80 1.46 4.30 0.98 2.65 0.98 2.67 
Other sector   1.78** 5.91 1.82** 6.14 1.81** 6.09 1.89** 6.59 1.45** 4.27 1.39* 4.02 
Frequency of research 
contracts (ref. : never) 
 W: 8.38 p=0.015 W: 6.58  p=0.037 W: 5.96 p=0.051 W: 5.72 p=0.057 W: 8.02 p=0.018  
Often or occasionally    0.82** 2.28 0.74* 2.10 0.77* 2.16 0.76* 2.14 0.84** 2.31   
Rarely   0.49 1.64 0.43 1.54 0.39 1.48 0.43 1.54 0.35 1.41   
Award of Canada 
Research Chair 
 W: 3.82 p=0.051 W: 3.68 p=0.055 W: 3.10  p=0.078 W: 2.97 p=.085   
Yes   2.07+ 7.93 2.21+ 9.10 2.05+ 7.73 2.04+ 7.68     
Research assistants  W: 0.93 p=0.335 W: 0.89 p=0.34 W: 2.926  p=0.087 W: 3.37 p=.066 W: 2.28  p=0.131  
Yes   0.25 1.28 0.25 1.28 0.48+ 1.62 0.53+ 1.70 0.40 1.49   
Post-doctoral fellows  W: 1.38 p=0.240 W: 1.58 p=0.208 W: 0.54 p=0.464 W: 0.40 p=0.526   
Yes   -0.35 0.71 -0.38 0.69 -0.25 0.78 -0.22 0.80     
Priority: improv.  of 
salary (ref.: low/not a priority) 
  W: 7.28 p=0.026 W: 7.20 p=0.027 W: 7.50 p=0.023 W: 7.62 p=0.022 W: 8.77 p=0.012 
High priority     1.03* 2.80 1.00* 2.71 1.03* 2.80 0.87* 2.38 1.09* 2.98 
Medium priority     0.53 1.71 0.42 1.53 0.43 1.54 0.27 1.31 0.57 1.77 
Seniority within rank (ref.: 
assistant prof. ) 
   W: 17.14  p=0.002 W: 18.00 p=0.001 W: 19.79 p=0.001 W: 16.19 p=0.003 
Associate prof. 6 years -       -0.28 0.76 -0.28 0.76 -0.20 0.82 -0.11* 0.90 
Associate prof.  7 years +       -0.90* 0.41 -1.01* 0.36 -0.97* 0.38 -0.89* 0.41 
Full professor 6 years -       -1.28** 0.28 -1.33** 0.27 -1.10** 0.33 -0.75* 0.47 
Full professor 7 years +       -1.48*** 0.23 -1.63*** 0.20 -1.52*** 0.22 -1.38*** 0.25 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Family /no research 
Variables in analysis ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß ß exp ß 
Age at appointment (ref.: 
under 30) 
   W: 2.35 p=0.504 W: 2.13 p=0.546   
31-35 years old       0.07 1.07 0.07 1.07     
36-40 years old       -0.40 0.67 -0.40 0.67     
41 years old +       0.19 1.21 0.14 1.16     
Nb. years of prior  
experience (ref.: None) 
   W: 2.28 p=0.516 W: 2.30  p=0.513   
1-4 years       0.69 1.99 0.68 1.97     
5-9 years       0.58 1.79 0.57 1.77     
10 years+       0.70 2.10 0.73 2.07     
Type of experience (ref.: 
teaching) 
   W:0.19  p=0.91 W:0.21  p=0.90   
Research       -0.05 0.95 -0.05 0.95     
Other       0.12 1.13 0.13 1.14     
Receipt of administrative 
stipends 
   W: 2.77  p=0.096 W: 2.82 p=0.093 W=3.13 p=0.077 W: 4.49 p=0.034 
Yes       0.61+ 1.83 0.62+ 1.85 0.60+ 1.82 0.68* 1.97 
Presence of children     W: 0.88 p=0.349  W: 2.00 p=0.157 
Yes         -0.28 0.76   0.37 1.45 
Spouse main occupation 
(ref.: univ. prof.) 
    W: 1.16 p=0.762  W: 1.86 p=0.602 
Other profes. occupation         -0.34 0.71   -0.39 0.68 
Other occupation         -0.10 0.91   -0.12 0.89 
No spouse         -0.05 0.95   -0.45 0.64 
Nagelkerke R2 0.039 0.261 0.281 0.339 0.345 0.317 0.284 
-2Log likelihood 528.290 446.217 438.452 414.132 411.512 458.003 484.89 
df 1 12 14 27 31 17 18 
 
  
 
